PREFACE

> How can a religion which affirms the incarnation of God and the resurrection of the body find it surprising that consciousness—in all senses of the word—adheres to the world and that the being of the world always seems to it the very type of being?[1]

Maurice Merleau-Ponty died early and left few disciples. However, in the past few decades there has been a reawakening of interest in the thought of this French phenomenologist perhaps too quickly set aside on the way to the wilds of post-structuralism.[2] Merleau-Ponty endeavored to provide a constructive way forward through the impasses of modern thought by way of our bodily connection to the living, social, linguistic, historical world. In this, his philosophy bears a deep resonance with some of the definitive teachings of the Christian faith and so has a largely untapped potential for helping theologians think through some of these central affirmations— from the divine creation of the world and of human beings as "good" (Gen. 1.31), to the Incarnation, the Word that became flesh and dwelt among us (Jn 1), to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Church as the incarnate body of Christ (1 Cor. 6.12), to the hope of future resurrection as inaugurated by Christ's resurrection (1 Cor. 15).

This work is the first book-length treatment of the topic of the conjunction of Merleau-Ponty and theology. The general claim is that appropriating Merleau-Ponty's thought helps one think through afresh such Christian doctrines of creation, theological anthropology, Christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. In order to display this resonance and the potential for fruitful appropriation, this work proceeds in two parts. Part One systematically lays out Merleau-Ponty's philosophical contribution, while Part Two proposes sites of interaction between Merleau-Ponty's thought and Christian theology. This proposal is structured to show a

fundamental interrelation between three "bodies" in Merleau-Ponty's thought and in Christian theology: the material as such or "nature" (the corporeal), the human body as a living body (the corporal), and the human social body (the corporate—including language and tradition). The second part is then roughly structured on the first part, against the background of Merleau-Ponty's finessed and non-reductionistic understanding of the relations between these orders of bodies.

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Merleau-Ponty, by way of introduction

1.1 Merleau-Ponty's life and writings[1]

Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born 14 March 1908 in Rochefort-sur-Mer on the west coast of France. After his father died in 1913, his family moved to Paris, where his mother raised Maurice and his sister in a devout Catholic home.[2] Later in his life, Merleau-Ponty would remark that he always wanted to be a philosopher.[3]

He attended the Lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris. The Louis-le-Grand was one of the two Lycées, or secondary schools, from which the vast majority of the students who attended École Normale Supérieure would come; thus Merleau-Ponty embarked upon what has become the standard route toward a successful career in the small world of French academic philosophy.[4] Having won through the stiff competition for a very limited number of spaces in the entering class, he attended the École Normale Supérieure (a premier institution focused on the training of future teachers and professors in France) from 1926–30.[5] He was a fellow student there with Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Jean Hyppolite. While there he studied philosophy with Cartesian and neo-Kantian Léon Brunschvicg, "the most important philosopher in France active at the time," whose positions Merleau-Ponty would later come largely to reject.[6] Merleau-Ponty likely attended Husserl's lectures at the Sorbonne in 1929 (which would be published as his *Cartesian*

Meditations—a work representative of the more idealistic Husserl about which Merleau-Ponty would be the most reticent).[7]

In 1930, Merleau-Ponty passed the *agrégation*, which qualified him to teach at lycées in philosophy. After his year of military service, he taught at the Lycée de Beauvais (1931–3) and at the Lycée de Chartres (1934–5). During this time, while he resonated with Catholic socialism (and associated himself with left-wing Catholic journals), he would eventually become estranged from the Catholic Church over its support of oppressive and violent leaders.[8] From 1935–9 Merleau-Ponty held a junior post as a lecturer at École Normale Supérieure. Roughly during this period, he had gravitated toward Hegel and Marx, attending Koyré and Kojève's enormously influential lectures on Hegel.[9] In this he was part of the generation of young philosophers turning away "from the four B's—Bergson, Blondel, Boutroux, and Brunschvicg—and discover[ing] German philosophy's three H's: Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger."[10] Also during this period, Merleau-Ponty was actively appropriating the Gestalt Psychology (*Gestaltpsychologie*) of Köhler, Koffka, Gelb, and Goldstein in order to critique what he saw to be the reductionism of behaviorist psychology. This was the subject of his first book, *The Structure of Behavior* (*La structure du comportement*), which was completed in 1938 (though not to be published until 1942) and would be his first or preliminary thesis (his *thèse complémentaire*) for the *doctorat d'état* seven years later. In 1939, he spent a week at the newly established Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium; he was one of the first visitors to use the Archives.[11] There he consulted Husserl's later unpublished papers, with the second volume of *Ideas* being especially significant. After returning to Paris, Merleau-Ponty was mobilized as an infantry officer (a second lieutenant) in the French army from 1939 and into 1940. His experience in the second world war "left indelible traces on his thinking," instilling within him with a profound sense of humanity's historical and incarnate being.[12] In the years of 1940–4, after the demobilization of the French army and during the German occupation of Paris, he taught at lycées in Paris (Carnot and Condorcet) and wrote his *Phenomenology of Perception* (*Phénoménologie de la perception*). After the war, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre (and others) founded *Les Temps modernes*, which was to become the dominant cultural journal with essays spanning philosophy, literature, art,

and politics and broadly representing perspectives of "existential phenomenology."[13]

In 1945, Merleau-Ponty published his *Phenomenology of Perception* (*Phénoménologie de la perception*)—the first French work with the word "phénoménologie" in its main title.[14] He also presented this work as his main thesis (his *thèse d'état*) for his Doctorate of Letters (*Doctorat ès lettres*).[15] After this, his career progressed quickly. From 1945 to 1948, he lectured at the University of Lyon and at École Normale Supérieure on such diverse topics as freedom in Leibniz, genetic or developmental psychology (Piaget), aesthetics, modern sociology, the body and soul (in Malebranche, Biran, and Bergson), language in general, and Saussure's structural linguistics in particular. In 1948, Merleau-Ponty was appointed Professor of Philosophy at University of Lyon.[16] In the same year, he also published a collection of essays entitled *Sense and Non-Sense* (*Sens et non-sens*) and gave a series of lively radio talks to be published later that year under the title *Causeries* or "talks" (the English translation would be titled *The World of Perception*). A year later (in 1949) he left Lyon to become the Professor of Child Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne, where he would stay until 1952. (Piaget would succeed him.) In 1952, at an unprecedented 44 years of age, Merleau-Ponty was elected to the Collège de France to be the chair in "modern philosophy." He was youngest person ever to be appointed to this chair—the most prestigious position for a French philosopher. He was a successor to figures like Henri Bergson and Etienne Gilson, who were previous chairs in philosophy (and was to be succeeded by the likes of Jean Hyppolite and Michel Foucault).[17] His inaugural lecture in January 1953 was later published as *In Praise of Philosophy* (*Éloge de la Philosophie*). With this appointment, Merleau-Ponty had, at one point or another, held positions at the three most influential educational institutions in the France of his day: the École Normale Supérieure, the Sorbonne, and the Collège de France.[18]

In the last decade of his short life, Merleau-Ponty had become increasingly interested in language and structuralism, becoming good friends with structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss.[19] In late 1952, he broke with Sartre and Beauvoir over their support of Stalin and the Soviet Union and resigned from editorial board of *Les Temps modernes*. The ideological background of this break is set forth in his 1955 book, *Adventures in Dialectic* (*Les aventures*

de la dialectique) and in his earlier *Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem* (*Humanisme et terreur, essai sur le problème communiste*) from 1947.[20] After 1956, Merleau-Ponty became something of a recluse, spending almost all of his time at home with his family or at the Collège de France.[21] In 1960, he published *Signs* (*Signes*), a collection of essays reflecting his interests in language and politics.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty died of a sudden heart attack or stroke (it is unclear which) at his desk in Paris on 3 May 1961 at the age of 53; he was survived by his wife, Suzon (a psychiatrist), and their daughter.[22] He received a Catholic burial.[23] When he died, he left a major but only partially completed work that would be published posthumously in 1964 under its working title, *The Visible and the Invisible* (*Le Visible et l'Invisible*). In the decades following his death, his work was to be marginalized in France by the advance of the more "critical" or suspicious 1960s generation of Lacan, Foucault, Barthes, Derrida, and Deleuze, with their creative retrieval of Heidegger, Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche.

1.2 Phenomenology, the factical, the life-world

For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology is a tradition of philosophy developing "in Hegel and in Kierkegaard of course, but also in Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud" into Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre.[24] But, more significantly, phenomenology is a practice of philosophy, a manner or a style, such that the most fundamental unity and "true sense" of phenomenology is not that of a philosophical tradition but something we find "in ourselves"[25]—the impossibility, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "in this world, to separate things from their way of appearing."[26] Husserl's phenomenology navigated between, on one hand, a materialism, a "psychologism and historicism" that would "reduce the life of man to a mere result of external conditions acting on him and see the philosophizing person as entirely determined from the outside" and, on the other hand, a "philosophy of mind" or a "logicism" that would assert a non-contingent access to truth, a truth not in contact with our contingent experience. Instead, as Merleau-Ponty

writes, the phenomenologist seeks "to unveil the pre-theoretical layer on which both of these idealizations find their relative justification and are gone beyond."[27]

Merleau-Ponty understands the phenomenological reduction, the entry into the philosophical mode of thought, as (quoting Eugen Fink) "'wonder' before the world."[28] Thus, the phenomenological reduction is not an idealist escape, a taking leave of the actual world to enter into a realm of eidetic forms, but is "the formula for an existential philosophy," a philosophy of our living in the world.[29] Correcting what he considers to be an overly idealistic understanding of Husserlian phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty writes that "the most important lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction"—for, in returning to the phenomena, to what is given, "we find, as a fundamental layer, a whole already pregnant with an irreducible sense."[30] What is given is not a set of disparate experiences but an always already joined together and meaningful whole, a "world." Phenomenology then seeks to make explicit, to "formulate," our experience of such a world "which precedes all thought about the world"—not to break our bond with the world but "to reveal it to us and to explicate it."[31]

In this way, Merleau-Ponty recognizes a more intimate relationship between the natural attitude (the way we normally think) and the transcendental or phenomenological attitude (the philosophical mode of critical reflection upon our experiences)—for it is our everyday involvement in the world that can draw us to philosophical reflection upon this "nonphilosophical," "preliminary," "primordial" world and our involvement in it.[32] Thus a philosophical "awareness of a world" not only "consumes and destroys our established significations"—reflecting upon the natural attitude—"but also renews and purifies them."[33] The essences, the more general forms that the phenomenological reduction reveals, are less "'exact essences' capable of an univocal determination" than "'morphological essences,' which are inexact by nature."[34] These essences, discovered through philosophical reflection, have to do with the way the world fits together—a rational elegance, a joining together, a "gearing into each other" of my own perceptions and the perceptions and perspectives of others in which sense "shines forth" at the intersections of experiences.[35] (We will get a better idea of how this works below.) In this, Merleau-Ponty's

phenomenology is intended as the kind of "genetic phenom-
enology" that Husserl mentions in his later works—less an idealism
than a meditation on how our ideas are "instituted" or "founded"
in our lived experience, in our dwelling in the world.[36]

The recognition of this life-world, the *Lebenswelt*, in phenom-
enology is the recognition "that philosophy does not possess the
truth about language and the world from the start, but is rather the
recuperation and first formulation of a Logos scattered out in our
world and our life and bound to their concrete structures."[37] The
life-world is something like a "second nature," an habitual being-
in-the-world, "a subjectivity and an intersubjectivity, a universe of
Geist."[38] It is the being-together of world and mind "before their
correlative idealizations" and as "the universal source" of these
more abstract and univocal ideas.[39] This life-world (considered
broadly) is what Merleau-Ponty calls "the world of perception"—
the world in which we live but which we rarely explicitly notice in
our natural, practical, "utilitarian" attitude. For Merleau-Ponty,
philosophy in general and phenomenology in particular are at their
best when they awaken us with wonder, not to another ideal world,
but to the world before us, the life-world, "the world in which we
live, yet which we are always prone to forget."[40]

Whereas a widespread understanding of science takes the real
world to be waves and particles and this world of perception
to be, ultimately, an illusion, phenomenology sees science as
itself arising from the world of perception, the life-world, and
ultimately unable to replace it. Even contemporary scientists,
Merleau-Ponty argues—unlike their forbears working within the
"classical paradigm" which fostered the illusion that the scientist
could penetrate "to the heart of things, to the object as it is in
itself"—recognize that physical science does not "present us with a
picture of the world which is complete, self-sufficient and somehow
closed in upon itself," but presents us with "an approximate
expression of the physical event and … allows this event to retain
its opacity."[41]

In seeing this fundamental place of the life-world, of how
"everything rests upon the insurpassable richness, the miraculous
multiplication of perceptible being," philosophy at its best "does
not hold the world supine at its feet," does not hold itself at a
height from the world,[42] but instead seeks a return to the life-world,
a return "to the site, the soil of the sensible and opened world

such as it is in our life and for our body," to take up and affirm our "factical situations."[43] Phenomenology, as such a "concrete philosophy," seeks to bring to light what is always already given.[44] As Merleau-Ponty writes:

> The world is not what I think, but what I live [*ce que je vis*]; I am open to the world, I unquestionably communicate with it, but I do not possess it, it is inexhaustible. I can never fully justify the permanent thesis of my life that 'there is a world.'[45]

As such a "will to grasp the sense of the world or of history in its nascent state," phenomenology "merges with the effort of modern thought" as found in the work of artists like Proust or Cézanne.[46] Whereas the "classical" view (often thinking of Descartes or Newton) had, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "the self-assurance of a system of thought which is unfailingly convinced of its mission both to know nature through and through and to purge its knowledge of man of all mystery," a "modern" (twentieth-century) view of the world is characterized by "difficulty and reserve."[47] This "modern view" gives priority to the world as contingent reality over any possibility or necessity and of our place within it[48] and often focuses on our ambiguous relation to our own bodies and to other persons within an unfinished world.[49] In its modern, phenomenological mode, "true philosophy," Merleau-Ponty writes, "entails learning to see the world anew," in that the world that is closest to us may seem to be something strange when compared to our common-sense notions of it.[50]

1.3 Against reductionism

For Merleau-Ponty, one of the great obstacles to coming to see the world as it is is a pervasive reductionism rooted in a classical (in Merleau-Ponty's sense) dualism. One of the consistent distinctives of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is an endeavor to escape from established dualistic ways of thinking. The primary classical dualism, exemplified in Descartes' thought, is that in everything that exists there are only two possible and mutually exclusive modes of being: either that of a thing, "the being of objects spread out in space," or

that of consciousness—*res extensa* or *res cogitans*.[51] On the basis of these two discrete domains, there have arisen two alternative reductionistic visions that would reduce one side of the dualism to the other.

Merleau-Ponty, in *Phenomenology of Perception*, names these two views empiricism and intellectualism. *Empiricism* is a naïve realism[52] with a fundamentally mechanistic view of the universe.[53] This "materialist" view makes "the 'mental' a particular sector of the real world"—"real" here meaning material objects following mechanistic laws.[54] For the empiricist (in Merleau-Ponty's sense) the physicist's atoms, empiricist reconstructions of reality on the basis of material bits, "always seem more real" than any other phenomenon.[55] The world for the empiricist is the "absolute objectivity" of "things in space"—the world "in itself" that simply acts "upon our eyes in order to make itself seen by us."[56]

While "there is no phenomenon," Merleau-Ponty writes, "that could be held up as a definitive proof against empiricism" (because "a manner of thinking that is unaware of itself and that is at home in the things cannot be refuted by describing phenomena"),[57] the empiricist's atomistic and mechanistic view has "continuously aroused obvious difficulties" in that it is unable to account for the whole of higher or complex systems.[58] To reduce the world to things in space "conceal[s] from us the 'cultural world' or the 'human world' in which almost our entire life nonetheless happens."[59] The most striking phenomenon that fails to fit easily into the empiricist framework is that of perception—what would seem to be the very foundation of empiricism. Part of the task of phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty is "the recognition that the theoretically complete, full world of the physical explanation"—the empiricist reduction of reality to things moving mechanically in space—"is not so, and that therefore it is necessary to consider as ultimate, inexplicable, and hence as a world by itself the whole of our experience of sensible being and of men."[60]

Intellectualism is an idealist perspective in which there is "a consciousness constitutive of the things."[61] With this world as sustained by thought, centered around an "absolute subjectivity," reality as we perceive it is a function of a constituting mind.[62] The problem with intellectualism is that it is difficult to see anything but the transcendental constituting consciousness; there is no given beyond what consciousness gives.[63] It then becomes a question

of how, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "the same subject is both part of the world and the principle of the world," and of where this ambiguous subject's constituting consciousness gets its content.[64]

Regarding both forms of reductionism, one must come to realize, as Merleau-Ponty notes, that one's "categories are not made for the phenomena which he himself has brought to light."[65] One needs a phenomenological conversion from reductionism—a change in the way one thinks that inverts "the relations between the clear and the obscure."[66]

In both of these overly constrictive perspectives, there is an underlying notion of objective thought, a "cleavage between the subjective and the objective" that might, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, "have been badly made."[67] Objective thought rooted in "classical" dualist thinking sets up many of the seemingly insuperable epistemological dichotomies that have vexed Western thinkers over the past several centuries: inside vs. outside, subject vs. object, thought vs. extension, clear and self-present thought vs. linguistic sign, etc.[68] Abstract objective thought views itself as taking up a perspective without a perspective, a kind of divine understanding that is without a point of view[69]—where "the scientist who perceives this system … alone ceases to have a place therein."[70] If it were not for our strange and seemingly exceptional status as the ones thinking of and presumably knowing the objective world, we would "have become parts or moments of the Great Object."[71] Such objective being is an "idealization," a constructed world that is at once based upon the lived world and yet forgets, or confusedly sees itself as replacing this lived world.[72] What is needed is a "re-examination of the notions of 'subject' and 'object'" with an eye toward "the perceived world" that "is beneath or beyond this antinomy," in order to see that, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "the relation between a thought and its object … contains neither the whole nor even the essential of our commerce with the world and that we have to situate that relation back within a more muted relationship with the world, within an initiation into the world upon which it rests and which is always already accomplished when the reflective return intervenes."[73]

This critique of a certain kind of "objective" thinking is not a criticism of science as such, but of the dogmatism of science "that thinks itself capable of absolute and complete knowledge" and thereby fails to do justice to the full breadth of human experience.[74]

The scientist who refuses to recognize any reason beyond that of the physicist's fails to see that the horizon of our experience of life and of the world is broader than "idealizing" science[75]—that a science only considers things "objectively" and "in themselves" while "excluding all the predicates that come to the things from our encounter with them."[76] In believing the myth of scientific knowledge as self-founding,[77] classical science has failed to understand its own roots in the phenomena of human experience, "has forgotten its origins and believes itself to be complete."[78] Science thus needs a kind of psychoanalysis to come to understand its own motivations and genealogy.[79] Phenomenology can function as a philosophical psychiatrist for science—or perhaps, better, a midwife that, by her recovery of "the structures of the perceived world," might aid in "the rebirth of a philosophical sense which will of course justify scientific expression of the world, but in its proper order and place in the whole of the human world" such that science that will cease to "hypostatize itself."[80]

1.4 The three orders: The physical, the living, and the mental/social

This return to the lived world "beneath the objective world," beneath the dualistic division between thought and things as two orders of existence,[81] is not to attain some ambiguous or purely equivocal state of non-differentiated awareness. Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, this move to "progressively enter into the Lebenswelt"[82] entails coming to see the world in terms of the three enmeshed, interrelated, and "founded" orders of the physical, the living, and the mental.

From early on, Merleau-Ponty writes of "three orders of significations" or "different types or levels of organization."[83] These three orders or "levels"[84]—these "three planes of signification or three forms of unity"[85]—have a verticality in the sense of a concentric "scale" in which the "higher" includes and can coexist with the "lower."[86] These are different orders in the sense that "binocular perception is not made up of two monocular perceptions surmounted; it is of another order."[87] These orders, Merleau-Ponty

insists, are not "three orders of reality or three sorts of beings"[88]—not different kinds of substances (like in Cartesian dualism)—but are rather different "leaves" of being, different senses of "body," different kinds of "corporeity."[89] Key to understanding these orders is seeing them in terms of their relations to each other. Merleau-Ponty describes the higher as "soul" in relation to the lower "body"—the higher invisible in relation to the lower visible—with life or a life as the soul of the material body and the social or mental as the soul of the living body. "Each of these degrees," Merleau-Ponty writes, "is soul with respect to the preceding one, body with respect to the following one … [T]he body is the acquired dialectical soil upon which a higher 'formation' is accomplished, and the soul is the meaning which is then established."[90]

The first order is the physical order of matter, nature, physics, and "physicochemistry."[91] This is closest to objective thinking's understanding of "the body as mass of chemical components in interaction."[92] This body is "the thing" in "its concrete physiognomy," the bodily as such—the "earth."[93]

The second order is the vital order, that of life, of "animality," of living bodies.[94] The living organism exists as "a meaningful being" with a "proper manner of dealing with the world."[95] Inasmuch as living bodies exist in a "dialectic of living being and its biological milieu," our bodies, like all living organisms, only persist as living bodies in a constant state of dynamic interaction with their environment.[96] Living beings are "configurations of macrophenomena of another level," complex and dynamic configurations of the physical, yet a dualistic mode of thinking would consign "the very notion of life," as neither thought nor thing, "to the category of confused ideas."[97] However, as Merleau-Ponty writes, the very "experience of one's own body … reveals to us an ambiguous mode of existence," the mode of living being.[98]

The third order is the human order, that of the mind, the social, of culture.[99] This is the domain of the self, of subjectivity,[100] but, as organisms always exist within an environment, so do selves exist in relation to other selves—my body is always in the context of the bodies of others and other egos in a "dialectic of [the] social subject and his group."[101] The human body as social is a "*nexus rationum* or *vinculum substantiale*," a node in a network of intersubjectivity.[102] With this social order there arises "the efficacity of ensembles that," as Merleau-Ponty writes, "have no physical

existence and that operate on man not according to their immediately sensible properties but by reason of their social configuration, within a social space and time, according to a social code, and finally as symbols rather than as causes."[103] Such social and mental "ensembles" operating in the "characteristically obscure and ambiguous" domain of language are of an "invisible" or ideal or virtual order, the order of the "logos."[104] This third order is the "place" of "the idea of a universe of thought or a universe of value."[105]

1.5 Relation between the orders

1.5.1 *Fundierung*

The relationship between these orders is a paradoxical one—a living paradox "outside of the logic and vocabulary at hand" that philosophy, in Merleau-Ponty's estimation, is to describe.[106] Such an entangled relation is to be presented and not analytically disentangled in such a way that it is rendered unintelligible—that the description fails to describe the reality.[107] While Merleau-Ponty, in his late (1959–60) course at the *Collège de France* on "Nature and Logos," uses the Husserlian term *Ineinander* to describe this relation between the orders as one of mutual "inherence"—of being "in" that which is "other"[108]—his most consistent way of describing this relation is with the term *Fundierung* (likely drawing from Husserl's third Logical Investigation).[109] *Fundierung*, which could be translated literally as "founding" or "foundation" or "funding," is Merleau-Ponty's way of talking about the "vertical"[110] relation between a higher and a lower order, a "founded" and a "founding."[111]

Fundierung is a "double relation," a "two-way relation" between orders[112] that holds together two elements: both a kind of transcendence, a difference between the orders, and a fundamental relation between them—it is a "type of surpassing that does not leave its field of origin."[113] The higher is founded upon [related] but not reducible to [transcendent] the lower; the lower is both surpassed and presupposed by the higher.[114] The unreflected (the lower) is both "a weight and a springboard for consciousness"

(as higher).[115] "From this primordial being to us," Merleau-Ponty writes, "there is no derivation;" we are not reducible to it, "nor any break," yet we are intimately related to it.[116] Between the orders, it is "a question of a 'functional opposition' which cannot be transformed into a 'substantial opposition.'"[117] A function is another order that arises from but is not reducible to a facticity.[118]

In the *Fundierung* relation, the higher order is dependent upon the lower "not merely in order to become embodied, but even in order to exist at all."[119] The higher orders are "founded on" the lower orders as a "ground" or "pedestal" such that the lower "cannot disappear without resulting in the abolition of the 'founded' elements."[120] The lower is conceived as a "vehicle" for the higher, an "infrastructure" that is "presupposed" by the higher order that it supports[121]—the higher that "lives of" the lower.[122] Thus *Fundierung* entails a kind of dependency in which the lower facticity supports the higher (but non-independent) function such that what obtains is not "a simple hierarchy founded on an addition" of another already existing reality.[123]

Nevertheless, the higher transcends or surpasses the lower, maintaining the "originality" or nonreducibility of higher orders (life or mind)—"liberat[ing] the higher from the lower" such that upon the "initial foundation of acquired and congealed existence" rests, for the human order at least, on an "open and personal existence."[124] Thus it is a mistake to think of the dependence in *Fundierung* in terms of a causal relationship; the lower is surpassed to the extent that one cannot properly (in an "empiricist" manner) "explain the higher by the lower."[125] *Fundierung* is, rather, as Gian-Carlo Rota writes, "a *primitive logical relation*, one that can in no way be reduced to simpler (let alone to any 'material') relation."[126] The lower, "the founding term," Merleau-Ponty writes, "is not primary in the empirical sense and the founded is not merely derived from it, since it is only through the founded that the founding appears."[127]

The "emergence" of the higher from the lower (life from the physical, social mind from life) is "miraculous"[128]—the higher, as something new relative to the lower, makes use of the lower "beyond all expectations," giving it a new signification, a "radical new sense."[129] In a few places, Merleau-Ponty presents *Fundierung* as synonymous with "institution"—thinking about how a new state of affairs can arise or be instituted from what came before

it.[130] The element of transcendence here is understood as a capacity for transformation, for "taking up" in a new way.[131] Mind forms and transforms the living body which forms and transforms the material; in this way mind through the body transforms, effects a "metamorphosis" of ideas into things.[132] The higher reorganizes the lower into new wholes, giving them new meanings such that, as Merleau-Ponty writes (quoting Hegel), "for life, as for the mind, there is no past which is absolutely past; 'the moments which the mind seems to have behind it are also borne in its present depths.'"[133] The mental world "is constructed on a prereflexive world, a 'logos of the aesthetic world,' the Lebenswelt."[134]

Like concentric circles, the higher both transcends the lower and includes or "integrates" or "englobes" it,[135] and the relation of each order to the higher order is something like that of the partial to the total.[136] The higher does not leave the lower behind (to make another world). It "does not surpass it without preserving it"; it "retains 'in its living depth' the initial structure."[137] In humanity, for example, "the appearance of reason and mind does not leave intact a sphere of self-enclosed instincts."[138] The higher, however, does not simply negate or fully absorb the lower—which would follow the error of "intellectualism" in seeking "to explain the lower by the higher."[139] The inclusion is not a "simple subordination" or an "overcoming" that abolishes "kinship" or relation between the orders as different.[140]

In the relation of *Fundierung*, the higher reveals the meaning of the lower as the "soul" of the "body" of the lower.[141] Using the analogy of mathematics, Merleau-Ponty observes that "formalized algebra is more meaningful than arithmetic, but in a sense it never surpasses arithmetic because it would mean nothing without arithmetic."[142] The higher reveals, or makes explicit, the lower, such that "it is only through the founded that the founding appears."[143] In this sense, the higher order can be seen as "founding" the lower by revealing its meaning.[144] While the higher order does not make sense from the perspective of the lower (life exceeds the physicochemical, the mental exceeds the biological), the higher (particularly the mental) is able to reveal the meaning or sense of the lower. There obtains then a "chiasm," a mutual entanglement in which between the higher and lower orders there is "simultaneously a taking and a being taken, the hold is held."[145] Such a relation of *Fundierung* is intended to describe a state of affairs that

is neither a dualism nor a reductionistic monism, but otherness in relation.

1.5.2 Dialectic and institution

The relation between the orders, particularly the relationship between the mental or human order and the others, is neither a univocal relation—in which there is a "literal reproduction," a mechanistic (ultimately redundant and fully reducible) re-presentation of the lower order by the higher—nor an equivocal—in which the higher is only a "distortion" of the lower.[146] The proper understanding of this relation is otherwise than such a "doctrine of contradiction," than a false either/or.[147] This relation is not a mad "binary dialectic" alternating between a "madness of activism," in which the higher is an utterly distinct creation *ex nihilo*, and a "madness of passivism," in which the higher is a transparent, complete explanation of the lower that thus ceases to exist as anything like a distinct order. "The dialectic is not binary," Merleau-Ponty writes, "because there truly are developments."[148] In thought or reflection there is both distance and relation.[149] This is a dialectic in which "the birth of reflection which as a matter of principle separates and separates only in order to grasp the unreflected" such that "to see the world itself, we must first withdraw from it."[150]

The orders are distinguished, not by "substantial difference[s]," but by degrees of integration;[151] the constitution of one level or order is based upon a prior level—as the soul of the prior (body).[152] In this way, the configuration of a given order (say an organism or mind) is not a timeless and independent essence but a "sublimation," an *Aufhebung*.[153] Merleau-Ponty envisioned phenomenology as a way of talking about the "relation between elements of the world" in terms of dialectic as "a surpassing that reassembles" and would thus be a "revision of Hegelianism."[154] The transition from one order to another is one of the *Aufhebung* or "sublimation" of past moments in present depths that "would be nothing without what leads to them."[155] Mind is a sublimation of the flesh, of the body.[156]

Merleau-Ponty describes something very much like this dialectic in terms of institution (*Stiftung*) in his lectures on "Institution in Personal and Public History" at the *Collège de France* (1954–5).

Endeavoring to present a kind of "metaphysics of history,"[157] a basic concept of what it is for something new to develop, Merleau-Ponty presents institution as a "transformation which preserves and surpasses" (like the dialectic which is "a surpassing that reassembles"),[158] a double relation in which something "is itself and beyond itself, restriction and openness."[159] Institution is a "real but relative revolution" that institutes through its transformation of preceding institutions; it is a "recentering … around a new pole."[160] Thinking particularly of human institution, of the human order, Merleau-Ponty presents institution as the establishment of a consonance, an open register, the dynamic framework of a system of references enabling meaning to occur, a "wherewithal" assumed by and making possible conceptual thought and perception—itself "neither perceived nor thought as a concept."[161] Institution takes up contingent events as a "call to follow," as an "invitation to a sequel," as "toward being a series" or a constancy.[162] Institution is based on past contingencies but "recentered," "re-created," "elaborated," gaining "a sense that surpasses them"—a proceeding from the preceding in such a way that the former cannot be reduced to or deduced from the latter.[163] This dynamic divergence or deformation is such that, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "the answer is not given with the question … The answer is truly new, but it is not so new that it creates the question."[164]

In the development of higher orders, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between "good" and "bad" dialectics. A "bad dialectic" or an "'embalmed' dialectic"[165] is one that "wishes to formulate itself once and for all, without anything left over, state itself as a doctrine, sum itself up."[166] In endeavoring to "recompose" being "by a thetic thought," this bad dialectic works to "identify" or to unite "the opposites" of univocity and equivocity (as described above), the "binary dialectic," within the "self-positing" of thought.[167] However, this kind of dialectic is simply a return to the univocal "relation" between thought and being, between the higher order and the lower orders. As Merleau-Ponty writes: "The ternary dialectic is itself madness and is reduced to the binary if one realizes the third term in one of the first two."[168]

A good dialectic, however, maintains an irreducible tension—a sense of otherness and thus ambiguity—that obtains in "a relation of being between."[169] While seeing an "indivision," a relation or communion between the orders, "the true ternary dialectic"

maintains a persisting equivocity, a sustained difference or transcendence between the lower order and the higher.[170] A good dialectic "criticizes itself and surpasses itself" and is thus "a way of deciphering the being with which we are in contact, the being in the process of manifesting itself, the situational being."[171] In *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty terms this "good dialectic" as "the hyperdialectic." The hyperdialectic is "conscious of the fact that every thesis is an idealization" and "is capable of reaching truth because it envisages without restriction the plurality of the relationships and what has been called ambiguity."[172] Such a "dialectic without synthesis" is "not therefore scepticism, vulgar relativism, or the reign of the ineffable" but a "surpassing" dialectic.[173]

1.5.3 Being between

Such an understanding of the relation between the orders of nature, life, and humanity yields a general picture of the world that is, inasmuch as it is outlining the way things are, a kind of ontology.[174] Being, for Merleau-Ponty, "what is not nothing,"[175] is "synonymous with being situated"—being together in constant exchange, a "being by porosity."[176] Against a dualist view of body and spirit as contradictory substances, we as thinking human beings partake of this "porosity" of being, seeing being "from within," and so give priority to the perceived world, the living world in which we are involved, as a basis for thought.[177] As it endeavors to think of the interrelation between the "visible" and the "invisible,"[178] such a constructive ontology needs to be a language that speaks "of the pre-language of the mute world," a language that "is open upon the things, called forth by the voices of silence."[179] As an ontology that attempts to think together "nature, life, man"[180] as "leaves of one sole Being in which we already are," that gives "glimpses of the world for someone who is of it and inhabits it in the cohesion of his life"—such an ontology entails our "complicity" with the non-world, different but *Ineinander*.[181]

An "hyperdialectical" vision of the world is one of "the interworld," a "Being of the in-between"[182]—that is, being in a system of intermundane, interdependent relations holding together in a mutual inherence (*Ineinander*[183]) of sameness and differences,

plurality and indivision, separation and union.[184] This is an holistic vision of the world in which form (as it is described in *The Structure of Behavior*) refers not to abstract universals but to "total processes whose properties are not the sum of those which the isolated parts would possess"—a dynamic and relative unity. Form as a "natural whole" is there "whenever the properties of a system are modified by every change brought about in a single one of its parts and, on the contrary, are conserved when they all change while maintaining the same relationship among themselves."[185] Form as "clusters of relations" is "the internal and dynamic unity which gives to the whole the character of an indecomposable individual."[186] The identity of a given being is tied to but not dissolvable into its relations in the midst of a broader community of beings.

2

The corporeal and the corporal

2.1 The corporeal, the physical

The first order, the physical or nature, is that of a primordial corporeality. This "corporeality in general" in which there is "neither individuation nor numerical distinction" precedes and supports the other orders—such that "from this primordial being to us, there is no derivation, nor any break."[1] This "primordial being which is not yet the subject-being nor the object-being and which in every respect baffles reflection" is the common ground between us and all other corporeal beings.[2] Considered as a bare corporeality, regarding a philosophical reconstitution of the world "as the physicist sees it," this fundamental order "stands at the horizon of our thought as a fact which there can be no question of deducing."[3]

Developing from his earlier view of nature as "a multiplicity of events external to each other and bound together by relations of causality," Merleau-Ponty's later view of nature is as "an ontological leaf … of nature-essence" that folds and founds, the *Umwelt* of *Umwelten*, the surrounding world that "englobes" us.[4] Nature or the Earth is "the arche"—the fecund resource, "the reserve from which all life, all future, all history can issue."[5] The corporeal order is the *Boden*, the ground or soil—as "fatherland," the "whence"—upon which the other orders are built and carried.[6] There is a procession "from the earth to my body and to the bodies of others—and to egos."[7]

Nature is an original productivity which "both partakes of the most ancient, and is something always new"—as *Urtrümlich* (as primal, as rooted like in soil) and *Ursprünglich* (as original, as primordial).[8] The corporeal order is an *Urstiftung*—an originary institution that is anterior, always already instituted, already sedimented, "always before the everyday and the empirical."[9] This institution, this inhuman productivity that is always already before us, is also a living present—an "existential eternity."[10] Making a distinction between a scientific understanding of nature that is itself a cultural product and the pre-vital world we encounter in perception, nature for Merleau-Ponty is the setting of our life. We are involved with it as an interlocutor.[11]

This fundamental physical order of nature is the "real" as an "imperious unity," an "insurpassable plenitude."[12] There is a "reality" or "aseity" to corporeal things as transcendent to us which "steals" things from our possession and establishes them as at once an "irrecusable presence" and a withdrawal, a "perpetual absence."[13] This reality, this natural world, is the ultimate background for our experience of the world, "the horizon of all horizons" that "ensures my experiences have a given, not a willed, unity beneath all of the ruptures of my personal and historical life."[14] Upon this horizon that is the shadow of philosophy ("which is not simply the factual absence of future light") lies the "constancy of things" (even if they are closer to "pure transitions" than static objects) in the relation between the "world of nature" and "world of mind."[15]

Instead of this "natural stratum in which the spirit is virtually buried in the concordant functioning of bodies within brute being," philosophy since Descartes has tended to make nature into "the object and pure correlate of consciousness"—an "accessory of consciousness."[16] Such a philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "leaves nature in silence" and "shuts itself in the incorporeal and for this very reason gives a fantastic image of man, spirit and history."[17] The pervasively influential Cartesian understanding of nature that lives on as the "common stock" of scientists presents nature as *naturata*, as "a pure product" composed of entirely external parts.[18] For Descartes, nature becomes the "auto-functioning" of laws[19] in which physical entities are reduced to "ensemble[s] of operations," like mathematical entities.[20] This, for Merleau-Ponty, leads to an evacuation of nature. The result is a

naturalism, a distorted empiricist view (itself a cultural object) of "nature" as "a sum of stimuli and qualities."[21] Phenomenology, on the other hand, opposes "the naturalism of science" that views nature as simply the object of thought, fully reducible to its calculations, and seeks to return to a view of nature as the hospitable homeland of life and thought.[22]

2.2 The corporal, the living

2.2.1 Organism and form

Biology, for Merleau-Ponty, is meant "to grasp that which makes a living being a living being." He concludes in his early work that the essence of life, what indeed makes a living being a living being, is "an indecomposable structure of behavior."[23] Such an understanding of life is neither atomist (empiricist) nor dualist (intellectualist). The atomistic interpretation entailed in the classical theory of the reflex "decompos[es] the excitation and the reaction into a multitude of partial processes which are external to each other in time as well as in space," effectively "setting in motion … a very large number of autonomous circuits."[24] Such a presentation of a living system as "defined by the mutual exteriority of parts and processes," by exhaustively breaking a such a system into "isolable fragments," fails to account for the way living systems actually function—from the level of the reflex to that of psychology.[25] To treat a living body as an assembly of parts is not to deal with it as living, but as dead—as "decomposed."[26] This is all to say that the second order, the order of living being, cannot be reduced to the order of isolated physical reactions in the first order without losing sight of life. Indeed, with twentieth-century discoveries of persistent complexities and ambiguities in such areas as quantum physics, Merleau-Ponty observes that "biologists remain more materialist than the physicists"[27]—though he did see some progress being made toward developing a more holistic understanding of life (drawing here from the work of *Gestalt* neurologists like Kurt Goldstein).[28]

Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty does not advocate seeing life as something separable from material processes.[29] Life is not "a power of being or a spirit" or "the manifestation of a new force."[30] There

is not, Merleau-Ponty writes, "a single 'spiritual' act that does not rest upon a bodily infrastructure."[31] The vital order does not leave the previous order behind but includes or retains the pre-vital world.[32] "The organism," Merleau-Ponty writes, "would not be a transcendent totality, any more than it would be a totality by summation."[33]

The living organism is understood by Merleau-Ponty in terms of significant organization.[34] It is in the form of the whole that one should seek "the character of the living being."[35] "The notion of form," Merleau-Ponty writes, "has value precisely because it goes beyond the atomistic conception of nerve functioning without reducing it to a diffuse and undifferentiated activity, because it rejects psychological empiricism without going to the intellectualist antithesis."[36] The form or organization of the animal body is not defined merely by the physical borders of an organism, for a living organism is in a constant state of exchange between its "interior" and the "exterior" world. The organism is "a take on the exterior world," being sensitive to some things and not to others, and so defining "a *templum* where [physical] events will have an organic signification."[37] The form of an organism is something like the "principle" that constitutes its order or organization.[38]

The meaning or organization or form of an organism cannot be revealed by reducing it to its component parts, but must be seen from the perspective of the whole. For Merleau-Ponty, it is only with the advent of the biological, with living things, that there can be meaning, a "biological meaning of behavior."[39] The workings of the nervous system in animals mediates and transforms the stimulus-response relation within the broader context of the animal and its behavior in its environment.[40]

This significant or meaningful organization is "not a simple consequence of the existence of organs or substrate," of anatomy—for each function or behavior there is not a "pre-established," underlying mechanism.[41] There is a complicity and irreducibility of "the phenomenal body"—of bodily, existential structures—to the "objective body" as an "impoverished image."[42] The organism opens up "a new dimensionality" arising "between the elements"—a macroscopic "envelopment-phenomenon" of the organism relative to its parts.[43] Life, as Merleau-Ponty states in his late lectures on nature, is "not a separable thing" but a between-being (an *Ineinander*), "another dimension," a "mode of process,"

a "fold or a singularity of physicochemistry."[44] Life as a structure is an "architectonic" whole in which "physicochemical events will play" as parts.[45] As Merleau-Ponty writes:

> The living being works only with physicochemical elements, but these subordinated forces join the unseen relations between them. We can at this moment speak of an animal. This moment is not entirely under the dependence of physicochemical conditions. The animal is like a quiet force.[46]

Merleau-Ponty often emphasizes holism when discussing the nature of living being. If the living whole is irreducible to the parts, the superior analysis is one that emphasizes "the character of a whole and its immanent law."[47] There is a distance between the "whole" of "the observable behavior" found in a life and "the anatomical-physiological hypothesis by which one tries to account" for this whole as merely "a sum of real parts," as "an automaton."[48] Between the part and the whole there is, as Merleau-Ponty describes it, a "reciprocal determination"[49]—such that without the founding parts there would, of course, be no founded whole and that the parts are dependent upon the whole inasmuch as their momentary "meaning" or function supposes "a global elaboration," "a constellation, an order, a whole, which gives its momentary meaning to each of the local excitations."[50] The parts presuppose the whole, and the whole, in turn, is founded upon its parts. Within this "reciprocal determination," then, the nature of the whole (and thus the way in which the parts depend upon the whole) holds a primary place as the form or the "character of the living being."[51] This holistic form (*Gestalt* as "form" or "shape") is the immanent law that is "emergent" in a living organism.[52] "Hegel," Merleau-Ponty writes, "already compared life to a cyclone: the cyclone is nothing other than water, but its form is not explained by water."[53] Emerging in a figure-field structure, the form of a living thing is not absolute or static, but entails motion and change of location and is more a "sketch or outline" or a "structuration" than an essence.[54] The meaning of such a living structure is "a clumsy meaning"—an ambiguous or indeterminate one—in which the model is not the reality.[55]

2.2.2 Behavior and situation

Merleau-Ponty often looks to behavior in a "biological" sense as playing a key role in his examination of the nature of the living being.[56] The living body is "the place of behavior" to the degree that "there is no difference between the organization of the body and behavior."[57] Behavior is activity that is "oriented" or entails a "sense," a directedness—be it "fixed by the species or by 'competence' for certain territories."[58] Instead of seeing atomistic and mechanical reflexes as the basis for fully explaining behavior, Merleau-Ponty sees isolated reflexes as "special case of behavior, observable under certain determined conditions."[59] The whole of behavior cannot be reduced "to a sum of real parts" but is rather "a kinetic melody" such that a change in one part of the system of behavior would modify the whole.[60] "Thus," Merleau-Ponty writes, "in spite of what mechanistic biology might suggest, the world we live in is not made up only of things and space: some of these parcels of matter, which we call living beings, proceed to trace in their environment, by the way they act or behave, their very own vision of things."[61]

The behavior of a living being always entails situation, a being situated in a world.[62] Behavior can be grasped only by "the type of thought that takes its object in its nascent state, such as it appears to him who lives it, with the atmosphere of sense by which it is enveloped."[63] In its behavior, life haunts its world.[64] There is thus a "mutual cohesion" not only between the parts of an organism (as presented in the previous section) but also between the organism and its surroundings.[65] The "world" of a living being's behavior is its "environment" or its *Umwelt* or "the world as the world of a living being"—it is that "aspect of the world in itself to which the animal addresses itself, which exists for the behavior of an animal."[66] Behavior is a pattern of activity that "gives shape" to its world—a way an organism is in a situation that defines the situation for it and so defines a situation's normality and abnormality for that organism.[67] Behavior is a "take" on the world beyond it, a relating of an organism to its milieu in "a sort of prospective activity in the organism," an orientation or "a priori of the organism" in which it is predisposed to certain meaningful relations in situations.[68] The "meaning" here is the manner in which an organism is disposed to receive and treat stimulations as

signals—as meaning something in the web of behavior of a given organism.[69] Here the living body is "not only a thing, but also a relation to an *Umwelt*," a relation to "aspects of the world cut up and organized by movements," a "hold" on the world.[70]

Organic behavior goes beyond simple anatomy as a kind of "directed activity between blind mechanism and intelligent behavior."[71] This "between" is like a habit, "a second body which is added to the natural body."[72] Such behavior establishes itself as "an institution" that orients the organism in the world and gives shape to that organism's world.[73] In behavior there is an "incorporation" of transformable form in that a living thing, as living, transforms and "restructures its world and its body."[74]

This basic understanding of behavior is not something that happens in consciousness alone but also at the most basic levels of life in which living beings "deposit a surplus of signification on the surface of objects."[75] In *The Structure of Behavior*, Merleau-Ponty describes different forms of behavior: the syncretic, the amovable, and the symbolic. Syncretic forms of behavior are the simplest (are found in invertebrates) "and always depend upon a large number of external conditions"; these are less distinguishable from their environment.[76] Amovable forms display a richer "interiority"—"a more or less rich interior signification and reference to 'situations' which are sometimes individual, sometimes abstract and sometimes essential."[77] Amovable forms entail a degree of abstraction in which "structures … are relatively independent of the materials in which they are realized."[78] (With symbolic forms of behavior we are moving into the human or social order.) Even in these lower forms of behavior, there is the sense in which behavior is life, as life is involved in a web of meaning "without this meaning being posited by thought."[79] Even human consciousness (entailing symbolic forms of behavior) is founded upon the living body and only has access to the perceived thing through "the circuit of behavior" that "closes upon" it.[80] The consciousness of the third order only thinks of the first order on the basis of the second.

Seeing all of the forms of behavior as involving a kind of meaning, Merleau-Ponty concludes that there are certain anticipations or "partial prefigurations" of the human, the social order in nature—a kind of "preculture."[81] It is because of this connection that the physiology of living bodies "cannot be completely conceptualized without borrowing from psychology."[82] It is also because

of this "preculture" that, as Merleau-Ponty writes, it is "no longer possible to maintain the sharp distinctions between 'reflex' activities and 'instinctive' or 'intelligent' activities which the classical conceptions established theoretically."[83]

3

The human I:
Body and world

3.1 The inhuman and the human:
A little more and a little less than man

The "human world" or the "anthropological" order,[1] for Merleau-Ponty, is a place of transformation in which the lower orders, "by a mutation which is never finished, change in sense and become history."[2] The "qualitative difference" that distinguishes the human order is not "the mere addition of reason to the animal (body)" but another "manner of being a body," another way in which "we are" a world.[3] The human is not just mind but "through and through mental and corporeal"—an "architectonic between its 'body' and its 'reason.'"[4] It is from this perspective that Merleau-Ponty states in his final enigmatic words of his inaugural lecture at the *Collège de France* that "to be completely a man, it is necessary to be a little more and a little less than man."[5]

To be completely human is to be a little more and a little less human. We are "less than human" in that we are living beings like other living beings. We are not disembodied minds. Rather we, like all living things, are born. But with the "event of my birth," something new arises—"a new being appears in the world"—there is the opening of "a new 'milieu,'" "a new register," "a new possibility of situations."[6] Human coming to be in the world has the two sides—simultaneously (1) to be "born of the world," as a

"solicited" and passive being of an "always already constituted" world, and (2) to be "born into the world," as an "open" and active individual in the world, "never completely constituted" by the world.[7] In the first we are "less than human"; in the second we are "more than human."

The human, for Merleau-Ponty, is based on—"installed upon"—inhuman nature.[8] The human is a "mode" of the process of living things with its "natal past" being "a fabric of preobjective, enveloping being, from which it emerges."[9] Personal existence is founded (*Fundierung*) upon the organism "without being able to reduce the organism to itself or itself to the organism."[10] Emerging from the pre-human to the human world, "man came silently into the world" (Merleau-Ponty is here citing Teilhard de Chardin's statement in *The Phenomenon of Man*)—meaning that there is a continuity, that the human is not alien to the rest of the living world.[11] Humanity's "overcoming" of animality does not abolish our "strange kinship" with it; rather humanity is "incredibly penetrated" by animality or living being more generally, as in a "lateral" union (vs. a hierarchical separation), an *Ineinander*.[12] In the human way of being in the world there is a grasping, a bringing together of one's organs, "so many natural selves" that are "on the margins of my personal life and of my own acts" and "already sided with the world"—though not "enclosed" within the "envelope" of the animal milieu.[13]

This view of the human as intimately related to the living body goes against any view of a disembodied mind as "an impartial spectator," "an interior without exterior"—a "for-itself"—set over against the body as "a thing without an interior," "one object among all others"—an "in-itself."[14] This "intellectualist" error is to make mind as a "bare-consciousness" to "depend upon itself, to separate it from the materials in which it is realized"—to see mind's only relation to the world in terms of the former constituting the latter.[15] Attempting to correct this error, Merleau-Ponty holds that the human (including mind and consciousness) is irreducibly another manner of being a body, of dwelling in an *Umwelt*.[16]

Humanity, for Merleau-Ponty, is "more than man"—more than our prosaic understandings of humanity—a "very great" and "strange" marvel, an enigma.[17] The human is not reducible to being merely another living thing, another animal; in the transition from the living to the human, there is a "metamorphosis."[18] An

"empiricist" (vs. intellectualist) perspective envisions a "mecha-nistic physiology" that would reduce and "absorb" the human into the "highly polished machine" of physico-chemical reactions.[19] Merleau-Ponty, however, argues that physico-chemical reactions have "no explicative force with regard to higher levels" and that phenomenology recognizes "that the theoretically complete, full world of the physical explanation is not so, and that therefore it is necessary to consider as ultimate, inexplicable, and hence as a world by itself the whole of our experience of sensible being and of men."[20] This stands in opposition to the empiricist "priority of the objective world" that contends for the "constancy hypothesis" that sees a "a point-by-point correspondence and a constant connection between the stimulus and the elementary perception."[21] This hypothesis cannot "make use of a single critical experiment in which it itself is not already implied" and is rather "progressively less verified as we gradually move closer to natural perception."[22]

What perception presents is the "antecedent unity" between the self and the world as a pregnant whole—with human being-in-the-world as "the miracle of a totality that surpasses what one thinks to be its conditions or its parts."[23] For an alternative, Merleau-Ponty looks to Gestalt theory which says that the most basic element is not an isolatable atom but a figure against a background—"a whole that does not reduce itself to the sum of the parts."[24] Merleau-Ponty utilizes this perspective to envision a new order as founded upon and "between" the elements of the old—a new relation between the body and the world as horizon.[25] The system "one's own body-world" is animated "with a silent and magical life" where one's "inherence in a point of view" is an expanding "field of presence" in the horizon of the world.[26] In human being-in-the-world, perspectives are "tied together" in a temporal "synthesis of perspectives"—a synthesis of fields in a field of fields.[27] With present experience there is always a presence of past experience as "an atmosphere, an horizon, or even the 'settings' that assign consciousness a temporal situation."[28]

3.2 The lived world

For Merleau-Ponty, the world, the "real," is given prior to the operations of consciousness and "every analysis."[29] The "there

is" of the world, the facticity of nature, presents the world as an "inexhaustible reservoir."[30] The real is not simply what we make of it, but is "a tightly woven fabric" that can be assertive, surprising, resistant, and stubborn.[31] The world actively "shows through and envelops us rather than being held and circumscribed by our mind"[32]—it is anterior to and present beneath our doubts and demonstrations.[33]

Phenomenology, then, should be less idealist than existentialist—not taking leave of the world into a realm of abstraction but opening our eyes to our being-in-the-world.[34] It is a momentary stepping back in order to awaken oneself to what may have been too close to see.[35] Merleau-Ponty approvingly quotes Eugen Fink's description of the phenomenological reduction as "wonder before the world."[36] The phenomenological posture is an "astonishment," a stepping back "in order to see transcendences spring forth,"[37] an allowing what is to give itself and so a "taking up" the affirmation of the world "that is made in us at each moment."[38] This posture is that of allowing the world to reveal (and reserve) itself "as strange and paradoxical," as "ungraspable."[39]

Merleau-Ponty advocates a realism that starts from a basis of truth, of relation to the world and not with doubt or the presumption of error or of illusion. It is an error to "think the true by the false, the positive by the negative"—rather "we only know that there are errors because we have truths, through which we correct the errors and recognize them as such."[40] Going back to "the working, actual body" there is a consciousness of reality as something that is other than our present experience and yet manifest in it.[41] This emphasis on the primacy of reality, of the given reality of the world, over necessity and possibility, brings a focus upon the contingency of the world—that to understand the world, we must begin with it.[42] The real is not the mere product of consciousness but is an inexhaustible source with and from which we live.[43]

This kind of emphasis on intimate relation to the real and contingent world coincides with Merleau-Ponty's attention to existence "in the modern sense of the word" as "the perpetual taking up of fact and chance by a reason that neither exists in advance of this taking up, nor without it."[44] Existence as an already-involved taking-up of the world—as "the movement through which man is in the world and involves himself in a physical and social

situation which then becomes his point of view on the world"[45]—
is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "subjectivity in the Kierkegaardian
sense," a way of being that "makes us be something" in relation
to something other than ourselves.[46] Human existence as a being-
together of freedom and nature, a being-with the real world that
both affirms and restricts freedom, is indeterminate and ambiguous
"in itself because of its fundamental structure"—not reducible to
an utterly determinate essence.[47]

The human is situated within (is "initiated into," is in a "muted
relationship with") the world and exists as "the openness upon the
world."[48] The world is a space of "dehiscence"[49]—it is "an open
and indefinite unity in which I am situated" and of which there
is always more to see.[50] This openness of the world corresponds,
for Merleau-Ponty, with the open unity of subjectivity—with the
way a self is always "set within a milieu" and bears a structural
"anchorage" within a whole.[51] The human is always in a living
space, a place of dwelling, a "habitat," and the task of the phenom-
enologist, for Merleau-Ponty, is to "return to this world prior to
knowledge"[52]—to unearth the *Lebenswelt* "beneath" the objective
world "as we lived it before our reflection began."[53] The universe
of science is thus "a second order expression" that is "constructed
upon the lived world" as a "first positivity"—the horizon of the
world that "secretly guides us in our constructions and harbors
the truth of the procedures of reflection by which we pretend to
reconstitute it."[54]

Seeing human being as intimately tied up with this lived world,
Merleau-Ponty concludes his *Phenomenology of Perception* with a
quote from Antoine de Saint-Exupéry: "Man is a knot of relations,
and relations alone count for man."[55] We are an opening toward
the world—a belonging to, a being "destined to," the world. We
live as "a primary opening onto things," onto an "already consti-
tuted world."[56] As such, the self "inheres" in the world—has a
bond, a "primordial familiarity" with the world[57] and lives from
an always tacit "absolute certainty," an "unquestioned belief in the
world [*le prejuge du monde*]."[58] With this grounding relation to the
world the self is continually being thrown toward the world in a
kind of "centrifugal movement."[59] (In this metaphor the self would
both be the center and that which is ecstatically drawn away from
itself and toward the world as that which is beyond the center.) To
be human is to be "with" the world rather than merely "beside"

it as a simple objective "outside" to one's subjective "inside."[60] In relation to the world, the human body is itself open and transformable, observing and acting—"not a relation with the system of preestablished triggers, matrix and rails of behavior"[61]—not a mirror reflecting the world but a creative "taking up" of it.

3.3 Body

3.3.1 Body and world

For Merleau-Ponty, our living body is a mediator between thought and things, a key element in understanding "the relations of consciousness and nature."[62] The body is an agent of metamorphosis, of synthesis, between ideas and things[63] such that meaning extends through the body to other things in order to make up a world.[64]

The world, for Merleau-Ponty, is that "open and indefinite unity in which I am situated."[65] One is situated in, encompassed by, an actual world[66]—an "antecedent unity," a "unity before segregation."[67] We live (like in a *Gestalt*) against a background, a horizon, that is the setting of our lives—"the permanent being within which I make all corrections to knowledge."[68] Nature as "the horizon of all horizons" encompasses the worlds that encompass us and form meaningful connections.[69]

One's existence, for Merleau-Ponty, is "inseparable from this particular body and from this particular world."[70] The world and the body "form a system"[71] such that the body is "rooted"[72] in a "situational spatiality" surrounded by a milieu.[73] The body—and consciousness through it—has a "belongingness" to, a cohesion with, an "inner communication with," the world,[74] and part of the task of phenomenology is to help explicate this bond to the world.[75]

Relative to consciousness, the body is fundamental or prior. The human is not something separate from the body but "another corporeity." One's body, for Merleau-Ponty, is "the absolute 'here'" from which "all the places of space" proceed.[76] Merleau-Ponty writes of the coexistence of body and world that the body is "geared into the world."[77] In our animal body, we are sutured

onto the "primordial world"—we are "in and toward the world."[78] In this connection and directedness there is a bodily "sense"—a located and directional meaning, a "new knot of significations," an "expressive unity" between the two.[79] Such a bodily synergy produces a "logic of the world." We approach things through our "primordial attachment" to the world "whose fundamental structures we carry with ourselves."[80] By means of the body we "live in things" as "moments" enclosed in the functioning of "the carnal unity" of our bodies.[81] By itself, the body remains incomplete, "gaping open," directed toward living in and from the world.[82] This gearing into the world, then, is a continual process in which the body is established, or rather increasingly established, in a domain—in a "march toward the real."[83] Such a process caries the hope of attaining greater clarity, an increasingly fine or precise "gearing" or connection that can help correct illusions.[84]

As Merleau-Ponty writes, "I am a body that rises up toward the world" and "plunges into" or "descends toward" the world.[85] Human life is an "exteroceptivity," an overflowing, a spreading out through the body toward the world.[86] Our bodies are moved toward the world in a "perpetual process" of both being drawn or "solicited" by the world and being impelled or "motivated" by our bodies toward the world.[87] A living body has or belongs to the world; it is bound to the world not as something foreign to it but as part of it, as dwelling in it.[88] Thus for Merleau-Ponty the phenomenon of the phantom limb (as he writes of it in *Phenomenology of Perception*) exhibits that the normal functioning of a human being is that of a bodily being toward the world in which the conscious self "continues to tend toward its world despite deficiencies or amputations and that to this extent does not *de jure* recognize them. The refusal of the deficiency is but the reverse side of our inherence in a world."[89]

The body is a vehicle for being-in-the-world. It is that through which I "go toward" the world—the "pivot" which I turn to it—thereby being engaged in certain projects within it.[90] The body is our "being between"—an "indivision" from the world—that mediates the world to us and us to it.[91] The world is of the same fabric as the body and is connected with the "intentional threads" of the body that in turn bind it to the world.[92]

The body then has a "permanence" as our means of communication with the world.[93] The lived world is not so much posited

by an observing mind as it is perceived through an enmeshed body.[94] The body is our preconscious "anchorage in a world,"[95] our means of "having" and being open to a world.[96] The body is the "*Weltlichkeit* [worldliness] of minds,"[97] that by which we "inhabit" and are situated "in the ensemble of Nature."[98] The living body "animates" and "nourishes" a world "from within"— "just as the heart is in the organism."[99] It is not a static or passive "thing" or an instrument between the self and the world, but rather more of an active living "organ" in a "synergistic system" forming a particular "congealed figure of existence," an "articulated mass" that is our bodily expression in the world.[100]

3.3.2 Pre-personal, body schema, things, desire, habit

In the body, our consciousness is always already found to be situated in the world. There is a pre-personal pre-history that my personal history takes up. This pre-history, this "pre-personal tradition," is a "communication" with, or "blind adhesion to," the world "more ancient than thought" that gives perception its sense. It is as if there were, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "another subject beneath me, for whom a world exists before I am there, and who marks out my place in that world."[101] Anthropological space is rooted to and constructed upon a natural and non-human space.[102] The body is this primordial level of our "oriented being"—our being oriented in a meaningful place in the world.[103] The human body is a pre-personal organism in "primordial contact" with the world—an "innate complex beneath the level of my personal life" that "sketches out the movement of existence" and adheres to the world.[104]

Our body is not to us merely an assemblage of pieces and parts (of things) juxtaposed in space.[105] Rather the body inhabits or "haunts" space "as a system of possible actions" or movements, as a place or a "seat of a certain praxis" defined by situated tasks, by things to be done in the world; the body is experienced as a potency, a "being-able-to."[106] This potential or imaginary body is a "diagram" or a "schema" of actual life.[107] We do not merely have a body but also have some schematic conception or consciousness of it.[108] Merleau-Ponty's term for this is a body schema (*un schema corporel*) or a "postural" schema. This is a sense of position of the

body, the body's limbs relative to itself and relative to the world, to the co-ordinates of its environment. The human body is not simply an isolated mass but is in relation to the world and has a kind of a global consciousness as an "index of being-in-the-world"—"a global, practical, and implicit notion of the relation between our body and things."[109] The body schema provides a kind of latent knowledge, a "pre-logical unity" or synthesis in which the body tacitly appropriates its given situation.[110]

The body, then, stands between being a thing and being a consciousness and is a middle order between nature and culture.[111] The body's "ambiguous mode of existence" is the "order of the in-itself that is for-itself," the entanglement of the subject and object.[112] The world of things is something we only have access to through the body by a relation not of distance and mastery but of a "vertiginous" or "overwhelming" proximity.[113] Things appear as "correlates" or "functions" of the body—as "moments" rooted in the "carnal unity" of the body—because a thing is first consti-tuted, not by understanding, but in a pre-objective manner "in the hold my body has upon it."[114] Objective thought "represses" this pre-objective "solidarity" between the body and things.[115] The body is not a stranger to things (as mind might be thought to be);[116] rather, things are "clothed in human characteristics … and conversely they dwell within us as emblems of forms of life."[117]

Desire, for Merleau-Ponty, bespeaks an orientation toward the world through the body. The corporal schema, as he puts it, has the common framework of "a libidinal structure."[118] Because of desire or love, objects or things come to exist for us. They come onto our radar as meaningful things, as things of value.[119] This affective milieu is a "living zone"—the "original world" animated by "an Eros or a Libido."[120] Through desire the body is "asking for something other than body, but asking for it by its own bodily weight," such that the desiring body opens onto an "*Umwelt* of fellow creatures"—"'pleasure' is opened onto 'reality.'"[121] Such desire or libido or sexuality is "continuously present" and "diffuse" in human life and existence in a kind of "osmosis"—an "atmos-phere" that is "coextensive with life."[122] This desiring orientation toward the world is fundamentally bodily; the body is the "I of desire."[123]

The body and its oriented activity, its behavior, have a "recip-rocal character," such that even if behavior is thought of as distinct

from the body, it should be seen as constituting a supplementary dimension or even a "second body." The body is oriented toward behavior such that it anticipates future behavior.[124] The body is not simply a thing that then engages in activities; it is itself a "spatiotemporal structure" or structured behavior, a capacity for meaningful gesture.[125] As such, the body is a pre-given, a pre-theoretical constitution; it has a density of corporeal "preconstitution."[126]

For Merleau-Ponty, this constitution of the body as behavior is closely related to habit. Habit is a modification of the body schema[127] in which the body "understands" and mediates between the body and the world.[128] In the acquisition of habit, the body both gains new significations, new meanings, and restructures its world and itself.[129] Through habit, the body has an habitual knowledge—an implicit, sedimented, latent knowledge—of the world.[130] It is as though there were two layers: the layer of the actual body and the layer of habitual body as a "secondary" or acquired "passivity."[131] The body is even itself a kind of "primordial habit"—something "between blind mechanism and intelligent behavior"—that conditions subsequent habituation.[132]

The habit-having body is a "hold" on the world; it "inhabits" the world.[133] Through habit we "dilate" our being in the world.[134] This modification of one's habitual relation to an *Umwelt*, one's moving and perceiving in a world, is one of the meanings of the human "corporal schema."[135]

3.3.3 The flesh of the world

Included in the body is a living bond with the world, with nature.[136] Trying to think of the nature of this living bond, Merleau-Ponty develops an understanding of "the flesh of the world." Since, as he writes, "my body is made of the same flesh as the world"—since the "flesh of my body is shared by the world"—there is a participation or kinship between my body and the world, an *Einfühlung*, a "feeling into."[137] There is a "preconstitution" in which the world is "virtually incorporated" into our flesh and our body "projects" us into the world.[138]

The flesh, the later Merleau-Ponty suggests, is an "ultimate notion" in that it is the "the formative medium of the object and the subject."[139] All flesh, our own and that of the world, "radiates

beyond itself"[140] as an openness, a "dehiscence," beyond itself and so then between the body and the world; flesh is an element "midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea."[141] As such, the flesh is a means of communication, of going "unto the heart of things" that is both "what one senses and what senses."[142]

Our sensations are "openings" of our flesh to the flesh of the world, "touching" the world, closing upon it.[143] The flesh of the body is a "general instrument" that puts us in contact with "the common texture of all objects," with the flesh of the world.[144] This is what it means when Merleau-Ponty says that man is a "*sensorium commune*"[145]—that body is intimate to the world, knowing more than we about it because it is attached to the world "by a natural bond" as "an object sensitive to all others, which resonates for all sounds, vibrates for all colors."[146] The flesh is the "field" through which one's body is "exposed to" the world[147]— a "television" that is at once most private and with the world.[148] Things are "an annex or prolongation" of the body, "encrusted into its flesh."[149] The world becomes our flesh as we are installed in it such that it is difficult to describe the limit between the body and the world.[150] The body, my flesh, is a "mirror phenomenon" in that simply in being itself, relating to itself, experiencing itself, in being present to itself, it is in relation to the world, to that which is other to the body.[151]

Flesh as *Empfindbarkeit*, as "sensibility," as a "sensing sensible," is "a carnal adherence the sentient to the sensed and of the sensed to the sentient."[152] From the "circle" of the touched and the touching, of the visible and the seeing, there is an opening of perception as another dimension—there is an "emergence of the flesh in life as life emerges in physicochemistry."[153] There is a cohering of many into one body/flesh that constitutes a synergic consciousness in which "each is bound to every other vision, to every other touch; it is bound in such a way as to make up with them the experience of one sole body before one sole world."[154]

3.4 Perception and perceptual faith

For Merleau-Ponty, human consciousness is perspectival; the individual subject inheres in a particular perspective.[155] We are of

such a nature that we are affected by factual situations.[156] As finite subjects we are subject to an "inherence in a point of view." In our "system of experience" we are not spectators, but rather part of an opening onto the world in that "perceptual experiences are linked together" forming an expansion of my point of view on or my "field of presence" in the world.[157] Since we are an active transcendence, an ec-stasis, moving within and toward the world, we are always moving from a particular location and orientation.[158]

The world is what we perceive, what we live.[159] It is "at the core" of the subject, and we are destined to it and inhere in it.[160] Perception then is a relation to this world—at once "the impact of the world upon me and the catch of my gestures toward it."[161]

Perception is a "basic" and "fundamental" experience.[162] It provides an instinctual, living infrastructure for intelligence (as a superstructure) such that with it we can come closer to understanding "the springing forth of reason in a world that it did not create."[163] Perception as closer to the corporal, to the living body, speaks to our "belongingness" to the world.[164]

Our pre-objective being-in-the-world is a conjunction between the mental and the living body—"the 'psychical' and the 'physiological.'"[165] We are in a perceptual field that gives us a "first model" of being, "the prepossession of a totality which is there before one knows how and why," until it becomes more articulated.[166] Our perceptual being-in-the-world is a "thick," pre-objective "perceptual bond" with the preexisting world.[167]

It is in this perspective that Merleau-Ponty sees perception as an originary faith or primordial opinion (following Husserl's *Urglaube* and *Urdoxa*) that "ties us to a world as if to our homeland."[168] Perceptual faith[169] is a tacit dwelling in, "an overall adhesion to," the world, a faith in the world that presumes a "living communication" with the world itself as the "originary field" from which our experiences arise.[170]

The understanding of "the originary faith of perception" envisions perception as oriented toward truth—"that experience, at each moment, can be coordinated with the experience of the preceding moment and with that of the following one, that my perspective can be coordinated with the perspectives of other consciousnesses—that all contradictions can be removed, that monadic and intersubjective experience is a single continuous text."[171] This is not as much faith in the sense of a conscious

decision but rather in the sense of "what is before any position."[172] In this perceptual faith one throws oneself into something not "completely justified," into "provisional thoughts"; one makes an unreserved commitment "prior to all verification."[173] In this faith we have an adherence—a tireless, "unjustifiable" or "naïve" certitude[174]—that "takes the world for granted," affirming the world in a manner otherwise than determinate knowledge.[175] Instead of an ascent from *doxa* (opinion) to *episteme* (knowledge), this is a descent from *doxa* to *Urdoxa*—to primordial opinion.[176]

This perceptual faith is "originary" in the sense that it makes our access to the world possible.[177] Primordial or originary opinion is "the foundation of all knowledge"; it is one's inherence into the world as an ambiguous frame that is in anticipation of intelligibility.[178] It is presupposed and tacitly utilized by science and scientific idealizations as "that by which" these can be thought.[179] Perceptual faith is an "initial openness" upon the world that future thought then goes back over, interrogating it; thus perceptual faith comes to engage in a process of "questioning itself about itself."[180]

As such, the originary faith of perception entails a non-thetic consciousness, a non-thematic sense that precedes thematic, thetic, objective, theoretical thought.[181] This consciousness of the "body-world" nexus is a "lived logic" that neither gives an explicit account of itself nor possesses "the full determination of its objects."[182] This is a genuine and not "lesser" sense in consciousness—the pre-reflective fund that explicit reflection presupposes.[183] This effectively, as Merleau-Ponty writes, pushes "back the limits of what has sense for us" and puts "the narrow zone of thematic sense back into the zone of non-thematic sense that embraces it."[184]

The foundation of determinate knowledge is itself indeterminate.[185] Philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty envisions it, then requires a "feeling for ambiguity"—a sense that there is a fundamental fugitivity or indetermination to things.[186] Lived experience, for Merleau-Ponty, is never fully comprehensible—it "gluts the machine for living; we do not see it fully."[187] Philosophical reflection on this fundamental and indeterminate ("bottomless") perceptual experience entails an infinite, "never completed synthesis."[188]

The perceived world that is the foundation of rationality emerges from "the recess of the body."[189] In the body, in the flesh, the perception of the world surfaces into the light of (initially and in the end irreducibly indeterminate) reason. Bodily perception

inaugurates and contributes to the process of knowledge.[190] In the end, any knowledge we have is supported by the "ground" of this prior communication with the world.[191]

3.5 The visible and the invisible

3.5.1 The chiasm

In his late work, Merleau-Ponty presents bodily, human being-in-the-world in terms of the interrelation of the visible and the invisible. This is not to set up a dualism, a pair of contradictories, but two sides in intimate intermediation.[192] The visible and the invisible are "in chiasm with" one another, manifesting a certain "reversibility."[193] In this situation of "reversibility" there are two "doublings-up": the "doubling-up" into "inside and outside" of my body and the "doubling-up" into "inside and outside" of things. The outside of my body and of things intermingle in the sensible, the visible. There are two invisible "insides": an invisible "inside" to my body (which is the domain of thought) and an invisible "inside" to things (that which transcends and yet is (at least partially) revealed in the visible).[194] The visible flesh of the world has both an interior horizon (of thought) and an exterior horizon (of things).[195] The invisibles on "this side" and on the "far side" of the visible are transcendent but related to the visible.

This chiasm is then constituted by three moments. First, there is the invisible on the other side of the visible, which is other to thought and yet given to some degree in the visible—in perception and the body, in the flesh of the world. This "invisible" is that of the world "in front of me," the exterior, the inhuman invisible. Second, there is the visible, my body "as interposed between what is in front of me and what is behind me"[196]—my flesh in the flesh of the world. (We have presented some of Merleau-Ponty's thought on these first two moments in this chapter.) Third, there is the invisible on this side of the visible, the invisible as the world of thought arising from the visible. This human invisible is an "interior" invisible "behind me."[197] (We will treat this human invisible more in the next chapter.)

3.5.2 The visible

In this chiasm, Merleau-Ponty begins with and gives a certain priority to the visible, such that "the invisible is divergence in relation to the visible."[198] The invisible is at the limit of the visible, "the opening of a dimension of the visible."[199] We have an intimacy with the visible "as close as between the sea and the strand."[200] There is a "strange adhesion" between the seer and the visible such that we possess and are "possessed by it." We are "of it"—we participate in it.[201] There is a "reciprocal insertion and intertwining" such that through the body we are "immersed in the visible."[202] The body is "the place of a kind of reflection," an *Empfindbarkeit*, a perceptibility that is at once a capacity for perceiving and being perceivable, both touching and touched, both seeing and seen.[203]

The visible, the flesh, the body is then a site for the making visible of what is invisible. "The flesh," Merleau-Ponty writes, is the "*Urpräsentierbarkeit* of the *Nichturpräsentierten* as such, the visibility of the invisible."[204] The visible is the flesh that makes fundamentally accessible that which is not presented, that which is other. The first invisible is manifest in the visible, and we come to understand the invisible from it.[205] The sensible world—the visible—is also "older" than that of thought, and the latter "has its truth only on condition that it be supported on the canonical structures of the sensible world."[206] The second invisible arises from the visible.

3.5.3 The invisible I

The invisible as the world without me—that on the other side of the visible "in front of me"—is the *Nichturpräsentierbar*.[207] The world that appears in the visible is manifest as exceeding its manifestation; it has a layer "of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence." The world, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "is in accordance with my perspective in order to be independent of me, is for me in order to be without me, and to be the world."[208] This invisible world is "given originally as *non-Urpräsentierbar*"— given as absent, as "a transcendence" on the other side of the visible, the "lining" and "depth" of the sensible.[209] The ground of

the visible, "behind" the visible, is not itself visible.[210] The visible "is pregnant with" the invisible, having within itself "an invisible inner framework," an "interior armature," which is revealed and concealed by the visible.[211]

The invisible on the other side of the visible "in front of me" is also present or presented in the visible. The world is the other side of the body—"the untouchable of touch, the invisible of vision"— such that it bears a "double belongingness" to the visible and to the invisible.[212] The visible is always presented as "further on"; it is "the *Urpräsentation* of the *Nichturpräsentierbar*," the appearance of the invisible as "the secret counterpart of the visible."[213] The visible body is "the visibility of the invisible."[214] As such the visible is the surface of an depth that reveals (and conceals) the invisible and reveals it as the depth of the visible, allowing one "to see farther than one sees."[215]

3.5.4 The invisible II

The invisible "behind me" is the "inner of what is outer," the interiority of the visible.[216] The sentient, "the invisible mind" is the "other side" of the body—the "inverse," the "obverse and reverse" of the sensible, of the visible.[217] Mind or self or spirit is the invisible world attached to the visible where it seems "that each man inhabits his own islet" (though, as we will see, this seeming opens onto a social reality).[218]

Invisible mind arises from the visible. The "Logos of language" relies upon "Logos of the natural esthetic world."[219] The soul does not descend into the body and the visible but is rather a "divergence" from the body, an "emergence of a life in its cradle."[220] The elements of the thought world—"these entities, these domains, these worlds" that "line" and "people" the soul—have been acquired "through its commerce with the visible, to which they remain attached" such that this invisible "level" or "dimension" is an "invisible of this [bodily, visible] world."[221] The human here is not a "hierarchical relation" vis-à-vis the living, animal body; rather, it is an "overcoming that does not abolish kinship."[222] The mental world is not something to be detached from the sensible and "erected into a second positivity," into an invisible and immaterial realm that has no relation to the visible and the material.[223]

There is also a manner in which the visible "borrows from," takes from, or "intersects with" the invisible world of the mind.[224] There is a "descent of the invisible into the visible," in which the visible is "informed" and "rendered visible" by the world of culture.[225] Our ideality lends to the flesh "its axes, its depth, its dimensions."[226]

Merleau-Ponty, as we will see in the next chapter, sees this human invisible as less a domain of isolated consciousness than of inter-subjectivity. The invisible is a "universe of ideas" populated with "virtual beings" of meaning: language, art, history.[227] The invisible "intelligible world" is intimately interrelated with speech, with ways of communicating and understanding the world mediated by social/corporate structures and meanings.[228]

3.6 Soul and body

3.6.1 Union and distinction

For Merleau-Ponty, the body and the mind are interwoven. While the mind or psyche is rooted in living bodies—resting "on the primary stratum of the sensible world"[229]—the mind and the body are not two disconnected orders but form one "synergetic system of which all of the functions are taken up and tied together in the general movement of being in the world."[230] There is not as much a distinct mental or rational order as there is an integrated "human order" that brings together the corporeal, the living body "into a single knowing organism."[231] As Merleau-Ponty writes, the "bodily functioning is integrated with a level which is higher than that of life and that the body has truly become a human body."[232] Against an understanding of the mental or the "spiritual" which "so isolate[s] it from human life that it is as inert as matter"—as a kind of flipside of an impoverished materialist account of the body as nothing more than chemical structure—Merleau-Ponty sees the spirit as "virtually buried in the concordant functioning of bodies."[233]

The body and mind form a reciprocal exchange—a "chiasm"— in which the mind is "the other side of the body," and, thus, the body and mind are a mind's body and a body's mind.[234] The mind

is as constituted by and constituting a body.[235] Merleau-Ponty depicts this in various ways. He writes of how the "psychical" and the "physiological" "gear into each other."[236] The spirit does not "descend into" the body "in order to organize it" but "emerges" from the body.[237]

Instead of seeing the human being as a body that is a "self-enclosed mechanism" upon which a soul acts as a "second force" from the outside—"a psyche joined to an organism"—the notions of body and soul need to be "relativized."[238] For Merleau-Ponty, the soul and body "can never be distinguished absolutely without ceasing to be,"[239] in that "man's body and 'soul' are but two aspects of his way of being in the world."[240] The human is not another substance, not an "imposition of a for-Itself on a body in-itself," but an "interbeing," another "way of being a body." [241] But, again, "the life of the human body cannot be described without it becoming a psycho-physical body"—the human body, as human, always has "a 'spiritual' side."[242] The "rigorous simultaneity" between the body and reflection, between the inner and the outer, arises when body and soul are fused "in the act," are united "at each moment in the movement of existence," such that there is a "sublimation of biological existence in personal existence."[243] With the soul, with the human body as characterized by thought, there is an openness beyond that of the merely animal body—a greater degree of interrelation that constitutes this body as "an open totality."[244]

The soul or spirit for Merleau-Ponty is "a level which is higher than that of life."[245] The soul or consciousness "spreads across" the "acquired dialectical soil" of the body and is "established" as the meaning of the body.[246] The soul or consciousness, as "a being of which there is no idea, a being we are and do not see," is the "for-itself" which "crowns a body"—an in-itself.[247] The soul is the "inside," the reverse of the body's "outside."[248] The body is the "natal space" of the soul such that, with the specifically human body, a "blending of some sort takes place" and a "spark is lit between sensing and sensible."[249] The body is a medium, a vehicle for soul and, as such, serves as the "matrix of every other existing space."[250] The self is in the flesh of the body which is in the flesh of the world—the soul as corporeal is then also "intracorporeal."[251]

3.6.2 Higher transformation

Consciousness for Merleau-Ponty is a lived structure.[252] Consciousness is a constant field, a "transcendental field," a "screen" that dialectically takes up—that at once "puts out of play" and valorizes or transforms—the biological "vital fields."[253] Intentionality entails a free selectivity regarding that to which one attends. These "spiritual" or existential structures are interrelated to bodily functions, the "bodily infrastructure," but also display a distance or freedom from them that allows both something like a free intentionality and new configuration or field of meaning that selects and puts together the events of experience in different configurations.[254] This structure does not as much "restrict my access to the world" as it provides a "means of communication with it."[255] The freedom of consciousness is to take up these givens, these "roots that it thrusts into the world," and to go further, to transform them.[256]

With the structure of consciousness, human bodies are an oriented activity or behavior that exhibit a meaningful and holistic "second body" beyond the "natural" one.[257] Human behavior is a "manner of dealing with the world," or "being in the world," in which acts relative to things in the world "symbolize" ways of behaving.[258] Consciousness has to do with the functioning of the living body in its "exteroceptivity," in its "ris[ing] up toward the world."[259] It is a primordial expression—a "little drama" in which that man is the spirit of the world perceiving what is there and remaking it it for his purposes.[260]

Mind is a higher transformation, a "taking-up." It is not new substance but new structuration, a "virtual space" that lies over "concrete space" and integrates and orients it, reorganizes it into new wholes. Mind or consciousness or the soul "retakes" or "recaptures" the corporeal existence of previous orders and uses them for a symbolic order.[261] The human body appropriates and transfigures the natural by introducing new "meaningful cores that transcend and transfigure its natural powers" and so opens itself (the human body) to new behavior.[262] Merleau-Ponty writes about this capacity for "taking up" and transforming in terms of the human being's "transcendence" or existence. Our "transcendence," our being as existing points to our capacity for making a situation "our own" by "ceaselessly transform[ing]" the life of the organism with a conditioned, limited freedom.[263]

This transcendence is a reversal, a turning "back on the world to signify it"[264] and is, as such, an ambiguous relationship, for we are embodied in and are limited by the world.[265] Mind's sublimation, the preserving and continuing the lower orders while transforming them,[266] "does not leave intact a sphere of self-inclosed instincts,"[267] but rather effects a "real" transformation—not bringing about "a new sort of being" but "a new form of unity" that is not independent of living bodies such that it appears as a new "condition of possibility."[268] The mind is "in a relationship of reciprocal exchange" with the body—"with the instruments which it uses"—in which the mind uses the "simpler activities" of the living body "to stabilize itself in durable institutions" and to express itself, "to realize itself truly as mind."[269]

Thought, the "acquired worlds" of consciousness, is "cut out of" and "sutured" onto a "primordial world"—founded on the living, "phenomenal" body that "grounds the primary sense of my experience."[270] Consciousness mingles in, is fundamentally "with," the world "which is older than intelligence."[271] Spirit, for Merleau-Ponty, is founded on, but not reducible to, matter; in this manner, we are, as he writes, the "spirit of the world."[272] Our interiority neither precedes the material human body, nor does it result from it.[273] The human is not a mind added onto a body, but "a mind with a body, a being who can only get to the truth of things because its body is, as it were, embedded in those things."[274] As such, the body "is and is not ourselves"; we are it, but it is not all there is to us.[275]

4

The human II:
The corporate (others,
language, history)

4.1 Being between: Envelopment,
openness, situation, transcendence

In Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, there is a consistent co-implication of the social, the mental and the linguistic—of "relations with others, intelligence, and language."[1] Thought is not only a reflective relationship with the self but is also always a relation to the world and to other people, and so it has "three dimensions."[2] We are "mixed up" with world and others "in an inextricable confusion."[3] We find ourselves in a world in which "intelligible speech is already instituted."[4] We are "internally" related to one another in such a way that the other person appears as "the completion of the system."[5] The corporate nature of human being, for Merleau-Ponty, is present in being-together of the "system 'self—others—world.'"[6]

While the relation of truth is a movement toward integration and openness to the world, it is also a passivity to a given instituted situation, a *Stiftung*, "composed with a lateral relation which retains it and ballasts it."[7] Perception entails then "a new sense of truth"—of truth as revelation, as *aletheia*, "as movement toward integration, openness."[8] Consciousness is a translucent between—not an alternative between "pure opacity" and "windows" but a porosity.[9]

There is a double envelopment between thought and concrete experience—a paradox of that which is without us and yet is necessarily (in as much as it appears to us) "augmented by our being."[10] Thus, "gnosis"—conceptual superstructures—is at once "founded upon" and yet "relatively independent of" one's situation in a given space, one's "praxis."[11] Situated consciousness is a passivity that is overlapped by an activity, such that "every spiritual production is a response and an appeal, a coproduction."[12] Tearing down the notion of a rational thinking separated from experience and from others, Merleau-Ponty does not see the human as an abstract "phantom" but rather as one "installed … in a language which has already done so much speaking, and in a reeling history."[13]

To move from recognizing thought's interrelation to perception to recognizing thought's being embedded in a social and linguistic milieu is to further explore the manner in which the life of consciousness is both situated and self-transcending.[14] As Merleau-Ponty writes, "the purely carnal and vital coexistence with the world and bodies" has been transformed into "a coexistence of language."[15] The life of consciousness is underpinned by an "intentional arc" that institutes a unity between our bodily senses, our culture, and our intelligence.[16] Our relation to this world is paradoxically a situation that is both "limitation and access to the universal" for consciousness—a hermeneutical circle that is the enabling condition and ultimate limit of our progress toward the truth.[17]

At the same time, consciousness exhibits a self-transcending relative to that which is other to self; I am being thrown "outside of myself" and am open to what transcends me even if such phenomena "only exist to the extent that I take them up and live them."[18] Consciousness is "turned primarily toward the world," and this develops from birth and on through childhood.[19] Here Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is a realism in which human existence is always with its other, and this existence is not to be reduced to the consciousness of existing after the manner of an idealist conception.[20] "My life," he writes, "continuously throws itself into transcendent things; it happens entirely on the outside."[21] Considering not just things but other people as well, thinking is fundamentally social, refracted through the taking up of the thought of others through speech. We transcend or "leave" ourselves "only through the world"—through perception and language as vehicles of transcendence.[22]

For Merleau-Ponty, the human is self-transcending in that it goes beyond the given, constituted, situated self in spontaneity—not being "caught in immanence."[23] What is given is "taken up" in consciousness.[24] We are never simply "molded" by the outside world but take a position relative to it.[25]

4.2 Others

Vision ceases to be solipsist only up close, when the other turns back upon me the luminous rays in which I had caught him, renders precise that corporeal adhesion of which I had a presentiment in the agile movements of his eyes, enlarges beyond measure that blind spot divined at the center of my sovereign vision, and, invading my field through all its frontiers, attracts me into the prison I had prepared for him and, as long as he is there, makes me incapable of solitude.[26]

4.2.1 Fundamental relation and communication

"Man," as Merleau-Ponty (after Antoine de Saint-Exupéry) writes, "is a knot of relations."[27] In his mind, the next step after his seminal work on perception was to explore how consciousness is related to others—to address "the problem of others."[28] Whereas, from the modern perspective of an isolated and autonomous subjectivity, the relation between self and other seems to be one of "reciprocal exclusion"—a "problem" that "appears to be insoluble"—for Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenon of others in the "living relation" of existence is "unchallengable" in that a "large number of our attitudes and behaviors are understandable only as a function of others."[29] If this is a contradiction, we "live that contradiction as the very definition of the presence of others."[30]

For Merleau-Ponty, the so-called problem of others was not just a discrete philosophical embarrassment to be dealt with, but an opening into a basic aspect of human being—our fundamental living relation to others. Through my "incarnate life's thought," in perception of the world and of the other, there is a sharing in which

"I find myself in relation with another 'myself,' who is, in principle, open to the same truths as I am, in relation to the same being that I am."[31] One's relations with the other are not secondary; life is not experienced as a solipsistic consciousness but instead "radically surpasses individualities."[32] If I "create others from my own thoughts," Merleau-Ponty writes, I also "borrow myself from others."[33] One's reflection is "taken over from preceding reflections and from a movement of existence which offers itself to me," such that with these social strata I "discover a temporality and a historicity that I am."[34] This is especially evident, Merleau-Ponty argues, in the experience of children in which other people are essential and indeed "occupy the principal position," such that "the child considers himself only as 'another other.'"[35] Even for the adult, it is the ability to "look at human beings from the outside" that "makes the mind self-critical and keeps it sane."[36]

The other is not primordially posited by a constructing consciousness but is given bodily. One is "taught" of the other by "the spontaneity of [one's] body," by a "coupling" or an "intentional transgression," "without which I would never gain the notion of the other as other."[37] It is through our bodies that one haunts and is haunted by others.[38] We draw near to the other person through the body, meeting his or her body as both "animated and animating," as "the natural face of mind."[39] We partake in a kind of anonymous existence, inhabiting many bodies: "the world and the others become our flesh."[40] My kinship to others arises in their being "variants of my corporeality."[41]

Bodily human behavior is social, always already in communication with others, living through the power of signifying and so transcending solipsistic isolation.[42] Human life, as human, is naturally articulate and communicative:[43] "man transcends himself through his body and his speech toward a new behavior, toward others, or toward his own thought."[44] We live as integrated into a "collectivity of speaking subjects" in a conversation that "envelops and inhabits" one "to the point that I cannot tell what comes from me and what from it."[45] The "communicative world" is not "a bundle of parallel consciousnesses" but a "common situation," a "community of doing."[46] Indeed, thought or consciousness as a relationship between oneself and others and the world is so deeply involved in communication (to the point of constituting consciousness's "essence") that we cannot determine "what is ours and what belongs to others."[47]

When we are not explicitly communicating with others we are in a perpetual "state of pre-communication"—in an initial community, "an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group life."[48] Our private worlds are a "divergence with respect to the world itself"—a privation relative to our more primitive being-in-common.[49] The true cogito is that one is given, that one finds oneself "already situated and engaged in a physical and social world."[50] Our primordial or latent or virtual self is not aware of itself "in its absolute difference" but caught up in a "prepersonal zone" of pre-reflective relations with others, a "naïve frequenting of the world."[51] The tacit cogito is the "fundamental truth" that "I 'belong to myself' in being in the world."[52] Though he later amends his understanding regarding this tacit cogito insofar as language ("words") is always a part of this awareness,[53] there is a basic continuity in Merleau-Ponty's recognition of our "preconscious possession of the world" including a "thickness of cultural acquisitions," the social and linguistic world of meanings.[54]

4.2.2 The body of the other and behavior

> The process of looking at human beings from the outside—that is, at other people—leads us to reassess a number of distinctions which once seemed to hold good such as that between mind and body.[55]

While we experience in cultural objects "the near presence of others under a veil of anonymity," the first and most foundational cultural object—"the one by which they all exist"—is the body of the other.[56] The other is not present as a bare consciousness, but as "an inhabitant of a body, and consequently of the world," as "immanent" in a body.[57] Likewise, the body of the other is not a cultural object as a brute thing but as a living body, a bearer of behaviors, a "symbolism," an "elaboration," another view of the world.[58] "The-Other-as-an-object," Merleau-Ponty writes, "is only an insincere modality of the other, just as absolute subjectivity is only an abstract notion of myself."[59] The body of the other is the first cultural object in that it appears as a bearer of "other and yet comprehensible ways of behaving" and makes me mindful of my co-presence in a field with them and so opens a "new dimension

of intersubjective being" through another being that "reserved the rights of another perception."[60] The world thus emerges as a common world, as a "co-perception."[61] The other's body—as an immanent transcendence, as a "given originally as absent"—intimates the "invisible world" of meaning beyond one's own thought.[62]

We discover the other's consciousness through his bodily behavior. For the infant, mind is learned as the visible behavior of others, in their ways of comporting themselves to the world, as much as it is in familiarity with oneself.[63] We see in the actions of another "themes of possible activity for my own body," for my own meaningful behavior.[64] This enables the emergence of a "system" functioning as a whole including the other's behavior and my behavior in which "instrumental usage precedes signification."[65] Thus the thought of others is "never wholly a thought for us," but rather the person as a whole, their existence, becomes possible through their body.[66] We apperceive the body of the other "as perceiving before apperceiving it as thinking."[67] We recognize in the other another corporal schema and thus an organism "inhabited by a 'psyche.'"[68] The body of the other, as "animated by all manner of intentions," is a body translucent to its soul, an "open" sensible thing; it is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, only "through his body that the other person's soul is soul in my eyes."[69] The presence of the visible body of the other inaugurates "the invisible life, the invisible community, the invisible other, the invisible culture."[70]

With the presence of the body of the other there arises a perceptual reciprocity such that even my own body becomes a body "for someone" and "my body is also made up of their corpo-reality."[71] Others are not fictions but "my twins," "flesh of my flesh"; though we have different lives, different thoughts, we share something of the world of perception "which can haunt more than one body without budging from its place."[72] In perceiving other people, our gaze does not stop at things in the world or at the other but passes through the other becoming a common perception—changing our perspective on things, adding another virtual layer.[73] In this the world "is not a world for me alone" but for others as well, constituting the "universal-lateral of the co-perception of the world."[74] In a complementarity of vision undergirded by myself and others as being inscribed in the same "order of being," we are "of," "possessed by," the visible.[75]

4.2.3 The other and the common world

Merleau-Ponty lectured on child psychology at the Sorbonne for three years before he was appointed to the *Collège de France*. During this time, he expanded on his insight that the common world of childhood is primary for human being.[76] In early childhood (before around three) one "lends" one's body and thoughts to others.[77] This can be seen in play in which children change perspectives, often exchanging roles with the parent.[78] The child is not an isolated monad but a product of and productive of a common world. Developmentally, one begins in a "dizzying proximity" that enables a later and derived separation and autonomy.[79] The perception of others is primordially present in the child's "psychogenesis,"[80] in which "ipseity" is not primary, but is linked to "situation."[81] In particular, Merleau-Ponty observes how the acquisition of language is inherently connected with one's relation to others—the child is "attracted and enthralled by the movement of dialogue around him." "The child," he writes (quoting Henri Delacroix) "bathes in language."[82]

Seeing our being-in-the-world from the perspective of such a recovering or "recapturing" of the primordial common world of the child,[83] Merleau-Ponty seeks to recover "the inter-world"—a shared world and history "in which we all participate as anonymous subjects of perception."[84] Whatever one thinks of child development, one always finds oneself situated (in the prior movement of believing) in a common world, "an intersubjective world."[85] Our common life with others is a "flywheel"—a dynamic or movement that also involves a stabilizing inertia (as a spinning wheel is more difficult to turn from side to side)—providing a "destiny and fatality" for the one caught up "in a circuit" connecting one to the world and others.[86] Our consciousness is a consciousness "with others,"[87] perceptually opening upon a common visible world such that we can "exchange our standpoints"; in such a "co-perception" there is no viewpoint "over here" without the imagined viewpoint from "over there."[88]

The focus here is on a common world that is not a discrete conscious ego but a field—an "antecedent unity," and "underlying bond" prior to segregation.[89] Merleau-Ponty describes this as a "transitivism," a lack of boundaries defining a distinct self, "the absence of a division between myself and others that is the

foundation of syncretic sociability."[90] This indistinction between self and other is a manifestation of a more primary system of "me-and-other."[91] This founding (if, for adults, usually only momentary) state is a sympathetic "investment" in others, "encompassing" them.[92]

There is a "coupling" between my body and the body of the other,[93] a tacit "global corporeal schema" that enables the perception of behavior in others.[94] There is a "circle" of the touching and the touched such that when you touch one hand with another you feel both the touching and the touched, that one can see and touch the same thing, that one can then "feel" the other body (as something like your own touching and touched body) from the inside at a distance. This communication, seeing a corporal schema that extends beyond one's own body alone, is a "telepathy" in that "to feel one's body is also to feel its aspect for the other."[95] Merleau-Ponty designates this "generality" that opens my body to other bodies as empathy (*Einfülung*) that summons within one's private life other corporealities.[96] In empathy, my union, my "compresence" with my body is extended or "prolonged" into my "compresence" with the other (through their body) such that my body is a "premonition" of the body of the other as, in turn, an "echo" of "my incarnation," of my bodily consciousness.[97] "The other," Merleau-Ponty writes, "turns back upon me the luminous rays in which I had caught him." There is a reversal in which, whereas I thought I was "catching" the other in my consciousness, I find myself "caught," attracted into and together with a common (non-solipsistic) hold or field.[98] There is a sensibility, an "anonymous visibility" that "brings to birth a ray of natural light that illuminates all flesh and not only my own."[99] In empathy's tacit "indivision" between my body and other bodies, one "divines" the (not so) private world of another's gaze in such a way that one becomes "its quasi-spectator."[100] Merleau-Ponty recognizes that this "indistinction" between oneself and the other rarely appears explicitly in adult life except in significant and intense "limiting situations" such as being in love.[101]

Merleau-Ponty regularly writes of this basic state of being-with using the language of desire, of sexual being.[102] We desire the other through the body in a manner in which it is as if the body "asks for something other than the body-thing or than its relations with itself."[103] Bodily eros draws the other toward one, making room

for the other from "within" oneself. In this "drawing" aspect, insatiable eros would appropriate what it encounters, would make the world mine.[104] There is also an aspect of eros as being drawn toward the other—that there is a "whirlwind" of the other and of language that draws me toward the other.[105] Such is an erotic reciprocity or coexistence in which "one person's world would thereby envelop the other's."[106]

In his later work, Merleau-Ponty elaborates upon this relation to the other in terms of a "thickness" of "simultaneity" that results from a chiasm or reversal.[107] This reversibility is a passage between the for-itself and the for-the-other—both taking and being taken—in which "the hold is held."[108] Both the seer and the visible other borrow from, encroach upon, intersect with one another.[109] The common world comes about from "a mediation through reversal," a seeing of something "in the eyes of others" and thus forms a unity between my world and that of others.[110] This reversal opens a field, replacing a "me-other rivalry" in which there are "positive subjectivities" with a co-functioning, with an "inaugural there is."[111]

4.3 Intercorporeity, intersubjectivity, and the social

In the transition from the corporal (regarding the living body) to the corporate (regarding the social), Merleau-Ponty sees such activities as gestures and speech as "transfiguring" the body, giving it an enigmatic nature—"secreting" a "sense"—such that the body becomes thought, becomes able to express a thought.[112] Through the significant (the signifying) use of the body, usually of the mouth and hands, the embodied person projects a "meaningful halo"—a bodily "zone of signification."[113] Through carnal relations the body gives rise to the social by revealing or generating an "autochthonous" or indigenous sense of the world.[114] Thus does the human body and the perceived world serve as a condition for the possibility of the cultural world—"of all rationality, all value"—and so deny an understanding of "essence as separated from fact, eternity from time, or philosophic thought from history."[115] The flesh passes "beyond the circle of the visible" to the invisible domain of

thought; for "the unified system of self-other," the expressive body is the substratum and speech and understanding are moments.[116] An intersubjectivity that is first intercorporeality and becomes culture through bodily communication serves as a ground or a field that can foster thought—even thought that comes to forget its intercorporeal origin.[117]

The human, the third order (beyond and upon the material and the living), lives within the social as its "transcendental field."[118] Along these lines, Merleau-Ponty investigates the "being society of a society" as the "connective tissue" between subjects (and subjects and objects).[119] Even the world of inanimate things is "visible for each 'I' under a plurality of aspects"—as under eyes other than my own at present. This social configuration of bodies in the world constitutes, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "the proper milieu of man and bring[s] about the emergence of new cycles of behavior" in relation to this layer of meaning.[120] In this kind of communal perception, the truth of things is tied to their common imposition on commonly situated subjects.[121] He goes so far as to say that human bodies without social bodies, without "a constellation of Myselves coexisting in a world," are not yet truly human bodies—that human life is irreducibly public.[122] "Nobody thinks or makes up his mind," Merleau-Ponty writes, "without already being caught up in certain relationships with others,"[123] without being in the midst of the social as a nexus of codes, ensembles of "social configurations," in the midst of a web of meanings and relations that "exists silently and as a solicitation."[124]

The social world for Merleau-Ponty is not a "collective consciousness" but an intersubjectivity, "a living relationship and tension among individuals."[125] My private existence "takes up and carries forward" a social horizon, a transcendental intersubjective horizon—not an isolated subjectivity but one "revealed" (to others and to itself) in relation.[126] This social world is "the permanent field or dimension of existence" in that we cannot cease to be situated in it.[127] Society is a complex structure of structures (linguistic, economic, kinship, etc.) of "man's co-existence with man" through a web of signification.[128] The social is not an object for us, in us or us in it, but the "social thing"—its "lived principle of cohesion"—is a symbolic system.[129]

In thinking, I participate in an intersubjective field of relations—"a background of belonging to the same world" with others.[130] Reason

is an activity (a privileged activity), and truth is an achievement (a privileged achievement) of thought which nonetheless operates in the midst of intersubjective "phenomena of expression"—of speech, of linguistic and symbolic systems.[131] The symbolic field of cultural objects, the symbolic apparatus, is a surplus of sense that is not a separate intelligible world but emergent from the intersubjective.[132] The relationship between carnal intersubjectivity and logical objectivity is one of *Fundierung*.[133] Merleau-Ponty identifies intersubjectivity as a "universe of *Geist*" in which life has an intersubjective sense—a "*Lebenswelt* logos"—that a given individual did not constitute.[134] This field of meaning is truly intersubjective and "not only a plurality of views that are incompossible and connected by their rivalry and their reciprocal destruction"; it is a sharing in the thickness of things.[135] Merleau-Ponty sees himself as following the later Husserl in understanding intersubjectivity as transcendental subjectivity[136]—not just as a collection of viewpoints but as a "primordial We," the *Ineinander* of their articulation.[137]

4.4 Language

4.4.1 Social and symbolic behavior

For Merleau-Ponty, behavior is a way of being in the world, of being in a situation that cannot be explained with a simple dualism between mind and things.[138] The actual life of human consciousness as a "manner of treating the world, of 'being-in-the-world' or of 'existing'" is shot through with sense, meaning, language.[139] Language usage, for Merleau-Ponty, can be understood as a higher form of behavior.[140] Language is acquired in a similar manner as behavior and is interrelated with behaviors such that meaning is sense as "found at the intersection of several behaviors."[141]

The distinctively human, for Merleau-Ponty, entails symbolic forms of behavior—as well as lower (syncretic and amovable) forms common to other forms of life.[142] Bodily symbolic behavior uses the activity of the body, uses its members to participate in language, in "a general system of symbols."[143] Through this "mutation or sublimation," the human, as Merleau-Ponty writes,

transforms "mobility into symbolic gesticulation and implicit expression into open expression"[144] such that the human body becomes a "symbolism" and language becomes a "second body," an "open body."[145] While animal behavior utilizes "signals," it does not use "symbols" which entail a use of symbolic form, of a "structure of structures," that grants a greater degree of flexibility, of manipulation, of improvisation, a greater generality, a greater abstraction—all of which plays a part in a greater degree of freedom.[146] Symbolic behavior is a different and higher order of behavior that is flexible—that "no longer *has* only one signification, it *is* itself signification." Such behaviors operate "by reason of their social configuration, within a social space and time, according to a social code."[147] Nonetheless, symbolic behavior as intentional uses its flexibility and generality to be "open to truth and to the proper value of things" beyond the immediate biological dictates of the animal body.[148]

Such distinctively human, symbolic behavior is inherently social. This fundamental relation to others in one's environment can be seen in the way that children acquire language. A child's imitation is not just mimicking but meaningful and intentional behavior. Seeking through the use of language "to obtain the same result as others," the child aims at the result and not simply the gesture, at a result based in "a community of goals, of objects."[149] The child is not just imitating the movement of bodies but the behavior, the intentional and meaningful acts of other people.[150] For the child, there is a profound link between language acquisition and "the family environment" such that the world is mediated to the child through others.[151] Others have a primordial priority over the self such that the child first becomes aware of these others before there is a central "I." The self is subsequently modeled after these first others; one learns to be a self from a "myself which is other."[152]

Human, symbolic behavior operates within an horizon of humanity as something prior—a social and linguistic given. We live in the "divergences or variants" in relation to this horizon.[153] The human is always determined by a preceding context in such a way that humanity can be seen as an "extensional concept" and as an "historic idea."[154] Language belongs to, is essential to, this given "horizon of horizons"—to humanity as it has come to be constituted.[155]

4.4.2 Speech and bodies

The linguistic activity or behavior of speech is intimately tied to our bodies. Speech is based on biological organs, is dependent upon "phonatory and articulatory organs."[156] Speech is comparable to bodily gesture as having a significant intention toward a goal.[157] It is through the body that there is the transition "from the mute world to the speaking world."[158] Phonemes, vocal sounds, as the "real foundations of speech," are bodily.[159] Speech as a behavior that uses this phonemic system[160] is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "a certain use of my phonatory apparatus and a certain modulation of my body as being in the world."[161] The symbolic domain, the system of speech—which is as immediately present as one's body[162]—is founded upon, presupposes, the "substratum" or "primordial institution" not of "a pure 'I'" but of "an 'I' endowed with a body," of "a more fundamental practice."[163] While speech inaugurates a "new world," it is also rooted in and emerging from always already social behavior. Children enter into language through their particular social context and its phonetic possibilities.[164]

Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty will reject perspectives which present the world of language as "secondary and derivative" relative to nature.[165] Language is founded upon the activity of the body, but it is not secondary or reducible to it. As being in speech, as fundamentally linguistic, the human person entails certain depersonalization.[166] Language is not sub-personal but trans-personal—less a prisonhouse than a teleporter—"a magic machine for transporting the 'I' into the other person's perspective."[167] The world of language enables a trans-corporeal "transcendence" that allows "oneself to be pulled down and rebuilt again by the other person before one."[168]

4.4.3 Language and intercorporeity

Language is not an order set in opposition to bodily being but rather is involved in corporeal life, modifying it as a way for the human body "to celebrate the world and to finally live it."[169] The nonthetic ground of language is a tacit language or linguisticity in bodily behavior. The movements of the eye and of the hand are "already" a "tacit language" inasmuch as they are an interrogation

of and response to the world in the world.[170] Language taken in its full incarnate activity—"total language" (as including but not limited to logical language) or "total speech" or "metaobjective language"—is inherent to our bodily being in the world.[171]

The domain of language is not an ideal realm, but arises from intercorporeal activity as something like a habit, a second body, a body as a "symbolism." It is less an "exercise of pure intelligence" than learning a structure of behaving.[172] It is a "superstructure"— "a phenomenon that is already a witness to another order." It is something "nonbiological" that presupposes a "quasi-biological" movement.[173]

As a quasi-corporeality, language is founded on the body but transforms it through the "sedimenting" of a second nature such that there is a "quasi-natural life" of language.[174] Language, as Merleau-Ponty writes, goes "back dialectically over what preceded it and transform[s] the purely carnal and vital coexistence with the world and bodies into a coexistence of language."[175] As consciousness is immanent to and yet transcending bodily parts, so also is linguistic meaning immanent to and yet transcending bodily signs—a whole greater than the sum of the parts.[176]

Linguistic activity in expression and communication entails a bodily power of transcending the body—of becoming transcorporeal and intercorporeal.[177] Language is a social activity, a "game," that participates in corporeal intentionality—a way for bodies to use their bodies to refer beyond bodies.[178] Speech, like bodies, is a mediator of relation, a bearer of an incarnate logic.[179] Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes:[180]

> As my body (which nevertheless is only a bit of matter) is gathered up into gestures which aim beyond it, so the words of language (which considered singly are only inert signs that only a vague or banal idea corresponds to) suddenly swell with a meaning which overflows into the other person when the act of speaking binds them up into a single whole.

4.4.4 Language and thought

Through language, through communication as founding ideality, there is another "side" of the logos of the world that is open to

human beings.[181] This logos of language relies upon a logos of the natural, sensible world; the former is a "resumption" of the latter "in an other architectonic."[182] Language does not harbor "the secret of the being of the world" but is a development on the reverse side of visible being; it is itself "a world and a being to the second power."[183] Language opens up an *Umwelt* beyond those of biological behavior.[184] Language "superimposes" upon the natural world—"the world according to man"—and so attests to other relations than what is "commonly" thought to be in the world of nature.[185]

For Merleau-Ponty, spirit, mind, or consciousness is distinct from but interdependent upon language as constituted thought.[186] "The spirit," Merleau-Ponty writes, "becomes dependent upon the linguistic organism which it has created, into which it continues to breathe life."[187] Language or speech is the nest and the access to the invisible as bodily perception is to the visible.[188] Thought and language put out branches into each other, yielding "thinking language and speaking thought." Language is "our element" as water is for fish, in that, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "words have power to arouse thoughts and implant henceforth inalienable dimensions of thought." In other words, thought is both ignited by and incarnate in language.[189]

Throughout his work, Merleau-Ponty sees an analogy between language and corporeality—more precisely, between the relation the body has to consciousness and the relation language has to thought (roughly, language:thought::body:consciousness).[190] As he writes: "Thought inhabits language and language is its body."[191] The phenomenon of consciousness is described as an "invisible lining" that "animates only by closely wedding" one's body and one's language.[192] Speech or language does not presuppose pure, pre-existing thought; language enables, helps to accomplish, thought's operation.[193] While thought is not reducible to linguistic significations, "thought and expression" are "constituted simultaneously." There is no pure thought, and language is "never the mere clothing of a thought which otherwise possesses itself in full clarity."[194] Thought is always incarnate in some concrete historical particularity. Yet it is through these concrete languages that human beings "speak and think and see."[195] Language is a way of being in the world—we perceive and interact with the world through it.[196]

For Merleau-Ponty, there is no subordination between intended meaning and language—"language is not meaning's servant, and yet

it does not govern meaning."[197] As the body "immediately signifies" to consciousness, so is meaning present in language. Meaning is not removable—it is "never contained in" language, and "every attempt to close our hand on the thought which dwells in the spoken word leav[es] only a bit of verbal material in our fingers."[198] Language "has as much influence on thought as the inverse" such that mind that possesses itself only by losing itself in language.[199] Meaningful words (or linguistic thoughts) arouse not pure thoughts but other meaningful words; this is why it is so difficult to found lived language from our end upon pure abstract thought.[200]

There is, for Merleau-Ponty, no pre-language thought. Expression is not a "second-order operation" that we only use to communicate our thoughts to others; we think through linguistic "expression."[201] One does not as much speak of one's thoughts, one speaks them.[202] This is against the ideal of a pure logical language "which in the last analysis would deliver us from language."[203] Prior to the objectivization of language, there is not a transcendental subject but a practice in a situation.[204] Against a dualist perspective that would see language as a kind of matter and thought a kind of immaterial spirit, Merleau-Ponty views a living "between" of language and thought as "two moments of one and the same reality"—such that there are no words without thought and no thought without words.[205] There is no language before language (language's mythic origin) that is not itself another language.[206] The "tacit cogito" must have words, must be a "language cogito,"[207] must be invested in sedimented language, in a stock of significations.[208]

Our common experience, however, is of thought as a figure (in the foreground) and not of language as a background. Language hides, effaces itself, such that only meaning remains. Words do not just lead to more words; words take us beyond words.[209] There is a fire of meaning, a force running through and connecting to my past experiences such that a book as an "infernal machine" that takes possession of a reader.[210] Thinking with and through words, we largely no longer think of words. Language makes itself be forgotten as if it had not existed[211]—it cannot itself be observed or grasped.[212] The peculiarity of language, as not separable from thought, is that it is "the more evident the more we surrender ourselves to it, and the less equivocal the less we think of it."[213]

Speech connects invisible and visible, is the dwelling of the invisible in the visible, in the audible through the "sonorous

inscription" in "the movements of phonation and of hearing."[214] Thought transcends itself in speech toward an interrelation to others and their thought; speech is the visible and public presence of the invisible.[215] Merleau-Ponty writes: "Thought and speech anticipate one another. They continually take one another's place. They are way-points, stimuli for one another."[216] There is a reversibility like that obtaining between seeing and the visible that is operative between speech and what speech signifies.[217] As speech is never done, so thought is never fully expressed in it; thought dwells in the fluidity, ambiguity, and incompletion of lived language.[218]

Speech is a fold in the background of the "immense fabric" of language.[219] Merleau-Ponty's understanding of language stands against a certain devaluing of language inherited from the Cartesian tradition that would view language as extrinsic to consciousness like a thing, at most an "accouterment" of thought that "owes nothing to the word."[220] As Merleau-Ponty points out however, language is resistant to being treated as a thing; it is neither a mind nor a thing, and is thus both immanent and transcendent.[221] Neither an intellectualist-idealist nor an empirical-mechanistic perspective can account for the status of living language.[222] Language exhibits a fluidity and a holism (a systematicity) such that linguistic meaning should be seen as "an element of a total configuration," as an aspect of culture.[223] Language functions in union with, in relation to, a living community that enables communication.[224] As including various "latent and incubating changes," the whole or system of language is not ready-made but is ever in the process of being made and is thus never complete.[225]

Such a provisional living language is not a means, not a cipher of some original pre-language language that is already complete. It is rather just this developing language that is "something like a universe" in which our thought moves (and would not otherwise?).[226] Thought does not use language as something extrinsic and incidental; it lives in it and through it. It is "constitutive of consciousness"—"a world and a being to the second power."[227] Language and thought are too intimately interwoven for language to be seen as a code that simply intervenes as a delivery system for (language-free) thought between minds. "The code," Merleau-Ponty writes, "is no more a language than is the automaton a life."[228] Language is rather an extension of activity. The meaning in language is less a function of the "I think" than it

is of the "I am able to."[229] It is not simply a replication of thought through language (or even of language in thought) but is a new mode of behavior that is founded and yet transforming, thus allowing novelty.[230] The novelty of thought in language, of living speech as animating the structure of language, is a mutation, a "coherent deformation," in which its consequences "always exceed its premises."[231] In describing the fluid structure of language, Merleau-Ponty writes of it as a style, a preconceptual generality, a texture that is felt, elaborated, modified[232]—something "defined neither by words nor by ideas" but by "oblique" and indirect signification.[233] In speaking, in being linguistic beings, we are "resuming a common effort more ancient than we"—resuming a "discourse already under way."[234] Speech always happens within a prior institution, living through and into it, not reducible to it but transforming and expanding it.[235]

4.4.5 Language and communication

While language usage is a free activity and expression of the individual, it is also irreducibly communal or social, connected to the speaking community.[236] Language is a manifestation of human intersubjectivity, and speaking is being involved in a "speaking community" such that when children learn to speak they are learning to negotiate intersubjective structures and values.[237] Language as fostering intercorporeal communication is involved in a not merely intellectual but also vital operation as a "means of effecting reciprocity with the other"—of "enter[ing] into communication with others."[238] Against a certain dualism, a living language entails "a conception of historical meaning" and is so a "togetherness of thinking and thing," of conscious activity and the passivity of language as a given artifact.[239] Language, as Merleau-Ponty writes, has "as much influence on thought as the inverse."[240] Our situated thought responds to the call of the thoughts of likewise situated others,[241] and the use of language is a "gesture of renewal and recovery which unites me with myself and others."[242] Learning to speak is learning to coexist in a given social environment—less a decoding where one knows the code than a creative operation, a deciphering in which one does not have a fully determinate key.[243]

Universality, a "concrete universality," is possible by passing through different particular languages and styles, not by escaping

from them altogether.[244] Our awareness of truth is not separable from language as its vehicle. Language thus enables and does not impede thought.[245] Mute experience—the *Vor-sprache*, the "other side" of language—calls for expression in a language that then in turn constitutes "a universe of the nameable."[246] There is a "transcendence of signification," a going beyond the givens of language, in which language refers beyond itself.[247] Speech as a gesture "suppresses itself as such" and goes beyond itself.[248]

Language as a cultural object plays "an essential role" in our relation to others. Through its assistance, my thought and that of the other's form a "single fabric"—a collaborative, reciprocal life—such that "I exist through language in a relationship with others."[249] Language "prolongs and transforms the silent relation," the intercorporeal relationship, with the other.[250] Through language as understood as "a totality of instruments for our relationships with people"—through being in the same cultural or linguistic world, participating in the same given institutions—we can "encroach upon" each other and share a common world.[251] Language—the "coupling" of language, encountering the other through their linguistic incarnations—enables a deeper common, intersubjective being.[252]

4.5 Culture

4.5.1 Meaning and institution

Merleau-Ponty describes the fact that thought and things are "unceasingly" related—that "sense and existence are one"—as the "marvel" or "miracle" of the real world.[253] The sense that is born in nature is reborn in knowledge.[254] The world is not just a screen upon which we project our subjective meanings; it is itself "the cradle of significations" and "the homeland of all rationality."[255] Meaning arises from the perceived world—our experiences "contain points of catch," of ready purchase, that are hospitable to meanings and ideas.[256] Meaning in language goes beyond the elements composing it by means of the elements composing it—and opens onto the world beyond any isolated singularity.[257]

Meaning—"neither a thing nor an idea"—is entailed in behavior, immanent to "living speech."[258] Meaning has to do with the

manner in which spirit emerges from bodies through behavior.[259] The space (implying interrelation) of meaning is "a social, cultural, or symbolic space which is no less real than physical space" and yet supported by the physical.[260] The universe of meaning, being not merely abstract, happens within a cultural situation as a "systematic deformation" of that situation.[261]

As arising in a particular situation, meaning is never rendered as a totality; meaning is never completely expressed.[262] Meaning, for Merleau-Ponty, is necessarily incomplete due to the inexhaustibility of things, that they are never completely given. There is always an excess, an "air of eternity," that makes the world not utterly inexpressible but inexhaustible, infinitely expressible.[263] Meaning emanates from the fullness of the world as a plurivocal "halo of signification."[264] Meaning is the invisible "secret counterpart of the visible,"[265] and the visible, perceived world is in turn "pregnant" with invisible "nuclei of meaning."[266]

This marvel characterizes not only the relation between the individual mind and the world but moreover coheres with the mystery of communication—that we join not just the world but each other in the world.[267] It is a marvel that, as Merleau-Ponty writes, I "can count on what I see which is in close correspondence with what the other sees (everything attests to this, in fact: we really do see the same thing and the thing itself)."[268] Social being for Merleau-Ponty is not mediated (in the sense of being interrupted) by signs, but is a sharing of a history (time) and a communicating in a world (space) together—a way of being together.[269] Meaningful signs, as the jointing and framing of being, operate through humans, making an intelligible home for us.[270]

Reason for Merleau-Ponty is social. The "fully realized object" is that seen by an infinity of gazes—the ideal "god's eye view" is not without a perspective but has a sense of a fully plural perspective, a communal perception in which we perceive and think of something as seen by a plurality.[271] In communication we do not merely express our private thoughts, but we think through others, having our thoughts reflected in others—we have "a power of thinking according to others, which enriches our own thoughts."[272] The "natural light" of reason, its universality, is to be found "in the dialogue into which our experience of other people throws us by means of a movement not all of whose sources are known to us."[273] Our perceptual faith emerges into "explicit truth" "as we

encounter it on the level of language, concept, and the cultural world."[274] Reason is to be found not as much in an absolute other world or within ourselves but in the world of our bodily perception and among others. The humanity of thought is essentially social.[275]

Meaning arises within human institution, which is not to be seen as over against the natural or the innate, because there is no "pure" innate, no "pure" nature when it comes to living things.[276] Human institution transforms the physical, the organic, and the animal by *Aufhebung*—a transformation which preserves and surpasses.[277] It is different from animal institutions due to its flexibility in transforming institutions through a symbolic matrix.[278] Merleau-Ponty sees in this understanding of human institution—as taking up the "past" (prior human, biological, physical institutions) in a symbolic matrix—a "revision of Hegelianism" that emphasizes "the living, real and original relation between the elements of the world."[279] This human layer of institution results in "the openness of a field," in a public, realist (versus a solipsist, idealist) understanding of meaning and thought that allows for "the possibility of a common adventure and of a history as consciousness."[280] Human institution is shared, existing between others and myself, such that it can be "taken up" by oneself or another as "the consequence and the guarantee of our belonging to one selfsame world."[281] In this shared institution (as opposed to a Husserlian "constitution" of a more idealist tint), the other is not just a reflection of the activity of the self, constituted from a given consciousness.[282] Institution instead places (or rather recognizes the presence of) the subject within "a field of presence and its relation to the world, to others, to doing"—within a common world that "makes sense without me"—whereas constitution "makes sense only for me and for the 'me' of this instant."[283] In institution the self can invest in the common world a meaning "which is transcendent to him"—that one shares as something real and public—"as a meaning dwells in the book and the cultural object."[284]

There is a historicity to thought, a circulation between the past and the present such that the past can frame and give rise to shared possibilities.[285] "The past," Merleau-Ponty writes, "takes on the outline of a preparation or premeditation of a present that exceeds it in meaning although it recognizes itself in it."[286] We are not the little creators of the worlds of our experiences, not "constantly conferring meaning upon things." Rather, we

are sharing in, dwelling in the midst of, living from instituted meanings—continuing "a vortex of experience which was set up at our birth."[287] The past sets up a situation, a between, that does not, however, determine a future, but is a question, is "indefinitely open."[288] The work of consciousness is not a creation *ex nihilo* but a building upon or changing of what is given from the past. The relatively novel work of the present in working upon the past then becomes the past effecting a circulation between past and present.[289] "Therefore," Merleau-Ponty writes, "at once the human [is] more connected to his past than the animal and is more open to the future."[290] The present resumes a prior institution, a prior "segment of history," but takes it up differently, exhibiting a growth that entails both inheritance and originality.[291] A relatively novel insight is not as much a "pure event" as a change of structure, of situation in which the present institution "condenses and opens up a future."[292] Human temporality is a symbolic real of cumulative history that makes up the institution of culture. It is not simply an imprint of the past but a "fruitful imprint."[293]

4.5.2 The human world, the invisible world

The human world is different from (while related to) the animal *Umwelt* in that the human body is not a "fusion" with the Umwelt, "with the system of preestablished triggers, matrix and rails of behavior" as that of an animal is.[294] The order of mind or spirit is natural to humans.[295] We inhabit both a natural world and an historical world made of "human traces."[296] In trying to think of the nature of human being, Merleau-Ponty sees humanity, the world, and language as interwoven—"given in one package"— in a relational unity.[297] The human world as founded cultural life (*Kulturwelt*—the "world of culture") is "the *homeland* of our thoughts."[298] Through bodily behavior the natural world is invested with signification; the world "outside" is sedimented with social meaning and comes to have "an anonymous existence." Thus, through language, thought takes up a position in the world of significations, the "mental" or cultural life that "borrows its structures from natural life."[299]

This "world of significations" is a virtual, ideal, cultural, imaginary space—an invisible world of what the later Husserl

would call "idealizations."[300] There is an ideality that emerges in language as a "hinge of the connection between me and others" that is realized and effective in the midst of this social "interweaving" and joining.[301] The human invisible is the order of language, art, history. It is an "abstract," "virtual" or human space arising from but then superimposed over and integrating concrete space. It is a "noncorporeity," a "new landscape" comprised by configurations of "ideal, correlative, virtual beings."[302] This invisible social "second life" of culture then comes to inform, to impinge upon, perception—to "impregnate all the things we see," to manifest its invisible life in the visible.[303]

This capacity for ideal intersubjectivity—the "halo of generality" in the "atmosphere of 'sociality'"—lies, for Merleau-Ponty, at the heart of the human.[304] The social world is an "irreality" in which "we are *Ineinander*," inhabiting and intending a human "singularity across the thickness of our lives."[305] This "invisible" living and imaginary or ideal existence lives in (as?) transformations of concrete life through culture; it does not suppress "our ties to time and space."[306] The ideal existence of the human, cultural world is "based upon the document," in that the document—the visible "ruins of the spirit," the "fragile facade that carries everything"[307]—is a public thing that brings together knowing lives "and as such establishes and re-establishes a 'Logos' of the cultural world."[308] This ideality of the cultural world operating and effective in the concrete artifacts of experience opens up the possible future of a thought for others, a generality no longer necessarily mine.[309] Through the concrete ideality of the *Kulturwelt* (a cultural horizon, an inter-human world) there is an order joining others to each other[310]—"the invisible hinge upon which my life and the life of the others turn to rock into one another."[311] The incarnate culture—a sedimentation, a naturalization, a circumscription of the invisible in the visible for those who share in the culture[312]—provides for a "second life" of ideas such that "ideas that are too much possessed are no longer ideas."[313]

4.5.3 Culture

In culture, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "life becomes ideas and the ideas return to life."[314] Culture, custom, or convention is "a

universe of *Geist*" … but a worldly *Geist*—as social spirit of inter-relation, an *Ineinander*. Such a second nature is a "transfiguration of Nature" that has a "second life," which is not ghostly, but rather has "solidity and completeness" in a bodily (intercorporeal) and social (intersubjective) life-world (*Lebenswelt*).[315] The cultural world is "a thought that resides in the exterior," where humanity's spontaneous acts "become sedimented on the outside and thereby lead an anonymous existence as things," thus adding another layer (an ideal or cultural layer) upon the perceived world.[316] In cultural objects, behaviors have descended or been deposited into nature; the human world has habituated things, has given them a second nature.[317] In short, culture inhabits things.

Relative to human consciousness, culture envelopes an individual life.[318] Culture mediates consciousness to itself such that it never completely possesses itself, and meaning is never complete, never absolutely transparent.[319] Culture saturates the human order, and one does not have thoughts without it. In places, Merleau-Ponty tries to drive this point home hyperbolically by declaring that one only discovers in one's life what one's culture has taught one to find there.[320] Culture inhabits consciousness.

Through culture, we dwell with others, as one dwells in space through "the thick and living presence of my body." Through the external objects of culture, one comes to dwell in another living space.[321] Through social behaviors (such as speech) the instituted sedimentation of culture that gives behaviors a common background (such as the cultural instruments of language) allows one to "think farther"—to be members of a common world, members of a social body.[322] Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of spirit is a philosophy of culture.[323] The symbolic world that is "proper to humanity" is the *geistlich* world of culture instead of a ghostly intelligible world.[324] Cultural "apparatuses of knowledge (words, books, works)" open a field in which there can be building and progress, a historicity, a becoming of "spiritual being."[325] The cultural world is a projection of the body, a cybernetic instrument of our bodily being in the world, just as the cane of a blind man becomes an extension of his body, his perception, his consciousness.[326] Culture is a part of the world of perception such that a renewed awareness of the world of perception is not an escape from culture but "a way of looking at works of art, language and culture, which respects their autonomy and their original richness."[327] There is an enabling

continuity of openness from perception to culture such that art as a cultural project can help reveal the world of perception.[328] Art can thrust us not away into another realm apart from our living bodies and their world but deeper "into the presence of the world of lived experience."[329] The dreams of culture can stir us to wakeful attention to the real world of our experience.

4.6 History

History is other people.[330]

4.6.1 The presence of the past

Human beings for Merleau-Ponty are historical beings. We dwell in a "layer of spiritual being."[331] Our life has a developed, historical, human atmosphere like the layer of atmosphere enclosing the planet.[332] In our experience and in our interrelationships with other people, there is presence of past as reanimated in the "living present."[333] Our historical being is a contingent and singular movement "that both creates stable forms and shatters them" and is, as such, neither "a perpetual novelty nor a perpetual repetition."[334] Our historical situation is like language: innovating from within a particular given structure or field with the innovations changing or mutating the structure over time.[335] There is, for Merleau-Ponty, an openness to history in that it is always taken up in a way that is not predetermined. "History is always lived history"; there is an "*Ineinander* of the present and of the past."[336]

For Merleau-Ponty, ideas bear historicity: "there is not a single truth of reason that does not contain a coefficient of facticity."[337] An awareness of this can inoculate us against a certain intellectual hubris, against "the dream of a sovereign knowledge capable of immediate access to all times and of an absolute objectivity."[338] Yet this historical location does not cripple thought, locking it in the predetermined perspective of a particular present. Rather the "intelligible becoming of ideas," the sedimented history of ideas is thinkable: "It offers us an order, a sense to which I do not have to submit but which I can place in perspective."[339] Instead

of the perspective of absolute thought where history contains or imprisons the subject "in a point in space and time," Merleau-Ponty advocates an idea of truth for which our inherence in history is enabling, not disabling—such that "whatever truth we may have is to be gotten not in spite of but through our historical inherence." He writes:

> As long as I cling to the ideal of an absolute spectator, of knowledge with no point of view, I can see my situation as nothing but a source of error. But if I have once recognized that through it I am grafted onto every action and all knowledge which can have a meaning for me, and that step by step it contains everything which can exist for me, then my contact with the social in the finitude of my situation is revealed to me as the point of origin of all truth, including scientific truth.[340]

Meaning is immanent in history with the event as "a genesis of reason."[341] Even philosophy is not independent of historical discourse, of the meanings that are already "there." It can, however, make conscious and manifest what is tacit and latent in a given situation; philosophy is historical but not historicist. Relative to the "Utopian" perspective that would have philosophy be absolute, Merleau-Ponty's vision (as he states it upon his installation as the Chair of Philosophy in the *Collège de France*) is of a philosophy that "dwells in history and in life"—a philosophy that "limps."[342] What he seeks is a way between seeing history as a series of chance events, and so not understandable, and seeing history a necessary development.[343] Ideas in history both "echo back to earlier foundations" and are open to a future understanding of the situation of the idea.[344]

Beyond seeing an alternative between an absolutism and an historicism—between "understanding and history or spirit and matter"—Merleau-Ponty sees in history "the milieu of life," an affinity.[345] Historicity is less isolating than enabling communication through sharing a history.[346] Throughout historical development, humans exhibit a common situation of willing "to coexist and to recognize one another."[347] For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of history is understandable through the problem of others.[348] Perceptual consciousness arises from bodily being-in-the-world, and this fundamental being-with enables a common world and

a common history.[349] As we find ourselves as "moments of the open field," truth and meaning then arise in an intersection of perspectives—"open significations and situations whose sense is in genesis."[350] Tradition and history do not simply predetermine the present; they are taken up.[351] When we receive a "heritage of ideas," we "transform" it "by the very fact that [we come] to know it."[352] This echoes Gadamer's insight that "we understand in a *different* way, *if we understand at all*."[353] For Merleau-Ponty, humanity itself is not an "unconditional possession" but an historical idea. Humanity too has to be continually "taken up"—"in the sense that this human way of existing is not guaranteed to each human child through some essence acquired at birth, in the sense that it must be continuously renewed in him through the accidents of the objective body"[354]

4.6.2 Tradition

Tradition, for Merleau-Ponty, is the particular content of historical human being; it is a "layer of spiritual being, i.e., of historical being," a horizon of the life-world, the *Lebenswelt*.[355] Human being exhibits dependence, "acquisition," as "an irreducible phenomenon"—"existence always takes up its past, either by accepting it or by refusing it."[356] Tradition or institution is an "historical unconsciousness," as that received, but is not only something to which we are passive subjects.[357]

Traditionality, *Tradierung*, is a "handing over"—a giving and taking up.[358] Merleau-Ponty describes the transmission of tradition as a taking up and a receiving,[359] a reanimation or reactivation[360] that would "salvage" and "preserve" what has come before—keeping the promises of others.[361] This following in the wake of thought is not a simple "return" or "defense" of the past, however.[362] There is a constant dialectic of freedom and inheritance such that, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "by taking up a present, I again take hold of my past and I transform it, I alter its sense, I free myself and detach myself from it." Through (by means of) this structure of existence I am not as much bound to what has come before but am free to progress by means of it, through modification.[363] Historicity is not, for Merleau-Ponty, historicism or relativism.[364] When one takes up the past, one always goes further. "It would not

be freedom," he writes, "without the roots that it thrusts into the world"—without the ballast of meaning that provides a relatively stable space for innovation.[365] The received *Stiftung* enables the "fecundity of the products of culture."[366] In this interrelation of originality and dependence, the founding of tradition echoes the founding of perception; we continually take up the world that is given to us as we continually take of the human past that is given to us.[367]

Merleau-Ponty describes this always-dependent and yet always-different taking up of tradition as a double movement—"being other in order to be the same, forgetting in order to conserve, producing in order to receive, looking ahead in order to receive the entire force of the past."[368] Our behavior is always in a situation that is an inheritance, a connection with the world and with others—a dwelling in historical truth.[369] It is hard to see just what we owe to tradition because we owe so much, and we often fail to see our dependence because we are "obsessed with objective thought," unable or unwilling to see the mediation of our human existence through the thoughts of others.[370] Indeed, a consciousness of the past is only possible through the intermediary of the social world.[371] Tradition is social. The social horizon "enlarges my world by taking up collective history, tradition."[372]

4.6.3 Sedimentation

One of the particular elements of our traditionality is language. Language, as rooted in the body, is in part accidental; "there is no expressive system that follows a plan or does not have its origin in some particular accident."[373] Yet it is also contingent and conditioned; language has a history. New "constellations" make certain meanings or creations or expressions possible, such that one does not simply "arrive at a certain state without passing through successive levels."[374] To see a rationality, a logic in this partially contingent and partially accidental configuration, is to envision a way beyond the alternatives of the historical as a chance blundering or the historical as an unfolding necessity.[375] The accidents of history are taken up by humans and "elaborated as the means of systematic expression by the community of speaking subjects" who want to understand and be understood.[376] One

carries on with the givens of language—putting forth to be taken up and taking up what is put forth—always taking up but differently—from a perspective partially shared (for if it were nothing shared, there would be no communication) and partially different (for if it were nothing different, there would be nothing that would need to be communicated).[377] That there can be a movement or progression of language, as building and expanding upon its past, "toward the more expressive forms from less expressive ones"[378] displays a "blundering logic" whose development is not guaranteed yet can endure in a kind of permanence.[379]

Merleau-Ponty sees the social world of thought as sedimented—as fluid but building up a determinate, if changing, situation or setting.[380] Sedimentation is inherent in the human being's habitual being in the world—in the manner in which "we are *condemned to sense*, and there is nothing we can do or say that does not acquire a name in history."[381] It is a "propagative process" like biological reproduction—where how "what precedes 'passes into' what follows" but is not an identical repetition.[382] Again, the acquired, sedimentation, must be taken up in a spontaneous, new and yet situated movement of thought.[383] The present is fragile and changeable, but there is (present in the present) the "weight" of the past: "when an attitude toward the world has been confirmed often enough, it becomes privileged for us."[384] The preceding "presents" are in the "heart" of the present, and the past is maintained as "the horizon of this present." This sedimentation (a "latent intentionality") is the means of understanding others in the same world.[385] The past is not self-reactivating but needs "taking up"; reactivation is "only a possibility." And this is not a "total reactivation" but an operation of "finite capacities of reactivation."[386] Our past acts come to define us; they become strata of our situation even if we change or disavow them.[387]

This sedimentation is so significant for Merleau-Ponty that he would see it as the "substance" of humanity, of "our understanding of man"—that humanity exists perpetually within "modifications in the human situation."[388] We do not just "get used to an environment"—behaving in a situation the way an animal does—we think, we engage in symbolic behavior and so "institute 'cultures'" as a particularly human order of sedimentation.[389] There are multiple "fields" beyond the "'natural' body" and its modifications: "imaginary fields, ideological fields, mythical fields."[390]

All of these are cultural, all the "secondary sedimentation" of the "symbolic matrices" of a "common world."[391]

Merleau-Ponty presents truth as a kind of sedimentation or institution that condenses the past and opens a future. Truth is true *to* the past (regarding the tradition) and true *for* the future, proving itself as a possibility inasmuch as it is proven to work. Such a truth is a "fruitful imprint," a "truth which becomes" and grows "by successive waves, or by means of detours."[392] This truth is something we "are in" and "cannot escape,"[393] an opening in the present to others, renewing "the old or alien project."[394] "Truth," Merleau-Ponty writes, "is another name for sedimentation, which is itself the presence of all presents in our own." There is, he continues, "no objectivity which accounts for our super-objective relationship to all times, no light that shines more brightly than the living present's light."[395] The sedimented light of the living present is the way in which discussion can contribute "to the formation of truth."[396] The logic of history, such as it is, is that the true is what has proven to work, what takes up the past in a way that opens fruitful possibilities for the future—"a process of elimination by which only the systems which are capable of taking the situation into account subsist."[397]

Our historical being is one exhibiting a non-reductive founding (*Fundierung*) in the immanence and transcendence of the human order (the third order) relative to the vital (second) and physical (first). "For man, everything is constructed and everything is natural" in that all human behavior at once owes something to or is founded upon "mere biological being" and breaks free from the animal, "deflect[ing] vital behaviors from their direction [*sens*] through a sort of *escape*"—creating significations "that are transcendent in relation to the anatomical structure and yet immanent to the behavior as such."[398] Thus, to separate the "natural" and the "cultural or spiritual" is both "abstract and insufficient," in that the human is "called forth and engendered" by the natural as a founding sedimentation.[399]

4.7 Subjectivity

4.7.1 Self-consciousness and temporality

For Merleau-Ponty, human subjectivity is not an absolute subjectivity such as one might find in different forms of idealism, but a fluid and worldly subjectivity. It is a subjectivity "that is indivisibly unmade and remade by the course of time"—a "presumptive unity within the horizon of experience" that is the "primordial layer where ideas and things are born."[400] There is a correspondence between the open unity of world and open unity of subjectivity.[401] A person is a new "milieu," a new tradition (an unfolding temporality), a new field in the world such that with "the event of my birth … the world received a new layer of signification. In the household where a child is born, all objects change their sense."[402]

Starting from the visible, Merleau-Ponty presents an idea of subjectivity as a field of presence.[403] The subject is "the X to which fields (practical no less than sensory) are open"—not just the "natural" body but "everything that is sedimented above."[404] From this direction, Merleau-Ponty seeks to "escape the alternative between the in-itself and the for-itself."[405] In the intentional act in which there is a consciousness or apprehension of something there is the certainty that I am the one doing the act. "Self-consciousness is the very being of the mind at work"—first-order activity grounds the second-order reflective awareness.[406] Merleau-Ponty understands the cogito as our being as a movement of transcendence. One's existence is a doing, an act of transcendence, "the violent passage from what I have to what I aim at, or from what I am to what I have the intention of being."[407] The ego is not primordially egocentric but is always already relating to that beyond it.[408] It is the abnormal subject that "refuses" this self-transcending and relational "dialectic of the self."[409] Despite its relative passivity to what is given, there is an absoluteness to the self "in the sense that it can always interrupt" the given, can assert itself as something other than what is happening.[410] This "for-itself" that "crowns a body," the intimacy of the self to itself in its movement of transcendence, is never fully self-conscious (is something of an "in itself" and so never a pure "for-itself") never fully coincides with what one is "in virtue of nature or history" (is never just an "in itself").[411]

Body and soul, as Merleau-Ponty writes, are "fused in the act"; there is a "sublimation of biological existence in personal existence and of the natural world in the cultural world."[412] For the acting, bodily subject, existence is temporal, and there is an intimate relation, a mutual entanglement, between time and subjectivity.[413] Subjectivity "lives time"—is a "sudden upsurge of time."[414] Conscious thought is a passive synthesis in which the bodily present is transcended and the past, present, and future are tied together in a single phenomenon of flowing.[415] Subjectivity brings together that which is absent—"the non-being of the elsewhere, of the bygone, and of tomorrow"—into a co-presence in a point of view and an intention and is, as such, open to other temporalities whether my own or of others.[416] Time also functions to make self-consciousness uncertain, as I am "never at one with myself"—being between the present, past, and future—lacking any simple location in one horizon.[417]

4.7.2 Freedom

"Freedom," Merleau-Ponty writes, "dawns in us without breaking our bonds with the world."[418] The passivity of human existence is a "passivity without passivism"—between being determined by one's inheritance and a pure originality, the freedom of a *creatio ex nihilo*.[419] In the face of a binary dialectic of "madness of activism, madness of passivism," Merleau-Ponty seeks an understanding of freedom "as remote from 'my past explains me entirely' as it is from 'I create the sense of my past ex nihilo.'"[420] Hegelian self-positing as a "ternary dialectic," for Merleau-Ponty, is only an apparent solution, for it "is reduced to the binary if one realizes the third term in one of the first two."[421] Instead, he wishes to see our life as both given and made.[422]

Human existence both presupposes a given and goes beyond by employing the given differently, imposing a sense.[423] What defines the human, for Merleau-Ponty, is "the capacity of going beyond created structures in order to create others."[424] The ambiguity of the "human dialectic" is that the structures that one creates can come to imprison oneself—that the products of freedom can come to limit freedom.[425] The freedom of human existence is not in pure creation but in taking up, in transforming. We "ceaselessly

transform through a sort of escape that is never an unconditioned freedom."[426] While one's past does not "impose any particular act,"[427] one's freedom is embedded such that it is a freedom of orienting oneself in a situation, in a field.[428] Our freedom does not destroy our situation, but "gears into it."[429] Freedom is found not as much in our conscious acts as in the "secret decisions" that guide deliberation—"the tacit decisions by which we have articulated the field of possibilities around ourselves."[430] Freedom is the spontaneity of an "I am able to"[431]—a taking up in a "new movement of thought"—resulting in a "double moment" of sedimentation and spontaneity, of developing the given.[432]

Merleau-Ponty's understanding of ethics or morality focuses on the centrality of the perception of the other as in common situation. The moral use of freedom is a taking up in good faith, "actively being what we are by chance, of establishing that communication with others"—taking up the opportunities given by the situation to be respectful of the other, to be in community, to be generous.[433] Love, for Merleau-Ponty, is a union with another—a dispossession that creates a new "reality" in communication, in communion.[434] Freedom in loving is not freedom from the other but toward the other, to consent to the other, to bring about a new community—entering "into an undivided situation with another."[435] Love is a free, not already "possessed," recognition of the other. The being "of good faith" of love "plunge[s] into the time which both separates and unites us."[436] It is a promise that is rooted in but transcends bodily situation.[437] It is a generosity toward the other, a trusting confidence beyond "what can be proved."[438] Such an ethical vision, being rooted in "the real relationships between people in our societies," is the basis for a humanism beginning with and taking up contingent situations.[439] A proper humanism for Merleau-Ponty is to see our lives in common as a single drama, a coexistence.[440]

4.8 Truth, ideas, thought's transcendence

4.8.1 Thought, expression, ideas

For Merleau-Ponty, thought "outlives itself" in expression,[441] but not in the form of literal reproduction.[442] Thought goes beyond

itself in that it is not possessed but rather marks out "a realm to think about which we therefore are not yet thinking about."[443] Language is then less a "container for thought" than a means of self-transcendence, "an instrument for conquest of self by contact with others" in which one acts and so changes oneself in relation to others.[444] The world invites us, draws us out, snaps us up beyond ourselves "as if the functions of intentionality and the intentional object were paradoxically interchanged."[445] In the act of thought we are not transcending or abstracting from the world but are transcending into the world—"caught up in the push and shove of being."[446] Communication as expression does not simply replicate an inward thought on the outside but is itself thinking and is creative.[447] In it a "new intention" in the present takes up the heritage of the past into a future, establishing a new habit.[448] Thought develops through expression.[449]

Thought does, however, have to do with a certain abstraction or detachability—imagining something possible or virtual.[450] Thought through expression in speech, writing, or art seems to "detach itself" from the bodily and personal subject and make an object in space a "speaking trace of an existence."[451] In intellection and expression there are superstructures built upon the infrastructure of perception; there is a "reversal" in which "one passes from the visible world."[452]

Ideas, however, are given in "carnal experience." It is not that ideas would "be better known to us if we had no body and no sensibility."[453] Ideas, as "the invisible of this world," live in cultural objects, "have their historical and geographical regions"[454] Ideas have to do with "a created generality, a culture, a knowledge come to add to and recapture and rectify the natural generality of my body and of the world."[455] Thus are ideas incarnated—"carried into the world of existence by their instruments of expression."[456]

Likewise, ideas are not at rest but rather have a historical becoming.[457] They are "born"; they "have a date."[458] Ideas happen within a progression of interrelated human makings, moving toward a future: "ideality is historicity."[459] They are calls or solicitations for further becoming, for "individual and inter-individual knowledge,"[460] such that "ideas endure or pass away, and the intelligible sky subtly changes color."[461]

4.8.2 Science

The human difference, beyond the merely biological, is that humans can reflectively interact with not only the "world of persons and minds" but the world of nature as well.[462] While there is, for Merleau-Ponty, "no question of discrediting science,"[463] he is interested in examining how objective science arises and the perils of the "objectivity" of the universe of science as a second-order expression "constructed upon the lived world."[464] Merleau-Ponty, recognizing the "inherence of the subject and the object of science in a preobjective Being,"[465] sees the ideal of objective thought (in which the world is figured in terms of the blind operations of pre-vital physico-mathematical correlations) as grounded upon perception, as presupposing "reference to the lived world."[466] While science is "the result and the natural continuation" of perceptual experience, it is also that which often makes us forget or lose contract with this ground of perception,[467] such "that classical science is a perception that has forgotten its origins and believes itself to be complete."[468] Classical science works from a "fundamental bias" that sees being as a neutral "thereness" and all value in the world emanating from human manipulability; this is, in Merleau-Ponty's words, "to treat everything as though it were an object-in-general—as though it meant nothing to us and yet was predestined for our own use."[469]

Scientific speech is a cultural entity that has "the pretension of expressing a truth of nature in itself" but forgets its grounding in perception and its own nature as a cultural product.[470] Science is not access to the true reality of nature, not pulling back the veil to view nature as such ("often only an idol to which the scientist makes sacrifices"). It is rather a more restricted vision that allows greater precision, dealing with "its own limited models of things" (models that are themselves "sensitive to intellectual fads and fashions")— "as if everything that is and has been was meant only to enter the laboratory."[471] Again, science is not to be discredited but situated within the whole of the human world "as an intentional system in the total field of our relationships to Being"—dethroned as the master perspective upon reality as such and recuperated as the genuine way for humans to understand their world.[472] This is not to say that science is invalid or arbitrary or nothing but the product of social structures but to recognize science as a human enterprise rooted in "pre-science"—that "science is not devoted to another

world but to our own; in the end it refers to the same things that we experience in living."[473]

4.8.3 Truth

For Merleau-Ponty, human thought is not enclosed in its own ideal or cultural world(s) but is rather dynamically related to the real world, approaching it through a gradual clarification, rectification, and fixity. Thought is "a reflection which turns back over the density of the world in order to clarify it."[474] The thinking human body is "geared into the world" such that there is "a perceptual *ground*, a background to my life, a general milieu for the coexistence of my body and the world."[475] In this milieu there is a "teleology of consciousness" that "invites us" to seek the resolution of error and doubt.[476] For Merleau-Ponty, clarity of perception and confidence in action are kinds of criteria for "a march toward the real," where clarity indicates a lesser or greater articulation, a being more or less "geared into" the real.[477] "What is given," Merleau-Ponty writes, "is a route, an experience which gradually clarifies itself, which gradually rectifies itself and proceeds by dialogue with itself and with others."[478] Clarity of perception is the degree of one's body's "hold on the spectacle."[479] The goal, even if it is never attained, is an holistic fidelity—a grasp of the whole, the totality in which the broader view is the truer, the greater hold.[480]

Truth, for Merleau-Ponty, is a more holistic "being true." Unlike mere things, we are "in and toward the world [*au monde*] and not merely in the world [*dans le monde*]."[481] As humans present themselves to themselves reflectively, as they are more conscious of their relations, their being true is a dwelling in and toward the true—"inhabiting the truth by our whole selves."[482] One is true "by being what I am at present," by taking up what one is and "plunging into the present and into the world."[483] Such is the ideal of "fully living" out one's relation with others and the world.[484]

5

Merleau-Ponty and theology

5.1 Between philosophy and theology

> Let us therefore so look as men who are going to find, and so
> find as men who are going to go on looking.[1]

While Merleau-Ponty did not consider himself to be a Christian
thinker, he was not hostile to religion. He displayed a consistent
openness to, if not interest in, theology as something to take seriously
that was perhaps uncharacteristic of French philosophers of his
era.[2] He did not accept uncritically (and was sometimes critical of)
Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche's reductionist (reducing the corporate
to the corporal) critiques of religion. Merleau-Ponty viewed reason
and faith, philosophy and theology as different. Philosophy is
"in another order" than, "almost the opposite" of, believing.
Thinking of the example of Socrates, there is a tension between
questioning and believing—"between Christianity understood and
Christianity lived, between universality and choice." (He would
say that philosophy also has the same tension—when philosophy
confronts engagement.)[3] As soon as philosophy and theology are
made identical, he thinks, they become rivals and "perpetually play
the role of warring brothers in history."[4]

Merleau-Ponty, seeing himself on the philosophy side of things,
commonly critiques theology from a philosophical perspective.
Merleau-Ponty saw theology as at odds with properly philosophical
wonder, in that, by looking for a necessary being, "theology makes
use of philosophical wonder only for the purpose of motivating an

affirmation which ends it."[5] A philosophy of religion should rather describe religious phenomena in history in order to understand religion—the "continual rebirth of the divine"—in philosophical or phenomenological terms "as one of the expressions of the central phenomenon of consciousness."[6]

While seeing theology and philosophy as different enterprises, Merleau-Ponty does not view them as necessarily opposed; philosophy is not necessarily atheistic.[7] There may be no conflict between the two—as Merleau-Ponty writes, "if only philosophy recognizes, beyond the possibilities it is judge of, an actual world order whose detail arises from experience, and if the revealed given is taken as a supernatural experience, there is no rivalry between faith and reason."[8] Yet there can be a real exchange between the philosopher and the Christian (even if those two are the same person) if this difference is understood. This exchange can happen, Merleau-Ponty writes, "if the Christian (with the exception of the ultimate sources of his inspiration, which he alone can judge) were to accept without qualification the task of mediation which philosophy cannot abandon without eliminating itself."[9] While he recognizes definite diversity within both philosophy and theology ("the hidden conflict of each with itself and with the other"),[10] a significant difference remains when it comes to the starting point of religious or theological reflection—the difference between natural religion ("natural revelation and natural prayer") as universally available and supernatural religion ("supernatural religion and supernatural prayer") as particular.[11]

Believing, the difference of faith, leads to a different understanding.[12] David Burrell, seeing theology and philosophy as "two separate things, each originally and necessarily quite extrinsic to the other," advocates an "additive" image of the relation between theology and philosophy.[13] The picture of a fundamental conflict of normativities—reason for philosophy and faith for theology—is based more on a "foundational" model of knowledge with its need for and fixation upon certitude that is ultimately incoherent (as philosophy is never with out its fidelities and faith is never without its reasons) that a proper description of the activities of philosophy and theology.[14] Burrell instead advocates—in a manner resonant with Merleau-Ponty and reflective of the broad tradition of Christian theological and philosophical reflection—a community between faith and reason that is one of "mutual normativity" and

"mutual clarification." The better theology is the one that best displays this mutual normativity (in which both faith and reason are operative).[15]

A faith enriched by reason is a faith seeking a better understanding of itself, to articulate or to formulate faith better.[16] If faith initiates one in knowledge, it is a knowledge that is never completed in this life. Theology, as Augustine writes, should have the mode of seeking, of searching, and should thus not make "hasty affirmations."[17] Theology should be attentive to the canons of reason, Augustine writes, in order "both to investigate [the articles of faith] more accurately, to understand them more clearly, and to proclaim them more earnestly"; it is thus proper for theology, in Burrell's terms, to subsist in a process of "constantly transforming itself" relative to philosophy and relative to its cultural milieu.[18]

Faith also enriches reason in this schema of "mutual normativity" or "mutual clarification." This is a faith seeking a better understanding of the life and world from which it arises. "Knowing-by-faith" can enrich, exalt, or fulfill ordinary human understanding or knowing—"the understanding proper to human beings, which cannot but be curiously open-ended."[19] Revelation can help to articulate a further understanding of both our native trust in the world (that which is "before" reason") and the limits of our reason (that which is "after" reason).[20]

There is always faith of some sort involved in reason such that faith in a divine revelation would not be utterly foreign to reason, even if it is of a different order.[21] Reason, as Desmond recognizes, arises from a first astonishment, a native trust in what is given to consciousness.[22] Burrell writes:[23]

> One can propose, that philosophy points beyond itself in such a way that theology fulfills it, or correlatively, that philosophy cannot ground itself, so that philosophical reflection 'begins and ends in wonder' as Aristotle noted in an uncharacteristically rhapsodic passage initiating his Metaphysics. Wonder offers an opening for revelation, which theology will proceed to elaborate precisely to thematize the wonder itself.

Merleau-Ponty gestures toward such a prior openness in philosophy when he actually describes the work of philosophy more broadly. Phenomenology as a philosophy of our living in the world entails

a "'wonder' before the world"[24] that "entails learning to see the world anew"—that the world that is closest to us may seem to be something strange when compared to our common-sense notions of it.[25] Philosophical reason reflects upon, renews, and "purifies" that which is given in the natural attitude.[26]

Merleau-Ponty too often focuses on persisting ambiguity, on the unfinished world.[27] Here there is room too for the integrity of philosophy as opening beyond itself. There is also what Desmond calls a "second astonishment" that can arise when reason comes to its limits[28]—after the failure of our attempts at a complete explanation of the universe.[29] Such "hyperbolic" meditations, thoughts of what is beyond our normal dealings with the world,[30] arise (as Thomas notes) relative to perplexities such as why there is anything at all and regarding the very different kind of "causality" involved in the doctrine of creation.[31]

5.2 Merleau-Ponty on Christianity

Before looking at possible fruitful interaction between theology and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy relative to several theological *topoi*, it is worthwhile to pause for a sense of his understanding of Christianity generally taken from some of his explicit comments on Christianity. Merleau-Ponty's largely positive appraisal of Christianity hinges on Christianity's opposition to a picture of the "'vertical transcendence'" of God as a "separated absolute" and to a concomitant "vertical relation of subordination" between God and the world.[32] The "Christian God," Merleau-Ponty writes, "wants nothing to do" with such a relation.[33] In the "religion of the Father" that Christianity is defined in opposition to, the world is made a shadow in relation to the overwhelming stature of God—God is "simply a principle of which we are the consequence, a will whose instruments we are, or even a model of which human values are only the reflection."[34] Christianity, when "it remains true to the Incarnation," can be revolutionary—can be a remedy of what Marx sees religion to be.[35] Merleau-Ponty even goes so far as to see Christian theology as making a positive contribution to philosophy: "How can we take ideas like those of history, subjectivity, incarnation, and positive finitude away from Christianity in order to attribute them to a 'universal' reason with no birthplace?"[36]

At its most developed, Merleau-Ponty's vision of Christianity seems to be a kind of Hegelian Christianity not unlike the radical theology of Thomas J. J. Altizer—in which that the transcendent God becomes incarnate and dies on the cross and so becomes immanent.[37] Hegel's philosophy of religion looms large in passages like this:

> The meaning of the Pentecost is that the religion of both the Father and the Son are to be fulfilled in the religion of the Spirit, that God is no longer in Heaven but in human society and communication, wherever men come together in His name.[38]

This kind of supremely "incarnational" Christianity ties eternity to time such that "there is a sort of impotence of God without us, and Christ attests that God would not be fully God without becoming fully man."[39] In Christianity, the "separated absolute" is replaced by "the absolute in men,"[40] such that we only know of God's existence through our own mode of existence, and there is "an ambiguity thanks to which we never know if it is God who sustains men in their human being or if it is the inverse."[41] Christianity recognizes "a mystery in the relations of man and God" in which man, through Christ, becomes "strangely" the privileged bearer of transcendence,[42] while Merleau-Ponty distinguishes himself from "the Christian viewpoint to the extent that the Christian believes in another side of things where the '*renversement du pour au contre*' takes place."[43] For Merleau-Ponty, this reversal happens, rather, "before our eyes"—he does recognize that "perhaps some Christians would agree that the other side of things must already be visible in the environment in which we live."[44]

5.3 On appropriating philosophy

The approach of this second part is to think of Merleau-Ponty and theology. We hope to see the "and" in "Merleau-Ponty and theology" as conjunctive, as bringing together to bring things into a new light. As such, this will be a theological appropriation of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. Such an appropriation is confessional in the sense of working from the perspective of faith.

Faith has to do with the unseen, that which is not discoverable by rational inquiry alone.[45] Faith is a foundation that suspends one, as from above,[46] cleaving firmly without perfect clear sight (between science/understanding and doubt/suspicion/opinion), before comprehension—not a false triumphalism, not something one possesses as finished.[47] To unbelievers, the objects of faith (these invisible things beyond reason that which order us to eternal life such as the Trinity and the Incarnation) are not credible; they entail a possibility of offense.[48] Accepting revealed truths is fundamental for theology.[49] Reason, in this context, would follow faith.[50]

However, there is a long tradition of appropriating philosophy in the task of thinking through the meaning of that which is held by faith. It is a provocation from "outside" to think through.[51] Such appropriation is the modification of the discourse of theology (changing, adding to, subtracting from) relative to that of philosophy. Appropriation is what theology takes away from the dialogue, how it changes under its influence. Origen once wrote that he was "very desirous" that Greek philosophy be accepted to serve "for the ordinary elementary instruction of our schools" as "a kind of preparation for Christianity"—as valuable for helping us to truly understand the world and contributing to the plausibility and coherent understanding of the Christian faith.[52] He used the image of the spoiling of the Egyptians (preceded by Paul in Acts 17 and followed by Augustine) in which the children of Israel were told "to ask their neighbors and companions for vessels of silver and gold, and for clothing," and in this way to find materials "for the Divine service."[53]

Theology, in this appropriative "taking up" (without simply accepting or rejecting), is helped by philosophy. Theology changes in the new light of philosophy, but does not simply take over a philosophy or mold itself to fit the shape of the given philosophy. From theology, specifically from revelation, our horizon is expanded in unexpected ways beyond the frame of philosophy, demanding a modification of the philosophy, a stretching of the received metaphysics so that, as Burrell recognizes, "we cannot expect everyone to follow us across the threshold."[54] In this interaction theology can be well served by the resources of philosophy, such that without such service, "the fare which theology serves," Burrell writes, "can be ill-chosen and underdone."[55] As Herbert McCabe reminds us, even the word "God" or "Deus" or the "Theos" of

theology is borrowed (and transformed) from pagan thought, and this is fine as long as it is so modified, as long "it does not mislead us into thinking that the God we worship (or don't) is a god."[56]

In this second part, Merleau-Ponty and Theology, I will place Merleau-Ponty in conversation with theology by drawing from a broad consensus of Christian sources. This broad catholicity draws particularly on the "Classic Christianity" of the Church Fathers as providing an ancient ecumenical consensus.[57] The predominant voices are Irenaeus, Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, and Maximus the Confessor. In a fairly brief (and compressed) compass I hope to provide a series of sites of fruitful cross-pollination between Merleau-Ponty and Christian theology. The hope is that these might serve as provocations and trajectories for deeper engagement and elaboration.

6

Theology and the material

In this chapter we will explore where Merleau-Ponty's philosophy might be appropriated to fund a Christian understanding of the world as such. As the material or the corporeal is usually set over against God as spirit, we begin with an understanding of God and the nature of divine transcendence (6.1). We will then consider creation and God's relation in and immanence in the created order (6.2) and then the theological vision of the recapitulation and restoration of the world in Christ (6.3) and finally the proper Christian affirmation of and relation to the world in the present (6.4).

6.1 Divine transcendence

Let us go mad the pair of us for prying into God's secrets.[1]

For as the hollow of one's hand is to the whole deep, so is all the power of language in comparison with that Nature which is unspeakable and incomprehensible.[2]

Merleau-Ponty has a certain unease about divine transcendence. His issue is with a dualistic transcendence that is the consequence of "a massive transcendence" that effectively sunders itself from the world and so retreats from understanding.[3] Such a transcendence is an evacuation of nature to make it a pure exteriority; it is a "scission" between the "naturans" (the living active element) and the "naturata" (the natured). This opposition places the active principle in God and effectively empties the world of life,

of anything but the moving exteriority (matter in motion). This scission that Merleau-Ponty sees in Descartes and Newton and traces back to Averroes is not, he notes, "the Judeo-Christian idea."[4] William Desmond echoes such a concern about a dualistic opposition that fixes God as eternal outside of the world of becoming and so leaves the world devalued and degraded.[5]

Such an extreme transcendence, Merleau-Ponty observes, leads to atheism. "There is nothing one can say," he writes, "about this hidden God inaccessible to speculation, whose affirmation lies in the shadowy regions of faith, and in the end He would appear to be a postulate of human life rather than the most certain of beings."[6] This God is so transcendent, has so little meaningful connection to our existence, that he disappears.[7] Desmond sees such a "nugatory transcendence" unavailable for any relationship with the world or humans as the result of having a God that is defined only negatively, in opposition to the world[8]—an *Ens realissimum* that is ultimately unrelated to life.[9]

Merleau-Ponty, in this context, is critical of the idea of eternity. In relation to us who are in space and time, the eternal is "precisely the definition of death," for "if I am always and everywhere, then I am never and nowhere."[10] God is in another way than we are and has "nothing in common with our experience." An eternal subject is "incapable of descending into time."[11] Eternity, for Merleau-Ponty, is a dream rooted in "waking time"—an illusion that feeds on time. Merleau-Ponty presents instead the thought of an "existential eternity" in which eternity is not "a separate order beyond time" but is "the atmosphere of time"—a "quasi-eternity" "at the core of our experience of time" in which, reminiscent of the Kierkegaardian moment, "each present that happens drives into time like a wedge and lays a claim to eternity."[12]

In the face of such a problematic understanding of transcendence, Merleau-Ponty intimates another kind of transcendence in which "God's being for us is an abyss." God can be thought as a mysterious and unsettling depth—"the depth of the existing world and that of the unfathomable God."[13] Another road might be taken to recover the "hidden God" that has "sacrificed to the Ens realissimum."[14] Merleau-Ponty suggests that "authentic Christianity" might entail such unknowing—a "relative unbelief, something that is not obvious."[15]

For the Christian, the being of God, what God is, is a deep mystery. As Augustine famously writes: "What are you, then,

my God? What are you, I ask, but the Lord God?"[16] Augustine's answer (one of them) is that "He is called being truly and properly in such a way that perhaps only God ought to be called being"—that God is supreme but in a way that makes Him strange to us.[17] A Christian understanding of divine transcendence that maintains a genuine transcendence and yet may attend to such concerns can be framed in terms of Robert Sokolowski and David Burrell's conception of the fundamental distinction, what Kierkegaard would call the "infinite qualitative difference,"[18] between God and the world, between God and "all things."[19] Such a distinction states "that the *principium* (the beginning) is not contained in the set of all things"[20] such that, as Basil of Caesarea writes, "nothing is with God as it is with us."[21] Irenaeus too recognizes this incomparability, that God is not contain-able.[22] Maximus the Confessor, in the vein of this distinction, presents God as He who "infinitely transcends all things which participate or are participated,"[23] who is "beyond all things"[24] and "beyond essence."[25] God is thus called both being and nonbeing "although not at all properly"—affirming "the being of God as cause of beings"[26] and yet as nonbeing, as not among beings, "denying in him the being which all beings have."[27] God is beyond being, is not "any of the totality of things that can be known in relation to other things."[28] Because of this being beyond being as the origin of being, God is "unrelated to anything," is not "associated by nature with any being." God is, as Gregory of Nazianzus states, "a nature which has absolute existence, independent of anything else";[29] this independence is to be taken in the sense of being related the way finite things are related to one another.[30] God's being, as Gregory of Nyssa writes, is "of an entirely different sort, and not that which the creation has."[31]

The Christian tradition also sees God as in some sense unknowable or incomprehensible. God transcends all knowledge, transcends the thought and representation of every intelligent creature.[32] God is essentially incomprehensible;[33] He "cannot be grasped by any reason or thought" because the uncreated is not "naturally contained" by the created.[34] In this tradition of apophatic un-naming, of theological negation, God—whose greatness is unknown,[35] who cannot be named,[36] who is above all names, even "Godhead" (God, the divine)[37]—is the Cause beyond all causes.[38] The "invisible God"[39] is such, says Athanasius,

because He has "His being beyond all created existence."[40] The negative designations for the being of God are to help us to be, in Augustine's words, "piously on … guard against thinking about [God] anything that he is not."[41] Nonetheless, as Gregory of Nazianzus notes, even if one thinks of God as "incorporeal," "ingenerate," "unoriginate," "immutable," and "immortal," none of these "give an all-embracing revelation of God's essential being."[42]

God is, for the Christian, known from revelation. God is revealed to us, but this revelation does not give us clear and full knowledge of the divine nature but of "the distinction" which, as Robert Sokolowski writes, "cannot be established by any prior premises,"[43] thus giving us a different understanding of the divine than that achievable in natural experience.[44] Paradoxically, as Athanasius put it, God's otherness, God's invisibility, is known by His works, is made known through relation;[45] even as revealed God is made known to us, as Augustine writes, "from what likeness or comparison of things known to us we are able to believe, so that we may love the as yet unknown God."[46]

God is not as the gods are in a pagan understanding of the world. The pagan divinities are part of the world; for the pagan, the divine is "the best and governing part of nature."[47] The God of the Christian tradition is not the First Being, the prime mover, the initial self-turning gear of the system of the world.[48] Along these lines, Merleau-Ponty sees "the natural and rational concept of God as necessary being" as that of "the Emperor of the world."[49] Merleau-Ponty is suspicious here of an onto-theological gesture (though he does not use that language) of using the idea of divinity as an idealized projection of objective mind that then serves as a means of securing a foundation for ourselves in the world, as a self-projection of our power.[50] Merleau-Ponty himself sees the rejection of "the Emperor of the world" as reflecting and "press[ing] to the limit that criticism of false gods which Christianity has introduced into our history."[51] The Christian understanding of God, however, is that of a different transcendence—a difference that enables a pervasive presence. Because God is not another thing in the world, He is not limited by things in the world.[52] He is, as Augustine writes, "most high, most deep, and yet nearer than all else, most hidden yet intimately present."[53] In the words of Gregory of Nazianzus, "the actual, personal being of God in its fullness

is neither limited nor cut short by any prior or any subsequent reality—so it was and so it will be."[54] The Christian understanding of God is not that of the biggest or best or most powerful or most perfect thing among other things,[55] but, as Sokolowski writes, a "generosity that has no parallel in what we experience in the world."[56] God, Maximus writes, "who is and who becomes all for all beings, through whom everything is and becomes but who by himself never is nor becomes"—this God cannot be contained or limited by the finite, cannot be included "in the law of nature" but fills all things.[57]

Regarding eternity (see Merleau-Ponty's critique above) there are, in the Christian tradition, resources for thinking of eternity not as no-time but as ur-time, of divine presence not as no-space (absence) but as ur-space. Paradoxically, eternity can be thought of not as separate, dead, and static but as an unmoved mover of the temporal—in Augustine's words, "never new, never old, renewing all things," "ever active, ever at rest, gathering while knowing no need."[58] The creator Spirit "moves itself without either time or place."[59] For Maximus, the divine is uncaused and so unmoved but is fecund.[60] God's "movement" is such that, generally, it "moves everything and draws it and holds it in being."[61] Particularly in the Incarnation, "that which is completely unmoved by nature is moved immovably around that which by nature is moved."[62] Maximus recognizes the "paradox" thus involved—in "the play of God" that is a "stillness eternally flowing."[63]

God has life or is life in Himself.[64] We ultimately do not have life "from ourselves." Life is fellowship with, a partaking in, a participating in God who is vivifying all life—such that death is teacher that our life is a gift, that we are not God.[65] God, as Maximus writes, is "the life of those who live and those who receive life."[66] As the Christian God is characterized (here by Irenaeus) not solely in terms of dominating power but by gift-giving and nurturing goodness, wisdom, and power/will, God is seen as manifest in giving "life to all living in the earth" with this manifestation of the glory and life of God increasing from the very being of matter, to the life of living things and finally to human being where "the glory of God is a living man" (and "Adam," this living man is "summed up in Christ").[67] God is the "creative power"[68] For Augustine, God is specifically the life of the soul[69]—addressing his soul, he writes: "your God is to you the life of your life itself."[70]

God's activity is agapeic—coming not from compulsion but "good will."[71] The Cappadocian Fathers present the source of life as love, as "goodness without measure" (Basil) or as "Benefactor" (Gregory of Nyssa).[72] God is not stingy but is "the fount of love" (Gregory of Nyssa)[73] giving forth like "a source, a spring, and a river" or the Sun (Gregory of Nazianzus).[74] God gives, as Augustine states, out of generosity and not need—from a "love without frenzy."[75]

The Christian God is not a domineering One or an erotic origin (in Desmond's terms). With such an Imperial One, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "in the end there would nowhere be a love of others nor others at all, but rather a single love of self that is linked to itself beyond our lives, that has nothing to do with us, and to which we cannot gain any access."[76] Instead of such a dominating One, Merleau-Ponty observes in the world a hyper-dialectic[77] of sameness and differences, plurality and indivision, separation and union.[78] For Merleau-Ponty, form as dynamic and relative unity consists as a "clusters of relations."[79] Beyond the dialectical—which privileges the whole, the one over the infinite, transcendence, otherness[80]—Merleau-Ponty's hyperdialectical perspective resonates with Desmond's metaxological as a "trans-dialectical logos of the metaxu," where community, pluralized intermediation, and "being in relation" are held up to be the more universal and ultimate categories.[81] Theologically, this metaxo-logical togetherness in difference characterizes both the relations between God and the world and the relations within the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity affirms, as Maximus writes, that "the Divinity is monad, but not dyad, and triad, but not plurality."[82] Augustine writes of this Trinity, whose being is beyond us,[83] that it is a three that is not bigger than one[84]—"in their own proper substance by which they are, the three are one, Father and Son and Holy Spirit … one and the same all together from eternity to eternity, like eternity itself which is never without verity and charity."[85] The Trinity is a community, "difference in harmony,"[86] working inseparably.[87] As such a community, the Christian God relates to the world in a manner otherwise than that of returning to an ultimately Monistic One, for even within Godself, God is not even such a One.

6.2 Creation, transcendence, and immanence

6.2.1 Creation

Merleau-Ponty views immanent being as a procession "from the earth to my body and to the bodies of others—and to egos."[88] This one universe is the "one sole explosion of Being which is forever."[89] The corporeal order of matter, nature, physics, and "physicochemistry"[90] is the *Boden*, the ground or soil—as "fatherland," the "whence"—upon which the other orders are built and carried.[91] Nature or the Earth is "the arche"—the fecund resource[92] that is prior to consciousness and is thus not instituted by man.[93] Nature is an original productivity "which is not ours," which "both partakes of the most ancient, and is something always new"—as *Urtrümlich* (as primal, as rooted like in soil) and *Ursprünglich* (as original, as primordial).[94]

In this arena, Merleau-Ponty's concern with "Judeo-Christian thinking" is that it is "haunted by the threat of acosmism."[95] The problem with the primacy of a certain transcendence from an immanent perspective is that if only God "is," then that which is other than God is ultimately nothing at all. Immanence ends up on the one side of a "scission," while on the other side is the "external God" with whom abides the meaning of the world and of history as cut off from the world and from history themselves.[96]

From the perspective of the Christian confession, however, the natural world as such is to be understood in terms of the doctrine of creation. Creation is held by faith as a revealed article of faith, as something different from an immanent view.[97] Creation is a mystery; its manner is, as Gregory of Nyssa writes, "ineffable."[98] It is, as McCabe writes, "an unintelligible notion"[99] that is believed in the face of, as John Milbank describes it, the "impossibility that anything else should exist outside of God, who is replete Being."[100] Creation is, in Desmond's terms, the "hyperbolic thought" of the origination of the world from nothing.[101] It is an act that, as Sokolowski writes, "cannot be understood in terms of any action or any relationship that exists in the world."[102]

The Christian understanding of an agapeic origin—of a gratuitous creation of irreducible otherness to be as irreducibly other[103]—can be conceived as having a supporting and not evacuating relation

to the vital world. Against religious visions such as those of the Gnostics and Marcionites who, Irenaeus observes, would see the creation of matter as "the fruit of defect and the offspring of ignorance,"[104] the Christian God calls into being "the substance of created things"[105]—creating, as Gregory of Nyssa writes, "the essence of the earth" in a manner that is unlike the becoming and generation that happen within the earth.[106] This properly Christian "agapeic" understanding of creation can be understood in terms of the power, wisdom, and love or goodness of the Creator. Irenaeus writes:

> With God there are simultaneously exhibited power, wisdom, and goodness. His power and goodness [appear] in this, that of His own will He called into being and fashioned things having no previous existence; His wisdom [is shown] in His having made created things parts of one harmonious and consistent whole; and those things which, through His super-eminent kindness, receive growth and a long period of existence, do reflect the glory of the uncreated One, of that God who bestows what is good ungrudgingly.[107]

The free creation of the world by God is not just an act of power, of the emperor of the world's sovereign *fiat*, but of a freely given gift, an act of power or will (freedom from any external necessity) paired with goodness.[108] Maximus writes of God as "creative of power but beyond power"—that if God is to be understood in terms of power, it is a power that is otherwise than our common human understandings of power.[109] One way of thinking of the power of God in creation is to figure it in terms its free generosity.[110] Creation is gratuitous and intentional—denominating God, as Burrell writes, "not as prime mover or first being, but creator."[111] World does not exist necessarily[112] but is the result of a free giving forth, "an utterly spontaneous and gracious act,"[113] God is the possibilizing source of being-at-all, of the primal "coming to be" of finite being—why there is something rather than nothing.[114] God does not create from any coercion[115] but from freedom, and he freely creates in such a way that what is created is "let be." The agapeic absolute "absolves" itself from its creation, making it other and free.[116]

Creation is also a result of God's wisdom. The world is made, as Maximus writes, "one harmonious and consistent whole."

God does not merely bring the world to be, but makes it to be as ordered, such that "all things combine with all others in an unconfused way," binding "both intelligible and sensible beings to [God] and to one another."[117] The world, for Maximus, is a kind of "circuit of things" with God as the beginning and end.[118]

Finally, creation comes from divine goodness or love. God's goodness, Origen explains, is the only reason for creation.[119] Creation, in Desmond's terms, is a "hyperbolic origination"—an absolving "letting be"—such that the arising of the finite world is "the arising of another as other."[120] Creation is a "non-possessive dispensation," a giving forth out of a "creative excess."[121] The growth and life of the world then reflects the glory of God inasmuch as God is such a giving-forth; the world's agapeic being reflects God as agapeic origin. Prior to the primordial generation or productivity of nature is the free giving-forth of the world to be as such.

6.2.2 God's immanence to the world

For Christianity, in Merleau-Ponty's estimation, God is not "external" but "mingle[s] in human life"[122] and so "wants nothing to do with a vertical relation of subordination."[123] For Merleau-Ponty (as he states in his later lectures and writings), theism, naturalism, and humanism "ceaselessly pass into one another,"[124] forming "the nexus, the vinculum 'Nature'—'Man'—'God.'"[125] The topic of this "vinculum" or folding together or connection is present in his last working note for *The Visible and the Invisible* (dated March 1961) where he muses that humanity should be recognized as being more closely related to Nature (as "the other side of man") and that something like the divine "Logos" should be seen "as what is realized in man, but nowise as his property."[126] At the very least, Merleau-Ponty envisioned some kind of immanent interrelation between the divine, the human, and nature that would not, in his own estimation, be at odds with one of the central insights of the Christian faith.

For Augustine, God's love is manifest in the creation of the world—"that it should be"[127]—and in the abiding of creation— "that it should abide."[128] God's sustaining work, suspending, giving life to the world from above,[129] is a continuous work that

empowers things to be.[130] In this sense, we exist "in God"—"by this arrangement that 'in him we live and move and are.'"[131] God is, for Augustine, "ceaselessly at work in these things which he has created," renewing all things,[132] "gathering while knowing no need, supporting and filling and guarding, creating and nurturing and perfecting."[133]

For Athanasius, the Word, the Wisdom of God, relates to the world not merely in terms of power, as a tyrant, but so as to reveal God—to make God manifest, to make the divine present in the world through "beholding the divinity of the Word unfolded everywhere, that is, in heaven, in Hades, in man, upon earth."[134] It is, Athanasius writes, "to this end" that the Word "moves all things, that through Him all may know God" and that he might "fill all things with the knowledge of Him."[135] God is then less a tyrant than a wise ruler—"as though a very great city were built, and administered under the presence of the ruler and king who has built it."[136] For by the Word, God "steers and preserves and orders all things."[137] God in the Word is an artist, the "Artificer of the Universe."[138] "Handling the Universe as a lyre,"[139] God brings and sustains a harmonious order and unity to the universe, "a marvelous and truly divine harmony,"[140] sustaining the plurality and diversity of the world.[141]

The world has a deep interconnection with the God who, Irenaeus writes, "contains all things"[142]—all things are "of God."[143] Teilhard de Chardin writes of this interconnection in terms of "the divine milieu," a being with God in the world: "By means of all created things, without exception, the divine assails us, penetrates us, moulds us. We imagined it as distant and inaccessible, whereas in fact we live steeped in its burning layers."[144] Not disregarding the world but relating to God through the world, the Christian takes the "elements" of the world and "prolongs them along their common axis, which links them to God: and, by the same token, the universe is thus unified for [the Christian], although it is only attainable at the final centre of its consummation."[145]

For Maximus the Confessor, all things participate in God[146] "through whom everything is."[147] Maximus follows such a line of thinking in his understanding of the *logoi* of the created world as pre-existing in God ("in potentiality before they exist in actuality") through the *Logos*, the Word "to whom all things are related and who exists in himself without confusion."[148] "It is," Maximus

writes, "as though they were drawn to an all-powerful center that had built into it the beginnings of the lines that go out from it and that gathers them all together. In this way the many are one."[149] Christ as the Logos "holds together the universals of beings by the power of wisdom, and embraces their complementary parts by the sagacity of understanding."[150] In him "all the principles of things both are and subsist as one in an incomprehensible simplicity"[151] and are "radiantly established as one."[152] God brings the diversity of the world together in a unity, a commonality; He "binds everything into peaceful friendship and undivided harmony" as common origin and end.[153] Through the *logoi* in the *Logos* all things share in a "portion of God" and make God manifest.[154]

6.2.3 The order of the world

The world, for Merleau-Ponty, fits together in a meaningful whole—a whole that phenomenology would describe and "explicate."[155] The world fits together with a rational elegance; there is a joining together, a "gearing into each other" of my own perceptions and perspectives along with the perceptions and perspectives of others in which sense "shines forth" at the intersections of experiences.[156] Nature is not constituted or instituted by humans. Rather, it is a primordial, "nonconstructed," "noninstituted" and "original productivity" that is not that of human beings. It "continues [to operate] beneath the artificial creations of man"[157]—as fundamental and founding for humans, as the "soil" that carries them.[158] The real world, the natural world, for Merleau-Ponty, forms a unity, an "imperious unity," an "insurpassable plenitude."[159] This natural world is the ultimate background for our experience of the world, "the horizon of all horizons" that "ensures my experiences have a given, not a willed, unity beneath all of the ruptures of my personal and historical life."[160]

In the Christian tradition, one of the chief characteristics of the world is that it exhibits a good order—while it is "vast," it is also "elaborate."[161] In the orderly process of the world,[162] things are usefully ordered for, as Basil writes, "the great advantage of all beings."[163] For Basil, the universe as an harmonious whole presents elegant scientific intelligibility that—in so working together, in the parts being dependent upon and useful for other parts—is not as

much a neutral mechanism as a good, caring, edifying whole.[164] In the "great city of the universe" there is a preparing, a providing-for, a providence, such that all "have come to life with the means of assuring their preservation."[165] Such a general integrity of creation, for the Church Fathers, is seen as displaying the world's origin in the wisdom of God.[166]

Christian thinkers also see the world as exhibiting a pervasive beauty, as being itself a work of art. The world is, as Gregory of Nyssa writes, "full of variety and beauty and rejoicing"[167] to the degree that, as Basil recognizes, we can see the "grandeur" and the "great wisdom" even "in small things"—such that "a single plant, a blade of grass is sufficient to occupy all your intelligence in the contemplation of the skill which produced it."[168] Even "the meanest things" in the world, Augustine writes, "are formed with such regular precision, that if you reflect upon them a little more attentively, the inexpressible wonder of it will almost make your hair stand on end."[169] But again, the greatest beauty is to be found not in the individual parts of the universe, but in the whole.[170] Moreover "the great and prodigious show of creation"[171] in which the "marvels of creation" come "one after the other in constant succession like the waves"[172] is seen as a work of art—not only wisely but "skillfully made,"[173] displaying, as Augustine writes, "an eloquence not of words, but of things."[174] The world exists in harmony,[175] with each thing contributing to the beauty of the whole[176] and making "a harmonious symphony result from the whole" (Basil)[177] as a "great chorus" (Athanasius).[178] As Athanasius writes, the "system of the universe" is not merely a set of disconnected atoms but a universe of difference in "concordant harmony"[179] where the difference, the intervals between notes, enables a community of difference.[180] In the harmonious weaving together, being together, community, or interrelation of distinct beings,[181] there is a "concord" or a "chain of agreement" of "the whole creation with itself,"[182] resulting in a universe characterized by "fellowship" and "attachment" and "united in one universal sympathy" (Basil and Gregory of Nyssa).[183] This holism considered temporally, as holding things together in a common movement,[184] is seen especially in Augustine as an unfolding or unwinding—a development in time.[185] The whole of the universe is "a society of things that do not all exist at once, but in their passing away and succession together form a whole,"[186] and this whole is to be seen

as forming "the beautiful tapestry of the ages,"[187] "the temporal beauty of the world,"[188] the "dance" of times and seasons,[189] the *musica mundi*.[190]

6.2.4 The goodness of the world

Merleau-Ponty understands the phenomenological reduction, the entry into the philosophical mode of thought, as (quoting Eugen Fink) "'wonder' before the world" and in this wonder seeing our interconnection with world, indeed our being-in-the-world.[191] His phenomenological project is, then, not world-denying (in the language of bracketing the world to attain a realm of eidetic essences) but world-affirming.

From this perspective, Merleau-Ponty laments the advent of an evacuated sense of nature in the West. This is the sense he sees as present in Descartes' ontology of nature as *naturata*, as an atomistic (vs. holistic) "empty shell" of exterior parts.[192] Merleau-Ponty sees this view as, at least in part, rooted in bad theology insofar as Descartes' conception of nature draws "the consequences from the idea of God" that he inherited from (in Merleau-Ponty's estimation) Averroës.[193] This prior, medieval view installed a dualism, a scission between that which is interior and qualitatively meaningful in the universe (the *naturans*)—which is associated with God—and the exterior, quantitative, neutrally "there" world of nature (the *naturata*).[194] With the advent of modern science in thinkers like Descartes, nature becomes an "auto-functioning" of a system of laws, making any "interiority" superfluous; nature is "the exterior realization of a rationality that is in God."[195] The world no longer has an orientation, just law-governed mechanical interaction.[196] God stands behind the necessity of nature such that nature lacks an integrity of its own.[197]

It is in the face of such a stark division between God and the world as the "naturing" and the "natured" that there is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, in "all Christian thinking" a "zigzagging" between a "positivist" "conditional essentialism" in which "God is and the world is nothing" and the "subordinate existentialism" of "negative theology" in which "God is obscure, and only the world is clear."[198] Christianity cannot abandon the world, but its commitment to transcendence, for Merleau-Ponty, leads

to a possible ambivalence. Merleau-Ponty, then, does not see Christianity as hating the bodily, the material. Instead, he recognized Christianity's affinity for the world and the bodily—especially in its "rejection of the God of the philosophers" as defined in opposition to the world, as the infinite that is simply the negation of the finite world.[199] He sees, however, a remaining tension insofar as "Judeo-Christian thinking" continues to be "haunted by the threat of acosmism" if only God truly "is."[200] Merleau-Ponty is uneasy about a posture toward the world—he describes in one place as "Calvinist"—in which salvation is the domain of God's inscrutable will and the world is then the domain of man's work:

> The created is the material upon which one works. It is to be transformed and organized to manifest the glory of God. The conscious control which is useless for salvation draws man into a temporal enterprise that takes on the value of a duty. Plans, methods, balance sheets are useless from God's point of view, since from that side every-thing is done and we can know nothing. All that is left to us is to put the world in order, to change the natural aspect and to rationalize life. This is the only means that we have to bring God's reign to earth.[201]

Such a negative view of the world is, for Merleau-Ponty, "finished" by a base capitalism—both being realized in the frenzied activity on the inherently worthless materials of the world and being destroyed in that there is, in Merleau-Ponty's estimation, no room in capitalism for the "transcendent motives" of the Calvinism that would see its work as bringing about the divine dominion on Earth.[202]

Within classic Christianity there is a complex but ultimately affirmative evaluation of the goodness world. While it recognizes a hierarchy in the created order, with the incorporeal as superior to the corporeal, the intellectual as surpassing the sensible, the invisible as superior to the visible,[203] these higher elements are yet seen as parts of one world. Maximus states: "there is but one world and it is not divided by its parts. On the contrary, it encloses the differences of the parts arising from their natural properties by their relationship to what is one and indivisible in itself."[204] The "earth," as Basil writes, is an "ally of reason," not dualistically opposed to it.[205] As Augustine writes, while the Christian does not

"adore the world as its god," he or she does "praise the world as a work of God"[206] such that, as Maximus writes, both hating creation and deifying it are "insolence against God."[207]

Augustine writes of the greatness of the world as a marvel, a "standing miracle," an object of wonder.[208] The Christian affirmation of the goodness of the corporeal and the material world joins, as Desmond observes, a kind of "pagan" celebration of "the immanent gifts of the earth" in which one is reawakened to the gift and goodness of finitude, to the open whole of created being in its given goodness and promise, yielding then signs in immanence of its generous origin.[209] The things of the world, for Augustine, are variably but ultimately irreducibly good and beautiful and so bespeak their Creator as "supremely and unchangeably good."[210] The corporeal, the material world is not seen as evil or as unreal but as good, and it is matter's relation to (origin from) God that grounds its goodness.[211]

The created world as a work of art is wisely ordered, "formed perfect by God" (Irenaeus).[212] It is perfect not in the sense of being complete but in being properly ordered. For Thomas Aquinas, that all existing things are good[213] is not a static situation but a dynamic one. Things are created good in substance but also toward an end.[214] As Basil writes, the "ancient earth" as "mother," is that "whence" we come.[215] But this original donation of the goodness of the world endows the world with a dynamism, an intrinsic or erotic orientation, such that all things are inclined toward the good due to creation. God, as Irenaeus writes, "bestowed the faculty of increase on His own creation."[216] "Our faith," Teilhard writes, "imposes on us the right and the duty" to observe this and to join the throng of the world, "to throw ourselves into the things of the earth."[217]

6.2.5 From the world to God

Merleau-Ponty advocates a phenomenological conversion from reductionism—a change in the way one thinks that inverts "the relations between the clear and the obscure."[218] Such a "modern" (twentieth-century) view of the world is characterized by "difficulty and reserve"[219] and holds out a place for mystery. While "classical" modern science would make human reason "masquerade as divine law," human reason should be measured "more honestly" and

should be circumspect in the face of the excess and strangeness of the given world.[220]

Basil observes that creation is difficult to understand and indeed exceeds our understanding.[221] There seems to be a coinciding of the intelligible order of the world as pointing to God who is ultimately beyond human knowledge and the ultimate unknowability of the world. For Christian theologians, as already intimated, the order of the world gives rise to seeing a wisdom behind the world; but this is, as Basil writes, an "ineffable wisdom."[222] The world is wisely ordered but ineffable, ultimately beyond our total conceptual mastery. The intelligibility of the created universe to human beings is grounded and yet ungrounded by the (inhuman yet perhaps supremely human) wisdom that made the universe.

Nevertheless, the world for the Christian imagination is, as Basil writes, "as it were a book that proclaims the glory of God."[223] For Irenaeus, the material world makes God (not some lesser, ignorant Demiurge) manifest as its origin.[224] For Gregory of Nyssa, one can be led to belief in God as a wise artist from "the art and wisdom displayed in the order of the world."[225]

The God of the universe for many Christian theologians is not the god of the philosophers to which, as Heidegger writes, one "can neither pray nor sacrifice" but the "divine God" before whom one can fall to one's knees or dance in awe.[226] The order of the world, for Augustine, is an object of wonder and astonishment that should bring one to praise the Creator.[227] The intelligent design of the world should serve less for our getting an ontotheological handle on the world and more for an opening onto doxology—less intellectual mastery than love.[228] Beholding the beauty of the world occasions bursting forth in wonder, in praise, in admiration, in love,[229] and because of the wonder of the universe one passes, as Augustine writes, "through these creatures to" God.[230] Augustine writes in his *Confessions*:

> And to all things which stood around the portals of my flesh I said, "Tell me of my God. You are not he, but tell me something of him." Then they lifted up their mighty voices and cried, "He made us." My questioning was my attentive spirit, and their reply, their beauty.[231]

"Yet," he later continues, "for all these things too I sing a hymn and offer a sacrifice of praise."[232]

While we can acquire some knowledge about God (here for Maximus) "from the creation of the world" as the "author" or "fashioner" "of existence gives himself to be beheld through visible things,"[233] such knowledge is to be acquired "piously,"[234] as something hyperbolic—with the beauty of the world exceeding/ throwing itself beyond itself.[235] We know God, as Irenaeus writes, from the perspective of one "infinitely inferior."[236] Though, Maximus writes, we cannot know God "from himself" or "from his being," God is nevertheless manifest as good through his own creatures, "from his magnificent works"—"as through mirrors" (think of the obscurity ancient mirrors).[237] We can know God—though "in supreme ignorance," as he is "unknowable in himself"—"by a perception of the ordered wisdom to be observed in creation."[238] In this worshipful learned ignorance before the world as "not obvious" one can see with Merleau-Ponty the "relative unbelief" of Christianity.[239]

That we can in some sense speak of God from the world resonates with the phenomenological way of thinking that recognizes "that the being of the world always seems to it the very type of being."[240] To think of creation is not to negate the world before us, but rather, as Thomas exemplifies this mode of thinking, to begin with the existing thing, the primacy of existence,[241] and to save "creation as a visible reality from any attempt at reduction, devaluation, or sheer annihilation."[242] Both Maximus and Thomas maintain that beginning with the perceived world, one can come to some knowledge of God's existence as Creator, even if we cannot know what God is, God's essence.[243]

6.3 The Cosmic Christ as vinculum between God, humanity, and nature

Merleau-Ponty pays attention to the manner in which God in Christianity is related to the world and humanity. In Christ, Christians "tie God to man" and are so "obliged to tie eternity to time."[244] In his later thought, Merleau-Ponty observes a breaking down of the frontiers or the "cleavage" between "naturalism," "humanism," and "theism"; "God, man, creatures" are seen as passing into one another.[245] The Christian doctrine of recapitulation,

developed significantly by Irenaeus, provides resources for thinking of the manner in which the world and God are interconnected specifically in and through Christ. It can help us think "the nexus, the vinculum [the folding together or connection] 'Nature'—'Man'—'God'"—to think theologically of how the natural and the human are tied to God (specifically how nature is related to God through the human) in terms of Christ.[246]

Irenaeus' doctrine of recapitulation (*anakephalaiosis*) presents Christ as "the head and living summary of humanity."[247] Christ's summing up humanity (and so all of creation) can be represented drawing on Merleau-Ponty's understanding of *Fundierung*. In the relation of *Fundierung*, the higher order can be seen as "founding" the lower by revealing its meaning, by allowing the lower to "appear."[248] "Adam" or humanity, for Irenaeus, is "summed up in Christ";[249] in Christ "God recapitulated in Himself the ancient formation of man."[250] In Christ, "Adam" or humanity is "created [again] after the image and likeness of God."[251] As Gregory of Nyssa writes, it is "as though the whole of mankind was a single living being" and that the work of Christ "passes through the entire race."[252] In this, humanity attains its original destiny—for as the Son is the image of the Father, the creation of humanity as made in the image of God is summed up in the Son, in Jesus Christ "after whose image man was made."[253] Also, for Irenaeus, creation is summed up in the microcosm of humanity (created "From the Will and the Wisdom of God, and from the virgin earth"). Inasmuch as true humanity is revealed and enabled in Christ ("born from the Virgin by the Will and the Wisdom of God"), creation, as summed up in humanity, is summed up in Christ, in whom humanity is summed up.[254] As humanity is founded upon the corporeal, the material world (truly bodily "from the virgin earth") and yet reveals or manifests the meaning of world, so is Christ founded upon the human (truly human, "born from the Virgin") and yet reveals or manifests the meaning of humanity and so the material universe.

For Maximus the Confessor, the human is a site of connection between God and nature as "a kind of second cosmos."[255] Through human nature "the one God, Creator of all, is shown to reside proportionately in all beings" as things are united in human being; "for this end," Maximus writes, "man was brought into the world."[256] Christ is humanity as it was intended, the true humanity—"the

only human being, the only one who preserved in himself God's intention"[257]—in that he "showed for what purpose the first human being was brought into being" in that the communion between God and humanity in Christ is our original "blessed end."[258] Maximus represents Christ as the recapitulator who has "become the New Adam, while bearing in himself the first Adam."[259] Christ is the recapitulation of "the things he has created" and is, as such, the "great and hidden mystery"—"the blessed end for which all things are ordained," the "goal for which everything exists."[260] He does not only recapitulate humanity, but holds together the universe: "he divinely recapitulates the universe in himself, showing that the whole creation exists as one, like another human being, completed by the gathering together of its parts one with another in itself"[261] such that "all the ages of time and the beings within those ages have received their beginning and end in Christ."[262] The creative Word recapitulates all things in himself; his "goodness is revealed and multiplied in all the things that have their origin in him."[263] In the Incarnate Word is the union of the cosmos, the joining together of all of the divisions of the world. He is "in himself the universal union of all"—"showing that the world is one and is not divided in itself," that there is no unpassable gulf between nature, humanity, and God.[264] As Irenaeus writes, when "the Son of God was made man," he assumed "the ancient production [of His hands] into His own nature."[265] Christ, the vinculum, has "united through himself heaven and earth, joined sensible to intelligible things, and showed the unity of created nature, internally coherent in its furthest parts."[266] Thus, as Teilhard writes centuries later: "Across the immensity of time and the disconcerting multiplicity of individuals, one single operation is taking place: the annexation to Christ of his chosen; one single things is being made: the mystical body of Christ,"[267] which is "the total divine *milieu*" that is "formed by the incorporation of every elected spirit in Jesus Christ."[268]

6.4 God in the world: Participation and contemplation

Merleau-Ponty recognizes Christianity as a champion of divine immanence. The opposition to a dualistic and dominating vision of

God as "the Emperor of the world" is aligned with Christianity's "criticism of false gods."[269] For Christianity, "an external God is ipso facto a false God."[270] Christianity, in Merleau-Ponty's view, should not entail "a vertical relation of subordination" under a "separated absolute," "a will whose instruments we are," but the "recognition of a mystery in the relations of man and God"—that God is "not above but beneath us," that the absolute "mingles" in human life.[271]

Classic Christianity can be seen to share such an emphasis on divine immanence. For Irenaeus, against a Gnosticism that cuts creation off from God,[272] God is immanent in/to creation, "present with every one of us."[273] "All things are of God"[274] in that God "contains all things."[275]

For Gregory of Nyssa, God is "in everything, penetrating it, embracing it, and seated in it."[276] All things, for Gregory, participate in and incline toward God,[277] who sustains the life of the world.[278] God's life is "a power overlying all, that is creative of all things that come into being, and is conservative of them as they exist."[279] Though beings participate in God in various degrees such that there can be a continual advance into God,[280] there is "nothing in creation" that is "left without its portion of the Divine fellowship."[281] Likewise in Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus, the Spirit is all-embracing, filling the world.[282] For Maximus too (in the East), all things participate in God,[283] "through whom everything is and becomes."[284]

For Augustine, God continually empowers that which God made to be.[285] The world's being is a being in participation, a being suspended in God.[286] The world's life is derived; it has its life in the one who has life in himself.[287] As all things "need Him who created them," "both for being and well-being,"[288] God generously sustains all things, gathering and filling.[289]

For Merleau-Ponty, philosophy generally and phenomenology specifically—beginning with a "'wonder' before the world"[290]—reflect upon the "nonphilosophical," "preliminary," "primordial" world and our involvement in it.[291] In this way, philosophy serves to lend a translucency to our everyday life—not leaving behind the natural attitude but renewing and purifying it.[292] Against the "occult" sundering of "the Heaven of principles and the earth of existence,"[293] Merleau-Ponty imagines a displacing of the sacred such that a "reversal" happens "before our eyes."[294] There is a

"discordancy" between the common availability of such a "natural revelation and natural prayer, which are open to all" and the kind of supernatural revelation entailed in Christian theology. "It is this very discordancy," Merleau-Ponty writes, "that one would have to take as one's theme if one wanted to construct a Christian philosophy."[295]

Toward addressing this discordancy, Christian theology makes a place for "natural revelation"—a theological view of the world that sees a kind of porosity through the world to God. As Maximus writes (and is echoed in other Fathers), there are "three general ways, accessible to human beings, in which God has made all things"—that "God is the beginning, middle, and end of beings."[296] First, we can see from being that God is the origin, the beginning of being. Second, we can see from the orientation of things (thinking specifically of our "eternal being") that God is the end or goal.[297] Third, in providing for the "well being" of things, the harmonious striving and thriving of things in the world, God is the provider. Focusing on this third aspect of how God is seen as manifest in the world, Maximus describes "the care that comes from God to the things that are"[298] as providential care, making things "harmonious and self-moving in relation to one another and to the whole universe."[299] As preserving and effecting formation and progress in the world, God is seen as "the guardian of the things that are and cares for them."[300]

Key to seeing supernatural revelation as helping to restore sight of God in the natural order[301] for Maximus is the habit of contemplation—"the spiritual contemplation of visible realities."[302] To contemplate the principles of visible things, to see the invisible in the visible, to see connection between God and the world is part of the created purpose of humans. In his *Questions and Doubts*,[303] Maximus describes the place of contemplation in a larger three-part process of relation to God. First, one is raised up, "ascend[ing] in desire" to God as "the Cause" of the world. Then, so oriented, with this theological religious orientation one "descends" to the study of created things, "to consider what is the nature of every being." Finally, "thus, having rightly investigated these things with knowledge," one is "through these things to be raised up in contemplative knowledge to their Creator." The theologically oriented imagination contemplatively comes to see the created world as manifesting the Creator.

In *Ambiguum* 10, Maximus presents the contemplation that elevates and orients one to know God as origin, provider, end—experiencing God "from the things that are"[304]—as being seen in "distinctions" such as *being*, that one return to God is the cause or origin of created being, *movement*, how everything is separated, distributed, and ordered in a wise manner, and *difference*, how given this wise distribution one can make decisions or judgements regarding better (in accord with orientation, being drawn toward the good) and worse ways of being.[305] Thus by "an accurate attention to the things that are," one can be "brought to fulness of being through the virtues at the level of mind in the Spirit."[306] The mechanism for the effectiveness of such contemplation for Maximus is the connection between the *logoi* of the world and Christ as the divine *Logos*. "Those," Maximus writes, "who look carefully at the present world, making the most of their learning, and wisely tease out with their mind the logos that folds together the bodies that harmoniously constitute it [the world] in various ways"[307] can observe through such contemplation the way, as Gregory of Nazianzus writes, "the high Word plays in every kind of form, mixing, as he wills, with his world here and there."[308] Through the contemplation of the *logoi* of beings—"the spiritual reasons of things perceived through the senses"—and bringing them together "into one" in "the productive and contemplative part of the heart,"[309] one can, as Athanasius writes, behold "the divinity of the Word unfolded everywhere, that is, in heaven, in Hades, in man, upon earth."[310] Seeing things, the world, through such a unity[311] enables one to see the goodness of the *Logos* as "revealed and multiplied in all the things that have their origin in him."[312] For, as Maximus writes, "it is in him as the Creator and Maker of beings that all the principles of things both are and subsist as one in an incomprehensible simplicity."[313] In this way, one is "moved by visions of beings … to praise in many ways God, who is and appears through all things and in all things."[314] In such contemplation, the unity of the cosmos comes to manifestation through the human. Contemplative humans "unite in themselves the torn fragments of nature" and thus become a site of connection between God and nature.[315] In this way, Maximus writes, "the one God, Creator of all, is shown to reside proportionately in all beings through human nature. Things that are by nature separated from one another return to a unity as they converge together in the one human being."[316]

7

Theology and the living

7.1 Living bodies

7.1.1 God as source of life

The second order of being for Merleau-Ponty is the vital order, that of life, of "animality," of living bodies.[1] The living animal, as opposed to the mere operations of physicochemistry, is like "a quiet force."[2] Life exists at the level of the whole as an "architectonic," as arising in the relations between the elements.[3] The living organism is an "inter-world," "a reinterpretation of a new dimensionality," a "macroscopic 'envelopment-phenomenon.'"[4] The physicochemical elements are "subordinated forces" that "join the unseen relations between them" such that life is "a fold or a singularity of physicochemistry."[5]

In the Christian tradition, God is understood to be the origin, not just of being as such, but also of life. God's *esse* is understood as the font of the life of the world—as the "act which is the source of all activity" such that all things depend upon God for their existence.[6] Irenaeus goes so far as to say: "God is life."[7] Thus, for Aquinas, "there is no difference between God's preserving activity and God's creating," because "all of God's activity partakes of creating: all that God can do is to create."[8]

Irenaeus sees the orientation of earthly life toward God (as origin and end) such that the human is placed within God's work of creation, vivification, and growth, of life ascending to participate more fully in God's life. God creates life and draws us into his life.[9]

From a theological perspective, Merleau-Ponty's insight that life somehow exceeds its material conditions can be understood from the perspective that life somehow participates and partakes in God, who is immaterial. The mortality of living beings is a teacher that our life is a gift, that we are not life-itself, that life is not something that we can possess perpetually from ourselves.[10] Life, Irenaeus writes, is a "manifestation of God," who is the life of "all living in the earth."[11] "Those things," he writes, "which, through His super-eminent kindness, receive growth and a long period of existence, do reflect the glory of the uncreated One, of that God who bestows what is good ungrudgingly."[12] Life is "found in fellowship with God."[13] Life is not a neutral "thereness" but rather arises in creation as the origination of another that could enter into community with God (with the God who is Triune Community),[14] to truly behold God, to be a living being before the living God. It is in this sense that "the glory of God is a living man; and the life of man consists in beholding God."[15] For Irenaeus, humanity's living destiny is manifest and ultimately enabled in Christ—Adam is "summed up in Christ."[16]

Though life is not reducible to physicochemical elements, life is not something that is foreign to the material. The Christian understanding of the flesh, of the body, as truly partaking in life, as being alive, is distinct from the view of the Gnostics who would see matter as unworthy of life, as a dead prison for living spirit. Presenting a Christian theology that is affirmative of life, Irenaues observes the reality of material life: "that the flesh can really partake of life, is shown from the fact of it; being alive; for it lives on, as long as it is God's purpose that it should do so."[17]

7.1.2 Life as unfolding

Life, for Merleau-Ponty, is intimately related to the structure of behavior.[18] Only with the advent of the biological, with living things, can there be meaning, a "biological meaning of behavior."[19] Life in structured behavior is in a constant state of exchange between its "interior" and the "exterior" world.[20] The structure of living behavior as a whole cannot be considered in spatial or temporal isolation; life's motion and change are only meaningful against the background of a more holistic "field structure."[21] One

cannot reduce the second order to the first. The body as atomistic assembly or "sum of real parts" is "merely an impoverished image" that is not living, but dead—literally decomposed.[22] Life must be considered, rather, holistically in terms of unfinished "modes of process"—of behavior as an unfolding activity.[23] Life should be understood in terms of holistic form (*Gestalt* as "form" or "shape") as the immanent law that is "emergent" in a living organism.[24] Such holistic form, such structure of behavior, is not absolute or static but rather entails motion and change of location, making it more a "sketch or outline" or a "structuration" than an essence.[25]

For Augustine, "the peace of the body" is the harmony of a "duly proportioned arrangement of its parts" like the ordered relations of a city.[26] The holistic holding-together of life is often understood in terms of a soul that is the life of an organism, that marks a distinction between the living and the nonliving.[27] This holism is also temporal. The corporal life, as with everything created, is mutable and mortal—coming to be and ceasing to be, existing in succession.[28] Indeed, for Augustine, corruption is a part of the successive design of the world such that "the corruption of transitory and perishable things … does not prevent their producing that which was designed to be their result."[29]

God's making in regard to life is not external coercion—such that God is the living hand in the dead puppet of matter—but, as Basil writes, "his creating activity fashioned all things in depth, working from within."[30] As Gregory of Nyssa writes, "Nature, to baffle [death], is ever as it were throwing herself into the breach through those who come successively into being."[31] Both Basil and Gregory of Nyssa (along with Augustine in his Genesis commentary) see in the seed a symbol of the consistent and yet dynamic power that is manifest in the natural order.[32] Life unfolds like a seed. Gregory writes:

> Who knows not the miracle of nature, what the maternal womb receives—what it produces? Thou seest how that which is implanted in the womb to be the beginning of the formation of the body is in a manner simple and homogeneous: but what language can express the variety of the composite body that is framed?[33]

As "the whole organization of the body is of equal value throughout,"[34] so is there a value in seeing a goodness and wisdom

throughout the life of an organism such that one can see, with Basil, in the "first structure" of an organism "in the womb" that there are "principles of growth" that serve to guide its development.[35]

Many of the Church Fathers see, with Irenaeus, life as intrinsically oriented in an unfolding progression toward God—in steps toward a loving nearness to God.[36] God created the world and "bestowed the faculty of increase on His own creation."[37] For Gregory of Nazianzus, the "most ancient law" is an instinctive law of ascent leading to God.[38] Basil sees in nature an immanent becoming or unfolding over time "waiting for the appointed time, and the divine order to bring forth,"[39] as if nature is taught "what she has to do in the course of ages."[40] Thus, the wisdom of the Creator is manifest in that living things, as Basil writes, "come to life with the means of assuring their preservation," with "the untaught law of nature" ordering living things to "choose that which is advantageous."[41] While life is orderly, it is also dynamic, changing in continuity such that the cycle of years is like a top bearing, as Gregory of Nazianzus states, a "motionless movement."[42] While the material is fluid, the harmony or "temporal peace" of the living body is an emerging structure or order that is like a habit.[43]

For Gregory of Nyssa, there is in life an intrinsic, natural unfolding or procession or growth toward perfection.[44] In humanity in particular, "that the Divine image does not at once shine forth at our formation, but brings man to perfection by a certain method and sequence."[45] Humanity is created last because the natural created order is a process of ascending development.[46] In humanity there is not a departure from but a gathering together of what came before it (materiality, vegetative life, and animal life) so that "perfect bodily life is seen in the rational (I mean the human) nature, which both is nourished and endowed with sense, and also partakes of reason and is ordered by mind."[47] This accumulative ascent in which the higher includes the lower leads to "the creation of man … as of one who took up into himself every single form of life, both that of plants and that which is seen in brutes."[48] For Gregory, the manner in which the human takes up the nutritive and the animal is reflected in the manner in which these powers develop in a given human being over time.[49] This development of powers in created life, of different kinds of life, leads again not away from the lower, but takes up the lower (such that the higher is "blended" of, a "mingling" of "every form of soul"), making an "ascent as it

were by steps," with nature thus advancing "in an orderly course to perfection" in human beings who can know and love God.[50]

7.2.2 Human as corporal, as living body

For Merleau-Ponty, human being is another way of being a body, "another corporeity."[51] We are living beings like other living beings such that there is not, Merleau-Ponty writes, "a single 'spiritual' act that does not rest upon a bodily infrastructure."[52] The human is based on—"installed upon"—the corporeal "infrastructure" of inhuman nature.[53] The "qualitative difference" of the human is the different "manner of being a body," a different way in which "we are" a world.[54] Our bodies, like all living organisms, only persist as living bodies in a constant state of dynamic interaction with their environment.[55] Our pre-objective being-in-the-world, our being "geared into the world,"[56] is a conjunction between the mental and the living body, "the 'psychical' and the 'physiological.'"[57]

For Irenaeus and the Cappadocian Fathers, the human is fundamentally material—formed from dust, our "humble" origin (humble, humus, human).[58] The corporeal (material) nature in the corporal (living body) nature of humanity is often figured in terms of this "dust." This "kindred dust" is, as Gregory of Nyssa writes, "the material of the whole body which serves as a common substratum for the particular members"[59] and will be that into which one will resolve when one dies.[60] Adam, as Irenaeus puts it, is formed from dust into the image of God—"from the Will and the Wisdom of God, and from the virgin earth."[61] The "ancient earth," Basil writes, is our "mother."[62] This humble origin is held in tension with the great honor that one is created by God.[63] Thus the "molding" of the material into the body through "the workshop of nature" is contrasted with the "making" of the soul by God.[64] Affirming the goodness of human being,[65] Gregory of Nyssa observes and appreciates the "miracle of nature" in our generation.[66]

Like all living bodies, the human body likewise is recognized as being in dependent motion, with a beginning and an end. The human body, Gregory of Nyssa notes, being "subject to flux," is "always advancing by way of motion," and "if it should ever cease moving it will assuredly have cessation also of its being."[67] We are mortal,

made like all of creation out of nothing; we are born and do not preexist, as in Plato's *Phaedo*.[68] The human body is a living thing that moves in relation to other living things in this protean world.[69]

It is through our sensitive/sensible bodies that we relate to the world. "The motion of sense"—in Gregory of Nyssa's estimation "the fairest of all the operations of nature,"[70]—while bounded or limited in nature[71] is not abandoned, as Gregory of Nazianzus writes, even "when we look at supra-sensible realities."[72] Our dependence upon and dwelling within the testimony of our sense for our awareness and knowledge of the world is so central to us that it is, in Augustine's estimation, absurd to fundamentally doubt it.[73] The mind even learns about itself "from what it knows to be other."[74]

For the Christian, the human is essentially but not merely (not reducible to) the body. The Christian should equally reject both a perspective which would see the body as evil flesh from which we escape and one that would see the body (conceived as nothing more than the material or the animal) as all there is to the human. As Irenaeus writes, "the soul and the spirit are certainly a part of the man, but certainly not the man."[75] Again, as Thomas writes, "I am not my soul."[76] One is rather a commingling union, a compound,[77] a "little world."[78]

7.2 Christ, God, and man

The Incarnation changes everything.[79]

Among things that have arisen in time the supreme grace is that man has been joined to God to form one person.[80]

All things that overpass the limitations of their own nature become especially the objects of admiration.[81]

7.2.1 The Incarnation

As Merleau-Ponty recognizes, the value of incarnation in general in Western thought has its birthplace in Christianity.[82] Christianity, by holding that God, the absolute, is fully man and mingles in human

life in Christ,[83] has a revolutionary capacity that is directly related to the degree to which it "remains true to the Incarnation."[84] Merleau-Ponty sees the immanence of God in Christ as a kind of "atheism in Christianity," as the "religion of God made man"[85] such that "Nietzsche's idea that God is dead is already contained in the Christian idea of the death of God."[86]

The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation announces the union of the Triune God and the physical in a human body. It is a declaration of the intimacy of God and the world such that the affirmation of the reality of creation, as Pieper reads in Thomas, surges "from reverence for the reality of the Incarnation of God."[87] The Son is sent from the Father into the world;[88] he descended, condescended to us, for us.[89] The image of descent, from the "outside," is yet paired with the human "descent" or coming forth in which, as Irenaeus writes, Christ's flesh "blossoms forth" from the flesh, the lineage, of a common humanity, from the "inside."[90] God the Son became what we are through the Incarnation without ceasing to be what He is—becoming, in Maximus' words, "God below."[91]

The Incarnation in orthodox theology is a mystery, something that seems to be impossible, something revealed to us beyond our horizons of expectation.[92] "His divine Appearing amongst us," as Athanasius writes, "which Jews traduce and Greeks laugh to scorn, but we worship"[93] is, as Maximus writes, the "great and dreadful mystery"[94] that God became flesh "by a strange ordinance contrary to nature."[95] As the manner of creation is ineffable, so is the method of the union of God and humanity in the Incarnation.[96] Indeed, the "infinite qualitative difference" between God and the world is brought into intensive relief in their being united in the Christological paradox.[97]

In the Incarnation, as presented by Gregory of Nazianzus and Augustine, the Word becomes flesh in that the Son *assumes* human nature[98] but is not "consumed into it."[99] Remaining "what he was" and assuming "what he was not,"[100] he was thus "made companion of those here below"[101]—taking on the form of a servant without losing the "form of God."[102] Taking up the metaphor of a "word," Augustine writes:

> Thus in a certain fashion our word becomes a bodily sound by assuming that in which it is manifested to the senses of men, just

as the Word of God became flesh by assuming that in which it too could be manifested to the senses of men.[103]

Maximus writes of this assumption of human nature as "an ineffable self-emptying" that is yet "without change" "which does a divine work by means of passible flesh"[104] Such a hominization of God (who does not thereby cease to be God) is the flip-side of deification of the human, who does not thereby cease to be human.[105]

Christ was fully both human and divine. As Maximus writes, Christ in the Incarnation became "double" or "composite," preserving "the natural difference" of the natures in his "monadic" person.[106] In this "exchange" he took on human nature "in deed and in truth and united it to himself hypostatically—without change, alteration, diminution, or division; he maintained it inalterably, by its own essential principle and definition."[107] In taking on humanity fully "except for sin,"[108] he was "the hypostasis of two natures, of the uncreated and the created, of the impassible and the passible,"[109] and in this kind of union did not abolish or confuse the difference between the divine and the human but "clearly confirmed the natures … along with their essential activities."[110] Yet these natures are truly united, "hypostatically united" such that they are "thoroughly interpenetrating … in a union without confusion."[111] It is such a vision of the union of natures without violating their respective integrity that underlies Maximus' understanding of the two "natural" wills of Christ as being operative in harmony,[112] in a union that harms neither element.[113] There is, Maximus writes, "no opposition between them, even though he maintains all the while the difference between the two natures."[114]

The purpose of the Incarnation, "the reason why God was born among men," is God's love for humans.[115] Out of this love, God through the Incarnation sought to draw humanity into divine communion. In the "take-over" of the Incarnation, "He was made man that we might be made God."[116] This loving purpose is manifest in two "works of love": to reveal and to save, to teach and to heal, to appear and to aid.[117] As Athanasius writes, "He manifested Himself by a body that we might receive the idea of the unseen Father; and He endured the insolence of men that we might inherit immortality."[118] The incarnate Christ is both "God's ambassador and advocate for humanity."[119]

The Incarnation reveals God. Christ makes manifest, visible, and known the "unseen and invisible" God as the Word and image of the Father,[120] the "epiphany of the supersubstantial God."[121] As God's "ambassador," as "a messenger of the great plan of God the eternal Father,"[122] Christ teaches "the way," and knowledge of God appears only "as they who need him can bear it"[123] As Augustine writes, Christ reveals God's love to us so that we may be "persuaded how much God loves us" in order to deliver us from despair.[124]

The Incarnation is also intended to bring about the salvation of human beings. The hypostatic union "recalls" humans to God,[125] bringing about a "reconciliation"[126] that heals and aids us,[127] such that death is put away from us and we are renewed, inheriting immortality.[128] As Gregory of Nazianzus writes, Christ "hallow[s] Man through himself, by becoming a sort of yeast for the whole lump. He has united with himself all that lay under condemnation, in order to release it from condemnation"[129]—refashioning anew human being that is under sin.[130] As such a "Mediator," the incarnate Christ is, as Augustine writes, "a way for man to man's God through a God-man."[131]

7.2.2 Reversal and restoration

Christianity entails reversal. Whereas the lower normally founds the higher, in the Christian view of the world the higher founds the lower, as with a kind of upside-down gravity. This other ordering or polarity does not negate the lower, nor does it collapse the lower into the higher. As the orders of the world ascend to the human, there is another gravity that suspends, that draws the world, through the human, beyond itself. There obtains then, in another sense, a "chiasm," a mutual entanglement in which between the higher and lower orders there is "simultaneously a taking and a being taken, the hold is held."[132] For the Christian understanding, this upward drawing is understood in terms of grace.

The most significant gracious reversal, for the Christian, is the reversal and restoration that is effected through the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The "atheism in Christianity," Merleau-Ponty writes, is that it is the "religion of God made man, where Christ dies."[133] He also recognizes that inherent to the

Christian understanding of the cross, of "the death of God" in the Christian sense, is a connection that is made between God and humanity that "is to tie God to man."[134] Finally, Merleau-Ponty notes the distinctive pairing in Christianity of "the incarnation of God and the resurrection of the body."[135]

For Irenaeus, the cross is at once the site of human brokenness and sin and the site of redemption.[136] For Athanasius, the cross is a site of reversal, a death that is a victory over death, that destroys death.[137] In the cross, as Gregory of Nyssa writes, the divine Son suffered in his human nature, a human nature "glorified by His assumption of it."[138] Thus, as Augustine writes, it is correct to say that in the "form of a servant" "the Lord of glory" (or even God himself) was crucified.[139] In "the Lord's body," Athanasius writes, "the death of all was accomplished … For there was need of death, and death must needs be suffered on behalf of all, that the debt owing from all might be paid."[140]

The change brought about by the work of Christ—a gift that effects a beneficial reversal—is described in many ways. Christ's death paid the *ransom* or the *debt* of our sins that is death[141]—"he," as Maximus writes, "submitted voluntarily to the condemnation owed me."[142] Christ *renews* his creation ("the work of the self-same Word that made it at the beginning"), creating humanity "afresh" "after the image."[143] Humanity in Christ is *restored* to itself and to God[144]—what was lost is saved and found.[145] In the cross, as Maximus writes, "the creator of nature, becoming human beyond nature, brought nature back to that which is according to nature"[146]—abolishing the enmity with which "nature waged implacable war against itself."[147] Humanity is *healed*,[148] *regenerated*, *reformed*,[149] "unfashion[ing] what is bad" in us[150] and bringing "that which had left reality back again to reality."[151] In assuming human nature, Christ "take[s] us to Himself" and so *cleanses* and *purifies* "the soul and flesh of believers."[152] Entering into humanity, becoming a sort of yeast or leaven for the whole "lump," Christ both *releases*—by uniting to himself "all that lay under condemnation"[153] and so "dissolving all the divisions introduced by the transgression of the old Adam"[154]— and *gathers, draws together* what "has been separated," acting "to check what has been borne away, and gather it to himself."[155] This leaven *changes*, *translates*, *transmutes* humanity, "altering it for the better."[156] In *bestowing grace* to humanity, Christ *imparts a divine*

power that gives life and stability to humankind.[157] Humanity is *glorified* and *divinized* by coming to share in Christ's nature.[158]

God, indeed, uses humanity's fallen state to bring humanity back to him.[159] More so, in Christ's death on the cross he "converted the use of death" to a fulcrum of exchange[160] such that Christ "submitted to the condemnation imposed on our passibility and turned that very passibility into an instrument for eradicating sin and the death."[161] In submitting to "the death through suffering which in Adam's case was thoroughly justified," the sin that places humanity under condemnation was itself condemned[162]—so turning "death from a weapon to destroy human nature into a weapon to destroy sin."[163]

As Christ's death releases us from death, Christ's resurrection brings about our resurrection. "He furnished," Augustine writes, "an instance of the resurrection which all shall at last experience,"[164] thus giving value to our faith[165] in the hope, in Maximus' terminology, of our "third birth" to eternal being.[166] Effecting perfection in the body, Christ goes before us in the resurrection, displaying the incorrupt beauty in human nature[167] in victory over death.[168] In the resurrection, the purpose of the Incarnation is made manifest: a full restoration to life and to God of bodily human being[169]—"in Himself," Irenaeus writes, "raising up man that was fallen."[170]

7.2.3 Theosis

Christianity, Merleau-Ponty writes, recognizes "a mystery in the relations of man and God." Through Christ there is effected a unity with God and humans, in which man becomes "strangely" the privileged bearer of transcendence.[171] With "the Christian God who redeems the world" the "separated absolute" is replaced by "the absolute in men"—a divinity that comes to us as "another ourself which dwells in and authenticates our darkness."[172]

For Merleau-Ponty himself, there is something like the divine "Logos" "as what is realized in man, but nowise as his property."[173] The higher in the human transforms the lower. In the miraculous emergence of the higher from the lower (life from the physical, social mind from life),[174] the higher makes use of the lower "beyond all expectations," giving it a new signification, a "radical new sense."[175] Mind forms and transforms the living body, which

in turn forms and transforms the material; in this way mind
through the body effects a transformation, a "metamorphosis" of
ideas into things.[176]

Christianity affirms that in Christ God assumed our human
nature,[177] that "the Creator of nature himself," as Maximus writes,
"has clothed himself with our nature, without change uniting
it hypostatically to himself"[178]—"the same one being both God
and man by nature."[179] Being thus "conjoined with all by a like
nature,"[180] Christ, as Irenaeus writes, "united man with God,
and established a community of union between God and man"[181]
and so acted as a mediator, an "intermediate," bringing about
"friendship and concord," "blending and communion" between
God and humanity.[182] For, as Maximus writes, "he is one, and
there is nothing more unified and nothing more unifying and able
to save than him, or that what is proper to him."[183]

Humanity is created to be in the image and likeness of God.
While we bear the image of God in our creation (in Maximus'
understanding), we approach likeness in growing in "well being,"
in participation with God through Christ,[184] in coming more and
more to imitate the divine.[185] Basil of Caesarea sees this imitation
of Christ as a parallel incorporation of Christ's narrative and that
of the Christian: his birth and our birth, his death and our death
in life (dying in baptism), his resurrection and our new life in life
(rising from baptism), his ascension and our soul's "return" to God
and temporary separation from body upon death, his return in
glory and our resurrection.[186] As Christ came to be "the mediator
of life,"[187] in imitating Christ, in following Christ's trajectory, we
come to further participate in the divine life, to "copy the example
of this divine image, the Son, and not draw away from God."[188]
Christ is a way to God, as Augustine writes, "a way for man to
man's God through a God-man."[189] In the Incarnation God has
"provided us with a bridge to his eternity" and "a model of return
to man who had fallen away."[190] The purpose of the Incarnation
is to draw us into a community of love with God; God came near
to us to draw us to him.[191] In Christ we become part of the divine
life.[192] In our "being made God"[193]—our theosis—we are drawn
toward an "affinity with God"[194] such that "the copy returns to the
pattern it now longs after."[195]

The Incarnation enables our deification in a "blessed
inversion":[196] God "passes into man," is "made man," becomes a

partaker of our humanity and mortality that man might "pass into God," might "be made God," might have a participation in His divinity (Irenaeus, Athanasius, Augustine)[197] to "the same extent that he was made man" (Gregory of Nazianzus).[198]

This, as Maximus writes, is in accordance with God's plan "before the ages": "that man's end was to live in him"[199] in our progressive "transformation unto deification."[200] Nonetheless, the union of God and man effected in the Incarnation unites but does not collapse the difference between them. There are still two natures and not a third thing.[201] In "deification," as Maximus explains, one progressively receives a "divine manner of being"[202] and becomes like God "so far as is possible to humankind"[203] such that "the fullness of deity" dwells in us "by grace."[204] Theosis occurs by grace, beyond (our human) nature, illuminating human nature and so elevating "our nature above its proper limits in excess of glory."[205]

Theosis is less a punctiliar event than a process. We are made to be in this relation to God. Human nature is truly revealed as that united to God in Christ. Thus, in a sense, our origin as human is at the end, in union with God. For Irenaeus, theosis is the carrying out in due time of the creation, the "formation" of humanity such that our creation will be complete when we are united to God in Christ, in "the kingdom of heaven" which is the uniting of man to God.[206] In humanity and in Christ, as Gregory of Nyssa writes, the earthly is "raised up to the Divine."[207] As Maximus presents it, theosis, our being "brought to deification," is progressive.[208] We actively participate in our being brought into accord with our true being which is the image and likeness of God, our *logoi.*[209] God creates us and draws us into his life; we, as Irenaeus writes, are "created … receive growth … [are] strengthened … abound … recover … [are] glorified … see [our] Lord."[210] The work of the creation of humanity in the image of God—a progression from "animal being" toward being "united to God"—continues as one piece over time.[211]

7.2.4 Resurrection

Merleau-Ponty recognizes that central to Christianity is the doctrine of the future resurrection of the body,[212] that "in the last analysis the soul is so little to be separated from the body that it will

carry a radiant double of its temporal body into eternity."[213] This fundamental affirmation of the human body in the resurrection is manifest throughout the writings of classic Christian thinkers. For Christians, human life is bodily even in the afterlife.

While thinkers like Origen seem in places to present humans as ultimately immaterial, disembodied souls,[214] the main stream of patristic thought from Irenaeus and Athanasius on saw the life to come in terms of the resurrection of the body. "The salvation of the flesh," Irenaeus writes, is that our bodies "shall rise at their appointed time"[215]—that our animal bodies "rising through the Spirit's instrumentality … become spiritual bodies, so that by the Spirit they possess a perpetual life."[216] "Life at the present moment" shows that the flesh can partake of life, and seeing that human life as such was brought into being from dust, God then manifestly has the ability to "confer life" upon our bodies which have dissolved into dust "inasmuch as He grants life to us who are in existence."[217] Through Christ, there is a reuniting of soul and body[218] related to his own resurrection.[219]

In the resurrection of the body there is a cementing of the union of soul and body and a "reweaving" of the bodily nature.[220] The "soul," Gregory of Nyssa writes, "attracts again to itself that which is its own and properly belongs to it" inasmuch as the soul "recognizes" and reunites even the identical "actual atoms"—one's "kindred dust," again like the dust of creation. For "if the same man is to return into himself, he must be the same entirely, and regain his original formation in every single atom of his elements."[221] The resurrection, for Gregory, is "the re-constitution of our nature in its original form," a restoration to our "ancient state," "reformed anew after the original pattern."[222] Our former "members," as Augustine writes, are gathered "from the most secret recesses of any other of the elements in which the dead bodies of men have lain hid."[223] While intriguing and making evident the deep connection of the human with the material, it must be said that such an account misses the intervening founding order (between the human and the material) of life that is not reducible to material elements, but is continually exchanging. Indeed, the most basic biological reality is metabolism as such an exchange.

The resurrection body is a "spiritual body," a higher kind of body such as, Augustine writes, "is worn by anticipation by Christ as our head, and will be worn by His members in the resurrection

of the dead."[224] It is, as Athanasius writes, an incorrupt body, "clothed all with incorruption, by the promise of the resurrection."[225] In the resurrection the mortal is "quickened" and "renewed"[226] so as to have a bodily life that is "equal with the angels."[227] Maximus describes the resurrection of body in terms of a third birth, a birth to eternal being. All three "births" (to being, well-being [in baptism], and eternal being) are births that involve body and soul. Jesus "honored" these "three births,"[228] and "we await the final incorruptibility of Christ in the Spirit," the third birth of the resurrection.[229] The resurrection "produces stability of soul and incorruption of body,"[230] and, in this state, we participate in the divine by becoming "wholly God in body and soul by grace and by the unparalleled divine radiance of blessed glory appropriate to him."[231]

7.3 Embodied spirituality

7.3.1 Spiritual life in the flesh

For Merleau-Ponty, significant organization of the whole, in life and in human life, entails the transformation of the constituent parts. The form or organization of the animal body is not defined merely by the physical borders of an organism, but rather is a "a take on the exterior world," being sensitive to some things and not to others, and so defining "a *templum* where [physical] events will have an organic signification."[232] It is in the form of the whole that one should seek "the character of the living being."[233] The organism is not a mere thing but a way of being in the world.

For many thinkers in the Christian tradition, the spiritual life is not a life that escapes from the material or the body but another way of being in the flesh. For Maximus, our "well being" (in the midst of his triad of being, well being, and eternal being) is a "voluntary good of likeness"[234] in which we imitate God.[235] Following one's "inclination and motion," "one zealously traverses one's course toward the beginning and source without deviation by means of one's good will and choice."[236] In this imitative approach to God we participate in his wisdom and goodness[237] by using our natural powers well (in choosing to cultivate "the good natural

seed")[238] in conjunction with the work of the Spirit[239] and so come into our true humanity, approaching the logos of our well being "which is in God."[240] This participatory cultivation toward our well being thus "shows the end to be the same as the beginning and the beginning to be the same as the end."[241] We are initiated into this well being in the second birth of baptism "in which we receive well-being in abundance" in that we both die to a disordered and destructive way of being and receive the helping and restoring Holy Spirit.[242]

The spiritual life in the flesh is also "spiritual" insofar as it is a life characterized by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, by partaking of the Spirit.[243] In the Spirit, God dwells in our fleshly bodies as his temple.[244] As Basil of Caesarea writes, the Holy Spirit makes people "spiritual by fellowship with Himself."[245] In the Spirit, as a given means of intercession, we are "adopted" by the Father through the Son and so come to participate in God.[246] The Holy Spirit is a gift, "the Gift" sent forth and proceeding from the Father,[247] who himself gives gifts and benefits by his indwelling.[248] The Spirit gives "life" to the body in the rebirth of baptism and beyond.[249] The Spirit empowers us toward our well being,[250] transforming and restoring us by dissolving the "stickiness" (as Maximus writes) of the vicious passions[251] and pouring the love of God "which brings us through to God" into our hearts (Romans 5.5)[252]—so effecting an inner resurrection.[253] Thus the Spirit graciously works with us, persuading our inclination.[254]

Being "spiritual" is a divine way of being flesh. In Augustine's understanding, a spiritual flesh comes about when the lower is affirmed as ordered to the higher, is lived "according to God," "under the grace of God."[255] Thus, "the flesh shall then be spiritual, and subject to the spirit, but still flesh, not spirit, as the spirit itself, when subject to the flesh, was fleshly, but still spirit and not flesh."[256] Like Christ, we endeavor and are empowered to perform "fleshly activities in a divine way" and to do "divine deeds by means of the flesh."[257] As Maximus writes, the flesh that serves the higher life[258] does not abandon earthly life but rather manifests a different "harmony" in the world and with God[259]—as if a different Spirit plays in our midst as corporal instruments,[260] as "members of God,"[261] as the temple of the Holy Spirit.

7.3.2 *Ordo Amoris*

The name of this spiritual harmony—in the midst of humanity and between humanity and God—is love. Merleau-Ponty sees in Christianity a love that pours itself forth excessively—as manifest in "the adventure of the priest-workers, as awareness that we cannot place God apart from humanity suffering in history; hence, so that God may be realized, the sorting out of humans who are the furthest from God."[262] Sacrificial love—a social-being that is beyond coexistence or exchange, a love that "tears me away from my lone self and creates instead a mixture of myself and the other"[263]—is "a deeper way of living" that emerges from desire in a "miraculous" manner.[264] Maximus, representing many other Christian voices, sees the ordering of desire toward love as the key to our proper ordering toward others and toward God.[265]

As Gregory of Nyssa writes, the ordering of our bodily existence in relation to God is not one of abnegation of the body in preference to the spiritual, but a virtuous (harmonious) ordering of our "bodily habitation."[266] Virtue operates on something of a horizontal axis and a vertical axis. Virtue is "horizontally" a moderation, a mean, a "middle way" in which one restrains oneself from excess so as to bring about a good relation in the midst of what one is through habit and regularity.[267] For Maximus, virtue brings about a "practical harmony" in the body.[268] Such a virtuous mind "functions according to nature"[269] and lives in accord with "the perfect natural logos,"[270] fulfilling the "beautiful and praise-worthy work of God."[271]

Virtue's "vertical" orientation entails prudence regarding the proper ordering of goods, of pleasures—the right ordering of desire regarding higher and lower objects.[272] This is classically described in terms of an *ordo amoris*—an order of love. The problem is not desire or even immoderate desire, but desire out of step with its object. We can and should desire God who "is himself absolute virtue" and worthy of desire without limit.[273] "The love of gain," Gregory writes, "which is a large, incalculably large, element in every soul, when once applied to the desire for God, will bless the man who has it; for he will be violent where it is right to be violent."[274] Desire is from God and leads us toward "God's friendship."[275] In the hierarchy of desires or orientations relative to the likeness to God,[276] the right ordering of desire leads the mind

God-ward—not despising that which is not God, but preferring God to "all that is in the world."[277] Such an order of love or desire is, as Maximus notes, based in the order of reality such that one should not prefer "the things made by God to God himself."[278]

For Gregory of Nyssa, the vice that arises from the "evil husbandry of the mind"[279] stands in contrast to the manner in which reason can "transmute" emotions into "a form of virtue."[280] For Maximus, virtue entails such a good "shepherding" by the reason of the lower orders of the human[281]—not abandoning the flesh but ordering it rightly,[282] "persuad[ing] the flesh to subject itself lawfully to the spirit" to become "unchanging through the unchangeable habit of virtue."[283] We pass "over from flesh to spirit" when we put to rest the disorder of the passions.[284]

We should avoid undue passionate attachment to lesser things[285] in order to be freed for the blessed passion of love, the love of God, that our love and passion might bind us first to things that are most worthwhile.[286] In the love of God, we worship "that immense ocean of goodness which is beyond astonishment."[287]

For Maximus, this kind of vertical ordering, such an *ordo amoris*, directs us toward participation in God, to being "deified to God through love."[288] Through virtuous habits one comes to participate "in God, the substance of the virtues";[289] one grows in "familiarity with God" by "habitually corresponding in all things to God."[290] For Maximus, the virtuous, proper/reasonable (in accord with the Logos) movement of the person is to be oriented by love toward God[291] with "charitable desire as the crowning virtue of the rationality of human nature."[292] For love "gathers together what has been separated, once again fashioning the human being in accordance with a single meaning and mode."[293] Our proper relation to and use of things in the world is not that of immoderate attachment or love but a use that brings about a situation in one's desiring relations that can be described as justice.[294]

Augustine writes that it is "a brief but true definition of virtue to say, it is the order of love."[295] To desire or value things in the right way, to find the proper enjoyment of the finite, is to see how things lead beyond themselves.[296] One's ordinate or inordinate love has to do with loving God first and then being able to attain a proper or ordered love of other things in the light of this supreme love and this supreme good.[297]

8

Theology and the human

8.1 The human as rational and social, the soul

8.1.1 Against reductionism and dualism

Merleau-Ponty opposes a reductionistic understanding of the human person. The body "is and is not ourselves"—we are it, but it is not all there is to us.[1] A mechanistic view of the universe—an empiricist reconstruction of reality on the basis of material bits—is unable to account for the whole of higher or complex systems.[2] Indeed, the perception that would seem to be the very foundation of such an empiricism fails to fit easily into the empiricist framework.

Likewise, Merleau-Ponty rejects any form of dualism that would see the essentially human as a disembodied mind (as "an impartial spectator," "an interior without exterior," a "for-itself") that is set over against the body (as "a thing without an interior," "one object among all others," an "in-itself").[3] While a dualistic understanding might present the mental as isolated from life as distinct substance, "erecting" it into a "second positivity," into an invisible and immaterial realm that has no relation to the visible and the material,[4] Merleau-Ponty sees the spirit as "virtually buried in the concordant functioning of bodies"[5]—the psychical "gears into" the physiological.[6] While he might think in terms of a "functional opposition" between the "body" and "soul," this, he writes, "cannot be transformed into a 'substantial opposition.'"[7] The

human is intimately related to the living body such that the soul or mind and body form a "synergetic system of which all of the functions are taken up and tied together in the general movement of being in the world"[8] and so "can never be distinguished absolutely without ceasing to be."[9] For Merleau-Ponty, there is no non-mental human body.[10] Our interiority neither precedes the material human body, nor is it merely a function of it.[11]

In Christian theology, the human is "compounded of body and soul,"[12] both corporeal and incorporeal, an alloy or commixture of animated body and living soul.[13] For Augustine, the human is a being together of soul and body, the superior and the inferior, the inner and outer, the invisible and the visible.[14] Human being is formed from dust in the image of God.[15] Gregory of Nyssa recognizes the mysterious connection between the mind and the body—and even dependence of the mind upon the body, such that the mind

> … is to be regarded as both in [the body] and around it, neither implanted in it nor enfolded with it, but in a way which we cannot speak or think, except so far as this, that while the nature [of the body] prospers according to its own order, the mind is also operative; but if any misfortune befalls the former, the movement of the intellect halts correspondingly.[16]

Human being, Maximus writes, is brought into being as both body and soul forming a "complete" or "whole human species" with neither being part preexistent,[17] such that, as he writes, "if the body and the soul are parts of man, as we have seen, it must be granted that as parts each necessarily bears a relation to something other than itself" and "what each is in essence can be distinguished only in thought."[18] Maximus will later go so far as to say that "the soul is never conceived apart from the body, nor the body apart from the soul."[19]

The Christian understanding of humanity is as created in the image of God. However, this revealed understanding is something mysterious;[20] we do not know determinately what the human as *imago Dei* is as the human is defined in relation to the Trinity and the Incarnation—the mysteries of the faith—apart from which we are in the position, as Kierkegaard's Climacus writes, of Socrates, that bewildered "connoisseur of human nature," who "no longer knew whether he was a more curious monster than Typhon or whether there was something divine in him."[21]

8.1.2 The higher order of the soul

The "soul," for Merleau-Ponty, is the higher, invisible, meaningful, "formation" in relation to the lower visible of the body as "acquired dialectical soil";[22] it is the higher that "lives of" the lower[23] as the higher's "presupposed" supporting "vehicle" or "infrastructure"[24]—such that there is a higher and a lower order, a "founded" and a "founding."[25] In this "founding" [*Fundierung*] relationship, the higher is founded upon but not reducible to the lower; the lower is both surpassed and presupposed by the higher that emerges from it.[26] The soul's "natal space," its "cradle," is the body.[27] This invisible "level" or "dimension" is an "invisible of this [bodily, visible] world";[28] it is "a level which is higher than that of life."[29] The soul is the sentience ("the invisible, mind") that is the "other side" of the body[30]—the human invisible is an "interior" invisible "behind me."[31]

For Gregory of Nyssa, the distinctively human emerges from a progression. Nature "makes an ascent as it were by steps"—"not growing all of it at once, but in a continuous progress" and "according to a certain necessary sequence in the order of things"—toward "what is perfect," which comes last.[32] It is "for this reason," he writes, that humanity "was made last after the animals, as nature advanced in an orderly course to perfection."[33] The progressive order of creation and of individual creatures is from corporeal matter ("devoid of life") to corporal life—first vegetative and nutritive (possessing vital energy or power "destitute of sense" as in vegetables and the earliest fœtus) and then sensitive and locomotive (possessing the power of "management" or "regulation" according to sense as in animals and in babies)—to the life of the rational intellect.[34] The development of higher functioning manifests a relationship of "founding" [*Fundierung*]:

> Seeing, then, that this life of sensation could not possibly exist apart from the matter which is the subject of it, and the intellectual life could not be embodied, either, without growing in the sentient, on this account the creation of man is related as coming last, as of one who took up into himself every single form of life, both that of plants and that which is seen in brutes.[35]

In such an ascent, the rational as the higher is dependent upon the lower orders.[36] Yet the human is last in this ascending development

and bears the rational capacity to gather together what came before it, to "include" and perfect the material and bodily life in relation to God—something that the material and other living bodies cannot do.[37] Gregory writes:

> He planted life in the work of His hand, that thus the earthy might be raised up to the Divine, and so one certain grace of equal value might pervade the whole creation, the lower nature being mingled with the supramundane.[38]

The soul, in the Christian tradition, administers the body. For Augustine and Basil of Caesarea, the soul (the "inner man") is not only dependent upon the body (the "outer man"), but in turn serves to lead, animate or control it.[39] Gregory of Nyssa describes the influence of the thinking soul on the body as that of "transmitting from itself to an organized and sentient body the power of living and of grasping objects of sense, as long as a natural constitution capable of this holds together."[40]

In Merleau-Ponty as well, the soul, the higher is not a mere function of the lower (living and material) orders. First, the higher is the meaning of lower; the soul is the meaning of the body. In the relation of *Fundierung*, the higher reveals the meaning of the lower.[41] The soul or consciousness "spreads across" the ground of the body and is "established" as the meaning of the body.[42] The bodily visible is "informed" and "rendered visible" by the soul's invisible world of culture[43]—the "founding" (the body) "appears" in and to the "founded" (the soul).[44] Our ideality lends to the flesh "its axes, its depth, its dimensions."[45]

Second, the higher for Merleau-Ponty (in a sense) constitutes the lower; the soul constitutes the body. The form of an organism is something like the "principle" that constitutes its order or organization,[46] and the mind is the higher "form" that organizes its living organism.[47] Habitual behavior, itself ordered and fostered by human thinking, constitutes a living body.[48] This distinctively human behavior, as distinctive of the thinking soul, gives bodily human being an openness beyond that of the merely animal body—a greater degree of awareness and interrelation that constitutes this body as more "open totality."[49]

Third and finally, Merleau-Ponty sees the higher as transforming the lower. In humanity, "the appearance of reason and mind does

not leave intact a sphere of self-enclosed instincts" such as is found in animals.[50] While mind's inclusion is not a "simple subordination" or an "overcoming" that abolishes "kinship" or relation between the orders as different.[51] Consciousness has the freedom to dialectically take up and at once put "out of play" and transform the given material and biological ("vital") "roots that it thrusts into the world."[52] The higher transformation of mind is not new substance but new structuration, a "virtual space" that lays over "concrete space" and integrates and orients it, reorganizes it into new wholes. Mind or consciousness or the soul "retakes" or "recaptures" the corporeal existence of previous orders and uses them for a symbolic order.[53] The human transfigures the natural by introducing new "meaningful cores that transcend and transfigure its natural powers" and so opens itself (the human body) to new behavior.[54]

8.1.3 The human difference

Humanity, for Merleau-Ponty, is a "very great" and "strange" marvel, an enigma.[55] For Merleau-Ponty, the higher transcends or surpasses the lower, maintaining the "originality" or non-reducibility of higher orders (life or mind)—"liberat[ing] the higher from the lower" such that upon the "initial foundation of acquired and congealed existence" rests, for the human order at least, an "open and personal existence."[56] The higher, as something new relative to the lower, makes use of the lower "beyond all expectations," giving it a new signification, a "radical new sense,"[57] a meaningful and holistic "second body" beyond the "natural" one.[58] The "emergence" of the higher from the lower (life from the physical, social mind from life) is "miraculous,"[59] and one cannot properly (in an "empiricist" manner) "explain the higher by the lower."[60] Our "transcendence," our being as existing points to our capacity for making a situation "our own" by "ceaselessly transform[ing]" the life of the organism with a conditioned, limited freedom.[61]

   In Christianity, human being or the human soul is likewise a mystery. Humanity is revealed as created in the image of God, but this is less a systematic handle that we have on human nature than a sign of its deep mystery.[62] The question of the soul and the nature of humanity (whether, as Kierkegaard's Climacus writes, man is "a more curious monster than Typhon or whether there

was something divine in him"[63]) is recognized as one, as Augustine writes, of "extreme difficulty."[64] Even though Augustine would know "nothing more" than "God and the soul," he also realizes that he knows neither.[65] Indeed, he writes that "nobody has yet managed to persuade me I can ever have such a grasp of the soul."[66] The more we desire to understand ourselves, "the more our language begins to stagger, and our attention fails to persevere until our understanding if not our tongue can arrive at some clear result"—one's own mind eludes one's grasp.[67] Basil of Caesarea sees the understanding of the soul or the mind or the self as "the most difficult of sciences,"[68] and Gregory of Nyssa responds to Paul's question "Who hath known the mind of the Lord?" with the further question, "who has understood his own mind?"[69] Augustine writes of the soul that "you cannot state better what it is than by saying that it is the soul or spirit of life."[70] All he can affirm about the soul, "whatever it is," is that it is from God and made from nothing—that it is and is created. Augustine also gives certain negations about the soul: that it is not God, that it is incorporeal (that "it is neither one of these four well-known elements, which are manifestly bodies") and "that it is immortal as regards life in the ordinary sense." Beyond these things, he says, nothing is certain about it.[71]

   Such a negative approach to the soul (being able to say something about what it is not but very little about what it is) is a way of figuring the transcendence of the soul. The soul is not reducible to the corporeal, to the material—it is incorporeal.[72] The rational soul is understood to be something that is created by God at conception and does not originate "from underlying matter."[73] Humanity, for Augustine, is a "great miracle," a "great treasure," the "greatest ornament" upon the earth[74] due to its singular rational nature—which means that the humans are not like other ("irrational") animals but go beyond them.[75] We are not as connected to our given situations (our given environments or our heredity or instincts) as other animals.[76] As Gregory of Nyssa notes, we are "in some manner our own parents, giving birth to ourselves by our own free choice."[77]

   Basil of Caesarea draws a connection between the essence of the human being, the soul, and "the superiority of reason."[78] The transcendence of the rational soul is seen in the reflective, rational capacity of presiding over, as distanced from, the bodily senses

(not being determined by natural instincts). In this the rational soul is like the "skilled intelligence" of an artist as it relates to the strings of a lyre, moving the several senses "according to the proper function of each."[79] Through the rational soul one attains a greater degree of transcendence from one's living body, or perhaps better, expands one's bodily dwelling through thought and through and beyond the senses toward the "invisible" on the far side of the sensible.[80]

Beyond all of this, however, the primary site of the human difference for the Church Fathers, of the distinction named by the human soul, is in the capacity for humans to relate to God.[81] "The privilege of reason," writes Basil of Caesarea, is that you are "capable of raising yourself to heaven," of thoughtfully relating to God.[82] This is related to the manner in which in the creation of humanity "there was counsel in God to consider how to bring the dignified living creature into life. 'Let us make.' The wise one deliberates, the Craftsman ponders."[83] As Basil writes, even if we are often "less reasonable about our own affairs than the fish," we yet have the ability to become mindful of God from creation.[84] Human beings, as Gregory of Nyssa writes, were created last in an ascending development in order that they might thoughtfully behold the wonders and the beauty of the world and through this come to know God—to be an image of the Creator within the created world.[85] As humanity is to enjoy both the good things of earth and their Creator, God has given man

> … a twofold organization, blending the Divine with the earthy, that by means of both he may be naturally and properly disposed to each enjoyment, enjoying God by means of his more divine nature, and the good things of earth by the sense that is akin to them.[86]

Bearing such a capacity to relate to God, humanity can serve as a kind of completion of creation—"that thus the earthy might be raised up to the Divine"[87]—such that with humanity the world can be declared "very good" (Gen 1.31).[88] As such, the human difference is that of a mediator between God and the rest of the material world. Humanity, as Maximus writes, is "a middle being between God and matter and has powers that can unite it with both."[89] Or as Gregory of Nyssa writes: "While two natures—the

Divine and incorporeal nature, and the irrational life of brutes—are separated from each other as extremes, human nature is the mean between them: for in the compound nature of man we may behold a part of each of the natures"—the material animal body and the rational and relational image of God.[90]

8.1.4 Microcosm

Merleau-Ponty sees humanity as a "vinculum" or folding together or connection.[91] Like concentric circles, the higher both transcends the lower and includes or "integrates" or "englobes" it,[92] and the relation of each order to the higher order is something like that of the partial to the total.[93] The human is connected to the rest of the living world.[94] As higher, the human reveals the lower, "founding" the lower by revealing its meaning.[95] Seeing all of the forms of behavior as involving a kind of meaning, Merleau-Ponty concludes that there are certain anticipations or "partial prefigurations" in nature of the human, rational, social order.[96]

   In the Church Fathers, especially Maximus, the world before man is teleologically ordered to humanity with humanity gathering together what came before into a little world, a microcosm or a "second cosmos."[97] The end of humanity, as Maximus writes, is that "the one God, Creator of all, is shown to reside proportionately in all beings through human nature."[98] This can come about inasmuch as humanity is capable of joining the distinctions between God and creation and, within creation, uniting "the torn fragments of nature"—between the intelligible and the sensible and between the invisible and the visible.[99] The human "by means of its natural relationship of belonging to each division of creation … draws these things through their own parts into itself in unity" and raises things "up to their Creator."[100] This unification, Maximus writes, ultimately comes about in Christ as "the perfect human being" who has "united the fragments of the universal nature of the all" and has thus "accomplished the whole will of God the Father on our behalf."[101] Christ, in summing up all things in himself, "showed for what purpose the first human being was brought into being."[102]

8.1.5 The human as social

For Merleau-Ponty, the human or mental is intimately connected to the social.[103] There is a co-implication of the social, the mental and the linguistic—of "relations with others, intelligence, and language."[104] In human society "the purely carnal and vital coexistence with the world and bodies" has been transformed into "a coexistence of language."[105] Such social and mental "ensembles" operating in the "characteristically obscure and ambiguous" domain of language are of an "invisible" or ideal or virtual order, the order of the "logos."[106] Human life, as human, is naturally articulate and communicative[107] and always already has a "thickness of cultural acquisitions," the social and linguistic world of meanings.[108]

For Gregory of Nyssa, we are at our most human when we are most social. Language and history are parts of the essentially human such that the mind is likened to a city. The less interpretive and historical something is the less human it is.[109] For the human, one's animal body, specifically one's hands and one's tongue, becomes an instrument of reason and an opening upon another world, the social world of reason and symbols. Being rooted in our bodily existence[110] and reason, our language operates in the domain of the social.[111] Such intelligible artifacts as speech or writing are tied, for Augustine, to the artificer and are an extension of the human.[112] The work of reason happens within the traditions, the corporal "handing down" (in physically speaking, writing, giving), and the customs through which different nations "regulat[e] their enthusiasm and their aims."[113] Experimental knowledge (Gregory specifically refers to medicine) is passed on, providing for the possibility of improving, of progress.[114]

For Merleau-Ponty, there exists a primordial intersubjectivity, a "primordial We" that is our fundamental living relation to others.[115] The social is the "transcendental field" for the human,[116] for as one is integrated into a "collectivity of speaking subjects," one lives in a conversation that "envelops and inhabits" one "to the point that I cannot tell what comes from me and what from it."[117] Bodily human behavior or being-in-the-world is social, always already in communication with others such that our private worlds are a "divergence with respect to the world itself"—a privation relative to our more primitive being-in-common.[118] Our consciousness is a

consciousness "with others"[119] such that human life is irreducibly public—that human bodies without a social transcendental field, without "a constellation of Myselves coexisting in a world," are not yet truly human bodies.[120]

Such an understanding resonates with the Christian insight that, as William Desmond writes, "to be personal is to be in social relations."[121] Humanity, Augustine writes, is the most social race "by nature,"[122] made to be ordered beyond ourselves toward the social life of the City of God.[123] The human person is, as Kierkegaard writes, a dependent set of relations—"a derived, established relation, a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another."[124]

Christian theology teaches that humans are social by nature, that we are made to be ordered beyond ourselves.[125] Human life is intimately tied up with the life of others. We are, as Merleau-Ponty writes, "a knot of relations"[126] and we exist, as Maximus writes, "by the relationship which unites [us] to each other."[127]

The defining element of humanity, that humans are created in the image of God, has to do with one's relation to another.[128] Furthermore, the image of God in humanity is seen as a Trinitarian image—an image of the God who is social.[129] The notion of person as a relation stems from a doctrine of the Trinity—in which "the term 'persons,' when applied to the divine perichoresis, is governed entirely by the language of relations"—and stands opposed to the modern understanding of the person as an "isolated, punctiliar, psychic monad."[130] Augustine's famous psychological analogy sees an image of the Trinity in the faculties of memory, understanding/knowledge/word, and will/love.[131] The modification toward which we are led by Merleau-Ponty is that this image of the Trinity in human rationality should take into account the fact that these rational faculties are themselves irreducibly social, arising in the context of a "primordial We."[132] The psychological analogy is thus ultimately a social analogy.

For Merleau-Ponty, our relation to others is a desiring relation. We are always already being drawn toward the other;[133] we experience empathy (*Einfülung*) as an orientation to and presence of others within one's own "private" life.[134] We have a sympathetic "encompassing" "investment" in others,[135] a fundamental "indistinction" between oneself and the other that we rarely explicitly experience in adult life except in significant and intense

"limiting situations" such as being in love.[136] Our existence is a desiring coexistence in which one person's world is co-implicated or co-enveloped with the worlds of others.[137]

Augustine, too, sees a fundamental orientation toward love and concord in human beings. Our basic desire is for harmonious and peaceful relationships through which we do good to others.[138] Such a desire or "natural affinity"[139] expands out in the different circles of human society from the family, to the city, to the world—from proximate community to abstract community.[140] This social being of humanity is, as Basil of Caesarea notes, a sharing in the attachment, fellowship, and harmony that unites the parts of the universe into one in a "universal sympathy."[141]

8.2 Tradition and the Christian tradition

Merleau-Ponty's understanding of tradition allows for both continuity and novelty. Our historical being in which we develop is a "transformation which preserves and surpasses" and is fundamental to human being.[142] Historical progression is a "real but relative revolution" that establishes new institutions through its transformation of preceding institutions.[143] Tradition, for Merleau-Ponty, is the particular content of historical human being; it is a "layer of spiritual being, i.e., of historical being."[144] The social world of thought is sedimented—as building up a determinate, if changing, situation or setting.[145] Sedimentation is the "substance" of humanity, of "our understanding of man"—that humanity exists perpetually within "modifications in the human situation."[146] Our "imaginary fields, ideological fields, mythical fields"[147] constitute the "secondary sedimentation" of the "symbolic matrices" of our cultural "common world"[148] as the system of references enabling meaning to occur.[149] The social horizon "enlarges my world by taking up collective history, tradition."[150]

Novelty, for Merleau-Ponty, is a taking up of past inheritance differently. These past "roots" are the ballast of meaning that provides a relatively stable space for innovation.[151] The institution of past contingencies can be "recentered," "re-created," "elaborated," gaining new and surpassing sense.[152] This dynamic divergence or deformation is a new "answer" to a prior question.[153]

The given past can become a "fruitful imprint" when one takes hold of the past and transforms it.[154] This taking up is not a "total reactivation" but an operation of "finite capacities of reactivation."[155]

For Merleau-Ponty, authentic Christianity has revolutionary potential. "Christian themes," he writes, "are ferments, not relics."[156] The originary in-breaking or novelty or advent of Christianity entails an extraordinary excess beyond previous institutions.[157] Although not himself a Christian, he finds Christianity to be of "enormous historical value."[158] He finds in Christianity an irreducible historical consciousness,[159] though Christians can, as Merleau-Ponty comments, seem "eager to forget whatever was wild and harsh," what was radical at the beginning of the Christian tradition.[160]

For the Christian, God's plan in human history is to heal and to teach, to edify and to educate.[161] Most broadly, this plan of education and edification that was the plan before the beginning— as Maximus writes, "the great and hidden mystery," "the divine purpose conceived before the beginning of created beings"—is deification, bringing humanity to fulfillment in communion with God.[162] This plan and its coming about are given from God in revelation.[163] It is, as Augustine writes, "because we were weak and unable to find the truth by pure reason that we needed the authority of the sacred scriptures"—"the testimony of those witnesses by whom the Scriptures, justly called divine … who by divine assistance were enabled, either through bodily sense or intellectual perception, to see or to foresee the things in question."[164] The revelatory "oracles" of God were presented through and to humans in history "by certain signs and sacraments suitable to the times."[165] Revelation, Augustine writes, was only understandable and "suited to our wandering state"[166] inasmuch as it spoke to us through some created and so changeable (historically mutable) substance.[167] Thus revelation condescends, "stoops" to us in order to "nourish our understanding and enable it to rise up to the sublimities of divine things."[168]

Merleau-Ponty describes tradition as a "handing over"—a giving, taking up, and receiving[169] in which what has come before is "salvaged" and "preserved," reanimated or reactivated, in the present.[170] With tradition, we inherit and dwell in the midst of instituted meanings that condense the past and open a future for

us.[171] Instituted tradition takes up contingent events "toward being a series" or a continuity, renewing the past as a "call to follow," as an "invitation to a sequel."[172]

The "hanging over" of tradition is essential to the constitution of the Church. Without, as Maximus writes, "the things of Holy Writ and those of the holy Fathers," the Church could not exist.[173] The defining tradition of the Church is commonly understood as the apostolic tradition in that the apostles are, in Irenaeus' words, "those through whom the Gospel has come down to us, which they did at one time proclaim in public, and, at a later period, by the will of God, handed down to us in the Scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of our faith."[174] This "doctrine" or teaching of the apostles[175] has been "delivered" and "taught among us,"[176] passed down from "the holy men"—as Basil of Caesarea writes, "originators and champions of the word" who were "pillars of the church and conspicuous for all knowledge and spiritual power."[177] This tradition is passed on by succession from the apostles through "the fathers," the "Elders," the "grey hairs" to us.[178]

That which is delivered, the gift or deposit or preaching of truth,[179] is to be "sent forth" as "glad tidings"—"proclaiming the peace of heaven to men"—to "the ends of the earth," progressively extending the "apostolic" message.[180] This gospel "preached every-where throughout the world" is a tradition that is trans-cultural (intentionally universal) in its reach.[181] In this passing on and taking up of the Christian tradition over time and throughout the world there is progressive change or transition. In the act of taking up (if it is truly taken up) there is a movement of persuasion and not force that entails a spontaneity on the part of the recipient. Thus in the tradition's progress there is (ideally) a preserved conti-nuity, unity, and catholicity in the midst of continually different and creative cultural and historical appropriations.[182]

8.3 The Spirit and the Church

8.3.1 The Spirit in the Church

Merleau-Ponty intimates an understanding of the Holy Spirit in his observation of Christianity's affirmation of the "absolute in

men."[183] The human person in Christianity serves as a sacramental "vehicle" for divine "presence and action"[184] and so becomes a "privileged bearer" of transcendence.[185] The "meaning of the Pentecost" for Merleau-Ponty (reflecting something of Hegel's philosophy of religion) is that God is "in human society and communication, wherever men come together in His name."[186]

For Merleau-Ponty, the invisible domain of thought lives from the social.[187] The intersubjectivity that is first intercorporeality becomes culture through bodily communication.[188] Such a conception has potential to fund thinking about a phenomenology of the Spirit, finding ways to describe how the Holy Spirit is operative in the midst of the Church.

For Augustine, the Holy Spirit is sent as "the gift of God"—"everlastingly gift, but donation only from a point of time."[189] The Spirit is the gift of love, "the charity which brings us through to God"; through the Holy Spirit the love of God is poured into our hearts (Rom. 5.5).[190] The Spirit works in the midst of the Church to lead people to God, cultivating and drawing them into communication, toward deification. By "the hands of the Father," the Son and the Spirit, one is "made in the likeness of God" (Irenaeus) and made holy by the Holy Spirit's participation within one (Origen).[191]

The Spirit, as Irenaeus writes, is "poured out … for the union and communion of God and man, imparting indeed God to men by means of the Spirit."[192] The Spirit leads people to the Son who brings people to the Father.[193] The Spirit's part in the Trinitarian work of the creation of humanity in the image and likeness of God continues as a piece over time—helping humans progress toward deification, "fashion[ing] man into the likeness of God."[194] As Irenaeus writes, the Spirit (as part of the Trinity's work of nurturing and appropriately raising us[195]) nourishes and "increases" us, helping us in and preparing us for the work of "making progress day by day, and ascending towards the perfect, that is, approximating to the uncreated One"[196]—"that man, having embraced the Spirit of God, might pass into the glory of the Father."[197] We are, as Augustine writes, "roused by the warmth of the Holy Spirit" and "woken up to God."[198] The movement of the Spirit, as Gregory of Nazianzus describes it, all has to do with the relation between humans and God: "being given, sent, divided, or his being a grace, a gift, an inspiration, a promise, a means of intercession."[199]

The unity and harmonious ordering of the Church is seen as being brought about through the Spirit and the gifts of the Spirit.[200] Basil of Caesarea, seeing a kind of reflexivity operative in the understanding of the Church as the "temple of the Holy Spirit," even presents the Spirit as the place of the saints, just as the saints are "the proper place for the Spirit."[201] The one Spirit is the place in which many are brought together as one as the Church. The Spirit, as Maximus writes, works through "uniting everyone in a common mind in the knowledge of the one God and in a single love for one another and concord. In such a relationship, no one is completely separated spiritually from anyone else, even if, spatially and bodily, they are separated far from each other."[202] God's working through the Spirit "by a kind [maternal] brooding" (Gen. 1.2)[203] provides a "fund of blessings," infusing and "pouring forth" dynamic and vital form into the world.[204]

8.3.2 Church as loving community in the world

Christianity, Merleau-Ponty writes, can be revolutionary, can be a remedy of what Marx sees religion to be, "when it remains true to the Incarnation."[205] Such a transformative "philosophy of the Church" is not an isolated individualism.[206] The Church should, in Merleau-Ponty's judgement, serve the world. The Church should not be a "sacred depository" that makes us break off "human relationships and the ties of life and history" because the Church is supposed to hold "the secrets of life and the instruments of salvation." The Church should not sunder our relationships with "the earth of existence" and "actual society" but should instead deepen them in working toward a deeper immanence of God in the life of humanity.[207] The properly (if not exclusively) Christian "deeper way of living" is the sacrificial life in which we are not released from the "pact of history … with the persecuted of tomorrow" but rather find God "hidden in the sufferings of the persecuted."[208] Service should be so fundamental to the Christian Church that it would think "God will not fully have come to the earth until the Church feels the same obligation toward other men as it does toward its own ministers."[209]

In the Church Fathers, the Church is seen as working in the world to bring about peace among former enemies. This peace

comes at least in part, as Irenaeus writes, in helping others acquire "righteous habits by the grace of God" and "changing their wild and untamed nature" so that those "of unlike races" who might be at odds with each other might yet be "of like dispositions."[210] The earthly goal of the Church is that the nations be, as Augustine writes, "bound in common human brotherhood."[211] We help others to love each other, Maximus writes, by encouraging them to love God, to imitate God in agapeic being, in loving all equally,[212] for "the one who loves God cannot help but love also every man as himself."[213]

Basil of Caesarea recognizes, however, that even within the Church confusion and discord can dominate. As he writes, "the love of many has waxed cold; brotherly concord is destroyed, the very name of unity is ignored, brotherly admonitions are heard no more, nowhere is there Christian pity, nowhere falls the tear of sympathy" and an "evil rivalry … possesses our souls."[214] In the world and within the Church, "all the great grievances with which human society abounds in the misery of this mortal state" are present—arising, as Augustine writes, from a love of power that splits people "from each other by clashing wills and desires."[215]

As love "harmonizes whatever is related by nature" and "gathers together what has been separated,"[216] the Church is to be an exemplar of love that brings about harmony and peace.[217] Abstaining from such lust for rule and war, the Church should be manifest in suffering and yet multiplying. For, as Augustine writes, "it was not given to them to fight for their eternal salvation except by despising their temporal salvation for their Saviour's sake."[218] True justice comes about when, as Maximus writes, "the law of grace teaches those who follow it directly to imitate God himself, who, if I may rightly say so, loves us, his virtual enemies because of sin."[219]

That peace that is sought is, as Augustine writes, "a good so great, that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying."[220] The good society that the Church is to exemplify and help bring about, the City of God, is "a community of well-ordered concord" where virtue brings about peace—"a harmonious collection of individuals" that are "bound together in harmony and peace by the ties of relationship."[221] The good life, the most properly human life, is exemplified by the social

life of a city.[222] Such a harmonious network of relations should be, as Merleau-Ponty would say, a good dialectic that maintains an irreducible tension, "a relation of being between"[223] to become, as Augustine writes, a "rational and well-ordered concord of diverse sounds in harmonious variety."[224] The progressive work of love leading to concord is ordered eschatologically toward "the supreme good of the city of God" as "unbroken," "perfect and eternal peace"—"the peace of freedom from all evil, in which the immortals ever abide."[225] In this "true peace," no one will "suffer opposition either from himself or any other."[226]

In Merleau-Ponty's thought, the other is given bodily such that it is through our bodies that one haunts and is haunted by others.[227] We partake of a common, intercorporeal being as a kind of anonymous existence, inhabiting many bodies: "the world and the others become our flesh."[228] The common world comes about from "a mediation through reversal," a seeing of something "in the eyes of others" and thus forming a unity between my world and that of others.[229] This reversal opens a field, replacing a "me-other rivalry" in which there are "positive subjectivities" with a co-functioning, an "inaugural there is."[230] Merleau-Ponty recognizes that humans have a primordial sympathy or being-with such that the experience of the other "tears me away from my lone self and creates instead a mixture of myself and the other."[231]

For Christians, the Church is the Body of Christ. Though Christians are, as Irenaeus writes, "scattered throughout the whole world," they have unity in the preaching and teaching of the Church.[232] As the Body of Christ, our bodies are "members of Christ,"[233] joined to Christ "to be in him as members of his body."[234] Through Christ, Christians are to be, as Augustine writes, "fused somehow into one spirit in the furnace of charity" and "bound in the fellowship of the same love."[235]

In the Church, God is "taken up in the tissue of carnal things" and is manifest as present in the world.[236] The Church, through our fleshly bodies, is the visible presence of the invisibly present God.[237] The Church is the temple of God "built up of the saints who were created by the uncreated God."[238]

Finally, the Church as a community of love is a community united with God. As Augustine writes, with "one and the same charity we love God and neighbor; but God on God's account, ourselves and neighbor also on God's account"[239] The end of

human social being is for self, others, and God to be in harmony—
to be, as Maximus puts it, "radiantly established as one."[240] This
kind of love is thus to bring about a kind of "angelic life on earth,
fasting and being watchful and singing psalms and praying and
always thinking good of everyone."[241] Maximus writes:

> God and man are paradigms one of another, that as much as
> God is humanized to man through love for mankind, so much is
> man able to be deified to God through love, and that as much as
> man is caught up by God to what is known in his mind, so much
> does man manifest God, who is invisible by nature, through the
> virtues.[242]

8.3.3 Baptism and the Eucharist

In the transition from the world of living corporality to the
corporate or social world of the distinctively human, Merleau-
Ponty sees acts of communication as "transfiguring" the body,
giving it an enigmatic nature—"secreting" a "sense."[243] In this
transfiguration the body becomes thought—expressing and partici-
pating in thought. For many Christians, the sacraments of baptism
and the Eucharist are symbolic actions that are neither merely
intention nor merely fact, but the more distinctively human activity
of "making values become facts."[244] Through these symbolic acts
one enters into a reality beyond oneself. Merleau-Ponty writes:

> Sacramental words and gestures are not simply the embodiment
> of some thought. Like tangible things, they are themselves the
> carriers of their meaning, which is inseparable from its material
> form. They do not evoke the idea of God: they are the vehicle of
> His presence and action.[245]

Baptism is one of the central symbolic and sacramental acts of
the Christian faith. It is not merely the separable external form
expressing an "inner" spiritual meaning. It both initiates and
incarnates a new reality. In the baptismal act—an act at once
material, bodily and social—we enter into a renewed and on-going
relationship with God with the fullness of our embodied and
intercorporeal humanity. Baptism is a microcosm of the newly

initiated life of participation between us (baptism as our faithful act)[246] and God (baptism as God's gracious act). In baptism, we are regenerated,[247] beginning a "second life" with death as a "mediator." As Basil of Caesarea writes, "the water receiving the body as in a tomb figures death"—our dying to the life-destroying habits of our old life—from which we are born again in the Spirit who is "renewing our souls from the deadness of sin unto their original life."[248] Basil writes: "This then is what it is to be born again of water and of the Spirit, the being made dead being effected in the water, while our life is wrought in us through the Spirit."[249]

Maximus presents baptism as a second birth, a birth to well-being by which one is born willingly and adopted by God in the Spirit.[250] This well-being is at once a gift and the initiation of an imitative activity depending on one's own "inclination and motion"; in this well-being there is "added to the natural beauty of the image the voluntary good of likeness."[251]

Turning to the sacrament of the Eucharist, Merleau-Ponty sees the flesh as a site for the making visible of what is invisible. "The flesh," Merleau-Ponty writes, is the "*Urpräsentierbarkeit* of the *Nichturpräsentierten* as such, the visibility of the invisible."[252] The visible is the flesh that makes fundamentally accessible that which is not presented, that which is other. The visible "is pregnant with" the invisible, having within itself "an invisible inner framework," an "interior armature," which is revealed and concealed by the visible.[253]

In the Eucharist the bread and wine receive the "Word of God," and through them we have communion (*koinonia*) with the body and blood of Christ (1 Cor. 10.16).[254] As the bread and wine is taken in and changed into the nature of the human body, so does Christ take in our nature and change it into something divine.[255] We are nourished and built up as members of Christ through the Eucharist.[256] The Eucharist is then, as Thomas writes, "spiritual food" that "changes man into itself."[257]

The Eucharist makes present to us Christ's passion, which makes possible our communion with God and foreshadows "the Divine fruition" of this communion.[258] Also, as Augustine writes, in the Eucharist "we, being many, are one body in Christ."[259] The Church is united, becomes the body of Christ, in its participation in Christ. With the Eucharist, the Church becomes one in Christ in offering herself to Christ and in Christ offering himself to her; we

thus come into communion with Christ and in Christ with God.[260] Augustine writes: "The whole redeemed city, that is to say, the congregation or community of the saints, is offered to God as our sacrifice through the great High Priest, who offered Himself to God in His passion for us, that we might be members of this glorious head, according to the form of a servant."[261] In physically partaking of the bread and the wine that "are" the body and the blood of Christ who is God become flesh, we participate in and celebrate creation and redemption as divine gifts—as material, living, social, and, in Christ, divine—and we do so in a manner that is material (with physical emblems), living (as food to be metabolized), social (for we are given and receive as the Church gathered locally and universally), and divine (in communion with Christ). In this way, the Eucharist enacts the entire movement of Creation—from the material to the living to the human—toward its consummation in Christ as God become human and in the Spirit as the Gift of God to the world, drawing the world through humanity as summed up in Christ unto the Father.

NOTES

Preface

1 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 74.
2 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 12.

Chapter 1

1 Lawlor and Toadvine, *The Merleau-Ponty Reader*, 447–8; Silverman and Barry, "Introduction: Philosopher at Work!" xiv–xvii; Baldwin, introduction, 1–6; Silverman, preface, xxxvi–xxxix; Matthews, *Merleau-Ponty*, 1–4.
2 Speigelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 528.
3 Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 392.
4 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 12, 188, 197.
5 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 194, 197–8.
6 Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 392.
7 Speigelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 517; Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 22.
8 Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 392–3.
9 Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 393; Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 23.
10 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 20.
11 Speigelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 530.
12 Speigelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 530–1.
13 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 32, 208.
14 Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 516.
15 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 167.

16 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 167.

17 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 194.

18 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 188.

19 Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 168.

20 Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 397–9; Schrift, *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy*, 168.

21 Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 399.

22 Morris, *Starting with Merleau-Ponty*, xiii; "Maurice Merleau-Ponty," *Encyclopedia of World Biography*.

23 "Maurice Merleau-Ponty," *Encyclopedia of World Biography*.

24 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxi.

25 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxi.

26 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 94.

27 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 51; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 165.

28 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii.

29 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxviii.

30 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii, 23.

31 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 28; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71.

32 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 164; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71–2.

33 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 17.

34 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 67.

35 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxxiv.

36 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxx, 128–9; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 75.

37 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 105.

38 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 167.

39 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 75; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 18.

40 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 39.

41 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 41, 43–4, 51.

42 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 16, 22.

43 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 160–1; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 93; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 38.

44 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 57; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 88.

45 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxxi.

46 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxxv; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 59.

47 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 73, 105.

48 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 419, Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 88; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 151, 225, 239.

49 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 106, 108; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 232.

50 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxxv; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 49.

51 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 39–40, 365.

52 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 41; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 103.

53 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 181; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 25–6.

54 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 3.

55 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 24.

56 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 41, 254.

57 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 24.

58 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 25–6; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 90, 124. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 21: "The functional relation they state has meaning only at their level; it has no explicative force with regard to higher levels."

59 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 25.

60 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 256.

61 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 103; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 4.

62 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 41, 254.

63 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 34–6.

64 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 43, 227.

65 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 33.

66 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 24.

67 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 10.

68 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 50; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 18.

69 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 15.

70 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 56.

71 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 15.

72 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 126; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 54.

73 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 22–3, 35.

74 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 45.

75 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 197; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 128.

76 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 15.

77 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 99, 147.

78 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 16; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 57; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 102.

79 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 85: "Science is not an unmotivated instance. We have to psychoanalyze science, purify it. Scientific consciousness lives in the natural attitude, as Husserl said, and it ignores Nature because it is there: it is a naive and uncritical enjoyment of the natural certitude … Its concept of Nature is often only an idol to which the scientist makes sacrifices, the reasons for which are due more to affective motivations than to scientific givens."

80 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 197; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 37.

81 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 57. The Cartesian "mind/body" problem comes from seeing the human body as a thing and not a living body. The "mind/body" problem is that it is actually a "mind/thing" problem.

82 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 167.

83 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 137, 91.

84 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 91; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 108.

85 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 201.

86 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 177, 234; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 36; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

87 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 7.

88 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 201.

89 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 212, 220.

90 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 217.

91 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 217, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 169, 176, 250.

92 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210.

93 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 57; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 67–8.

94 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 217; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 169, 176, 250.

95 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 57.

96 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 67–8.

97 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 74.

98 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 204.

99 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208.

100 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 57; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 250.

101 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 67–8; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210.

102 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 172, 176; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 228.

103 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 23–4.

104 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 6; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 228; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 169, 211.

105 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 57. In his later thought, Merleau-Ponty began to make a distinction within the broader order of human between the human body and the more social linguisitic logos. See *The Visible and the Invisible*, 167, 169.

106 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 108.

107 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 268.

108 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 108; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 214, 220.

109 E.g. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 128; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 48; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 172–3.

110 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 20; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 177, 234.

111 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 27.

112 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 52, 55; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 7.

113 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 153.

114 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 177.

115 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 72.

116 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 66.

117 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 181.

118 Rota, "'Fundierung' as a Logical Concept," 73–4.

119 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 128–9.

120 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 136, 148; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 68; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 27.

121 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 9; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 146, 177; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 55.

122 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 153.

123 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 214. Rota, "'Fundierung' as a Logical Concept," 73: "It is awkward to admit that what matters most, namely, functions, is *unselbsständig*; we might feel more comfortable if we succeeded in *reducing* functions to *selbsständig* facticities."

124 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 136, 148; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 202–3, 456; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 177.

125 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 124–5; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 458.

126 Rota, "'Fundierung' as a Logical Concept," 73.

127 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414. Rota, "'Fundierung' as a Logical Concept," 75: "Western philosophy, haunted as it is by a *reductionist anxiety*, has refused to face up to the consequences of taking *Fundierung* seriously. The history of philosophy is riddled with attempts, some of them extremely subtle, to reduce *Fundierung*-relations to 'something else' that will satisfy

our demands for a certification of *existence*. We find it inadmissable that 'unreal' functions should turn out to *matter*, rather than 'real' objects or neurons in people's brains."

128 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 200; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210, 217.

129 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 180; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 128; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210, 214.

130 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 129; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 52.

131 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 173: "'Transcendence' is the name we shall give to this movement by which existence takes up for itself and transforms a *de facto* situation."

132 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 7; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 167; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

133 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 207.

134 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 72; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 173.

135 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 181; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 177.

136 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 180.

137 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 54.

138 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 21, 181.

139 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 124–5. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414: "The founding term (time, the unreflected, fact, language, perception) is primary in the sense that the founded term is presented as a determination or a making explicit of the founding term, which prevents the founded term from ever fully absorbing the founding term."

140 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 21; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 268.

141 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210.

142 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 55.

143 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414.

144 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 202; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 173.

145 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 266.

146 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 159–60.

147   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 225.

148   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 119.

149   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 145.

150   Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 156–7.

151   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 212; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 203.

152   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 262.

153   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 54.

154   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 95; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 44.

155   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 207; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 9; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 51.

156   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 145, 154–5.

157   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 79.

158   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 23, 54; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 95.

159   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 12, 58–9.

160   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 11, 25–7.

161   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 8–10, 12–13.

162   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 11, 77; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 40–1.

163   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 36, 40–1, 77.

164   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 11, 13, 24.

165   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 165, 175.

166   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 93–4.

167   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 94, 165.

168   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 119. This parallels William Desmond's "dialectical" sense of being. See Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 131–75.

169   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 278.

170   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 279; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 119; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 157–8. This parallels William Desmond's "metaxological" sense of being. See Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 177–222.

171   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 93–4.

172 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 94.

173 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 94–5, 264.

174 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 167.

175 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 212, 220, 228.

176 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 263; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 72; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 149.

177 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 147; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 220. Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 126: "All being that has a meaning for us is to be conceived on the basis of the perceived world."

178 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 151, 251.

179 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 126–7, 251.

180 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 212, 220.

181 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 220, 228; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 107.

182 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 373; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210, 217, 229–30.

183 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 108; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 212.

184 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 84, 234.

185 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 47, 51.

186 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 142. Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 91: "Each moment in it is determined by the grouping of the other moments, and their respective value depends on a state of total equilibrium the formula of which is an intrinsic character of 'form.'"

Chapter 2

1 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 174; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 66.

2 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 65–6.

3 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 10; *Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 93.

4   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 3; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 177, 212.

5   Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 74.

6   Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 67–8; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 4.

7   Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 68.

8   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 125; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 267.

9   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, xvi–xvii, 207; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 32; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 58–9.

10 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 3, 125; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 267.

11 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 26, 334, 456.

12 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 15.

13 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 242.

14 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 345.

15 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 288, 326; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 178.

16 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 64–5, 83.

17 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 62.

18 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 69; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 8.

19 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 10; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 27.

20 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 91.

21 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 26.

22 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 4.

23 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 46.

24 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 8–9.

25 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 4–5, 9, 20.

26 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 455.

27 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 26.

28 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 227. See Goldstein, *The Organism*.

29 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 124–5.

30 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 177, 210.

31 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 455.

32 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 207.

33 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 153.

34 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 17: "No precise limit between organization and life (Bergson)."

35 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 150.

36 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 91.

37 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 13; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 146.

38 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 33.

39 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 21; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 163.

40 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 21, 32.

41 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 68, 79, 88; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 4.

42 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 455–6.

43 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 213.

44 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 121–2, 208, 217, 238.

45 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 207, 213.

46 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 177.

47 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 65.

48 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 58, 93; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 164.

49 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 50.

50 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 14, 26, 44.

51 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 150.

52 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 145.

53 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 153.

54 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 6; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 283.

55 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 117.

56 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 21.

57 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 146.

58   Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 64;
     Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 17.

59   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 46, 150; Merleau-Ponty,
     Nature, 140.

60   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 93, 107.

61   Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 75.

62   Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 7.

63   Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 122.

64   Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 298.

65   Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France
     1952–1960, 95.

66   Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 15; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*,
     167.

67   Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 73–4, 76; Merleau-Ponty,
     Nature, 146.

68   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 146; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of
     Perception*, 4.

69   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 167.

70   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 209, 216, 221; Merleau-Ponty,
     Phenomenology of Perception, 295.

71   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 40.

72   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 147.

73   Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France
     1952–1960, 41; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 167–8.

74   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 162.

75   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 167–8, 172–3.

76   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 104.

77   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 109–10.

78   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 105.

79   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 3.

80   Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 173.

81   Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France
     1952–1960, 95; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 18;
     Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 176. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 125: "Man and
     society are not exactly outside of nature and the biological; they
     distinguish themselves from them by bringing nature's "stakes"
     together and risking them all together."

82 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 93.

83 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 43.

Chapter 3

1 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 25; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 300.

2 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 44.

3 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 214; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 27.

4 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 226–7; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 214.

5 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 64.

6 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 69; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 429: "One day, and indeed once and for all, something was set in motion that, even during sleep, can no longer cease seeing or not seeing, sensing or not sensing, suffering or being happy, thinking or resting, in a word, that can no longer cease 'having it out' with the world."

7 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 452, 480.

8 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 16.

9 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 121–2, 273.

10 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 86.

11 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 267; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 128–9.

12 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 268, 271.

13 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 89, 224.

14 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 55–6, 89–90; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 214.

15 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 126, 480; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 129; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 32, 37.

16 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 216.

17 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 66; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 4.

18 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 272.

19 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 55–6, 78.

20 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 21, 256.

21 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 8, 28.

22 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 8, 237. This places Merleau-Ponty squarely in the anti-reductionist position described by Thomas Nagel in *Mind and Cosmos*.

23 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 8, 231, 261.

24 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 4, 8–9; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 204.

25 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 206.

26 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 50, 317, 326.

27 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 345–6; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 171.

28 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 23, 294.

29 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxiii.

30 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 36; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 93; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 360.

31 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxiv: "The real is a tightly woven fabric; it does not wait for our judgments in order to incorporate the most surprising of phenomena, nor to reject the most convincing of our imaginings."

32 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 6.

33 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 360. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 36: "To reduce perception to the thought of perceiving, under the pretext that immanence alone is sure, is to take out an insurance against doubt whose premiums are more onerous than the loss for which it is to indemnify us."

34 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxviii.

35 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 309.

36 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii.

37 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 102.

38 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 343.

39 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 214.

40 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 309; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 40.

41 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 162; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 310.

42 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 419; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 15; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 40.

43 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 338; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 41.

44 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 129.

45 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 72.

46 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 152.

47 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 148, 172–3; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 72.

48 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 35, 223.

49 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 217.

50 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 317–18, 345, 348–9.

51 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 293, 429.

52 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 55; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxii.

53 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 61; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 49.

54 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxii; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 51. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 3: "What Saint Augustine said of time—that it is perfectly familiar to each, but that none of us can explain it to the others—must be said of the world."

55 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 483.

56 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxiv, 99, 311; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 123–4.

57 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 58; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 123.

58 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 5, 311.

59 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 124–5.

60 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 99.

61 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 221–2.

62 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 3.

63 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 167, 212.

64 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 203–4.

65 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 317–18.

66 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 451; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 50; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 48.

67 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 261.

68 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 334, 342.

69 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 345.

70 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 431.

71 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 122.

72 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 278; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 105.

73 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 86, 102.

74 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 27, 152; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 99.

75 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71.

76 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 75, 208.

77 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 261–2, 316.

78 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 80, 366.

79 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 148, 155, 213.

80 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 341.

81 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 74, 306.

82 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 147.

83 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 291.

84 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 310–11.

85 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 78; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 38–39.

86 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 78.

87 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 242, 275.

88 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 80; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 229; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 38–9.

89 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 83.

90 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 84, 330; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 127.

91 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 140, 146; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 93; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 278–9.

92 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 74; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 167; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71.

93 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 94–5.

94 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 340–1.

95 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 146, 292, 296.

96 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 147; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 217, 222.

97 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 216.

98 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 28; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 214.

99 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 209.

100 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 196; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 243; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 5; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 222.

101 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 265.

102 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 306–7.

103 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 264.

104 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 86, 224.

105 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 100.

106 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 260; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 5; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 7; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 74.

107 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 164–5.

108 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 117.

109 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 100–2; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 5, 117, 122; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 51; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 209, 223.

110 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 241; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 117.

111 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 205: The body is "always rooted in nature at the very moment it is transformed by culture."

112 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 204–5; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 127.

113 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 56, 66; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 304.

114 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 304, 328, 334; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 4; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 74.

115 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 304.

116 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 166.

117 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 63.

118 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 225.

119 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 156.

120 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 158.

121 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 218–19, 225.

122 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 171–2.

123 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210.

124 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 147–8.

125 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 196; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 36.

126 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 165; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 81.

127 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 143–4.

128 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 145–6; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210.

129 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 148; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 162.

130 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 247.

131 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 84; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 85; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71.

132 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 93; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 40.

133 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 140–1, 325.

134 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 145.

135 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 209.

136 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 27; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 224.

137 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 138, 248.

138 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 81.

139 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 140, 147.

140 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 186.

141 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 139, 147. Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 223: "This that-is-openness to things, with participation on their part, or which carries them in its circuit, is properly the flesh."

142 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 135, 259–60.

143 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 16.

144 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 244; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 218.

145 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 244, 248

146 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 245, 248; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 53.

147 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 138.

148 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 16.

149 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 163.

150 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210–11; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 138.

151 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 9, 127, 225.

152 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 209, 217, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 142.

153 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 217, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 143.

154 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 141–2.

155 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 62.

156 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 93.

157 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 317.

158 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 453–4; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 128–9.

159 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxx; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 123–4; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 4.

160 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxiv, 427–8.

161 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 137.

162 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 34.

163 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 53, 57.

164 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 41.

165 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 81, 82.

166 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 105; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 42.

167 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 457; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 38–9.

168 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 336, 358–9, 431; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 82.

169 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 274, 311, 343; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 3, 11–14, 23, 28.

170 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 251; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 163; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 5.

171 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 54.

172 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 3.

173 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 358, 420; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 179.

174 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 11, 13, 42.

175 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 28; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 179.

176 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 79.

177 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 311, 343.

178 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 360, 417; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 13.

179 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 14, 18, 23; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 302.

180 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 28, 103.

181 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 172.

182 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 195; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 50.

183 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 252, 288, 293, 302.

184 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 287–8.

185 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 360.

186 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 4; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 106; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 214; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 22.

187 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 362; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 198.

188 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 21; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 402; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 56.

189 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 13; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 9.

190 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 124; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 5.

191 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxxv.

192 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 21.

193 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 261.

194 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 263–4.

195 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 271.

196 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 209, 218.

197 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 12.

198 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208.

199 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 21.

200 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 130–1.

201 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 134–5, 139; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 173.

202 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 138, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 162.

203 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 209.

204 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 209, 215; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 217.

205 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 268.

206 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 12.

207 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 215.

208 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 187.

209 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 149, 180.

210 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 228, 246.

211 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 149, 209, 215–16.

212 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 268; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 137, 255.

213 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 215, 217.

214 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 217.

215 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 143; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 20–1.

216 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 218, 272–3.

217 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 212; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 136–8, 147, 152.

218 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 14, 27, 145, 199; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210. Merleau-Ponty observes that the invisible here that corresponds to some degree with Sartre's "nothingness" (Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 258).

219 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 212.

220 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 215, 218.

221 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 150–1.

222 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 268.

223 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 149.

224 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 261.

225 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 151, 212.

226 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 152.

227 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 227–8; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 149, 215.

228 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 118, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 162.

229 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 12.

230 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 243.

231 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 180; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 242–3.

232 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 202.

233 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 28, 83; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 367.

234 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 7; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 259.

235 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 94.

236 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 79, 162.

237 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 140, 218.

238 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 202, 210; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 90.

239 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 209. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 90: "There is no single movement in a living body that is an absolute accident with regard to psychical

intentions and no single psychical act that has not found at least its germ or its general outline in physiological dispositions."

240 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 53.

241 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208.

242 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 168.

243 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 272–3; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 86–7, 91.

244 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 218; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 234.

245 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 202.

246 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 78.

247 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 249, 455.

248 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 261.

249 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 163–4, 176.

250 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 176.

251 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 250.

252 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 5; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 269.

253 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 321; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 178; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 238.

254 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 404, 455, 482.

255 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 482.

256 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 483.

257 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 368; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 64; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 147.

258 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 333; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 58; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 63.

259 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 78.

260 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 66–7.

261 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 91, 181, 184; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 7.

262 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 199.

263 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 173–4; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 4.

264 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 7; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 199.

265 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 70.

266 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 7.

267 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 181.

268 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 181, 202, 207.

269 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 4, 7.

270 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 131, 336.

271 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 52, 59.

272 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 128; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 66.

273 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 163.

274 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 56.

275 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 83: "Neither end nor means, always involved in matters which go beyond it, always jealous nevertheless of its autonomy, it is powerful enough to oppose itself to any end which is merely deliberate, but it has none to propose to us if we finally turn toward it and consult it."

Chapter 4

1 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 21.

2 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 145.

3 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 481.

4 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 189.

5 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 368.

6 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 61; Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 32.

7 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 135.

8 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 135, 137.

9 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 134.

10 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 68; Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 5.

11 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 8.

12 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 8.

13 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 240.

14 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 25.

15 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

16 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 137.

17 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 82; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 108: "Trapped in this circle, human existence can never abstract from itself in order to gain access to the naked truth; it merely has the capacity to progress towards the objective and does not possess objectivity in fully-fledged form."

18 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 49; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 381.

19 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 116; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 13–14.

20 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvi.

21 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 387.

22 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 184; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 11.

23 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 138; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 188.

24 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 425.

25 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 108.

26 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 78.

27 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 483.

28 After presenting *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty stated: "My works in preparation aim to show how communication with others, and thought, take up and go beyond the realm of perception which initiated us to the truth" (Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 3).

29 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 41.

30 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 94.

31 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 95; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 17.

32 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 97–8; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 49.

33 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 159.

34 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 93.

35 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 37; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 86.

36 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 89–90.

37 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 83; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 93.

38 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 161.

39 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 229.

40 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 370; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 211.

41 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 9.

42 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 200, 369; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 140.

43 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 225; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 11.

44 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 200.

45 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 99; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 19.

46 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 19; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 140. As I write this on a cool Fall morning in Lincoln, Illinois, I am watching a series of cars in a funeral procession pass by my house from Holy Family Catholic Church (across a parking lot from my porch). The departed life as not an isolated point but, even in death, within a train of significant others.

47 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 145; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 49.

48 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 119.

49 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 10.

50 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 377.

51 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 119–20; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 49; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 51.

52 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 430.

53 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 171.

54 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 311, 424.

55 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 83.

56 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 363–4.

57 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 209.

58 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 364, 369; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 226; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 18.

59 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 474.

60 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 18, 26; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 136, 143.

61 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 125; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 218.

62 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 180.

63 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 86; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 117.

64 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 117.

65 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 118; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 52.

66 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 169–70.

67 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 76.

68 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 118.

69 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 76; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 82; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 170, 172.

70 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 229.

71 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 123, 235; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 218.

72 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 15.

73 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 16.

74 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 125; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 218.

75 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 134–5.

76 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 371–2.

77 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 151.

78 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 39.

79 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 154.

80 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 118–19.

81 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 49.

82 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 21; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 12.

83　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 203.

84　Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 369, 373, 428.

85　Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 371; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 17.

86　Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 134; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 269.

87　Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 38.

88　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 13, 216; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 170.

89　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 221, 261.

90　Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 135.

91　Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 146.

92　Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 39.

93　Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 118.

94　Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 36.

95　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 143, 245.

96　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 142; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 171.

97　Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 175.

98　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 78.

99　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 142.

100　Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 279; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 47.

101　Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 154.

102　Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 74.

103　Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 225.

104　Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 373–4.

105　Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

106　Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 373.

107　Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 56; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 199.

108　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 263, 266.

109　Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 261.

110 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 214–15.

111 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 215, 239, 263.

112 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 203.

113 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 244.

114 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 466; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 68; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 269.

115 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 408; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 13, 93.

116 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 144; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 18.

117 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 173; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 273; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 141.

118 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 172.

119 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 174.

120 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 162, 175.

121 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 17.

122 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 56; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 68; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 25.

123 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 87–8.

124 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 23–4; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 379.

125 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 90.

126 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 378, 457.

127 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 379.

128 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 118; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 152.

129 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 379; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 74.

130 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 478; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 175.

131 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 196.

132 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 6, 59, 74.

133 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 172–3.

134 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 167; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 474.

135 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 60–1.

136 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 97; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvi, 378.

137 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 47; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 175.

138 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 124–5; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 7.

139 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 125–6; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 309.

140 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 176.

141 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 146; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 426.

142 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 103–4.

143 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 180, 245.

144 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 9.

145 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 211, 219.

146 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 120, 122; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 54.

147 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 123; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 23–4.

148 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 123.

149 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 33–5.

150 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 35–6.

151 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 109; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 35.

152 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 37–8; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 134–5.

153 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 35–6.

154 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 36.

155 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 37–8.

156 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 411.

157 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 89; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 139; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 146.

158 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 154.

159 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 33.

160 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 23.

161 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 425.

162 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 104.

163 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 18, 45, 139.

164 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 42; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 14, 32.

165 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 43.

166 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 19.

167 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 19.

168 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

169 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 193.

170 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 211; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 171.

171 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 57, 62; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 94.

172 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 147, 211; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 99.

173 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 12; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 29.

174 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 227; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 93.

175 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

176 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 209.

177 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 14–15; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 94.

178 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 25; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 89.

179 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 88, 93.

180 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 235.

181 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 227; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 44.

182 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 212, 219.

183 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 96, 235.

184 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 39.

185 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 194; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 38.

186 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 163; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 3, 50, 90.

187 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 23.

188 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 214, 224.

189 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 17–18.

190 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 83; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 232; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 140.

191 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 102.

192 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 195.

193 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 182–3.

194 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 188–9; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 8.

195 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 20.

196 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 89; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 257.

197 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 83.

198 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 89.

199 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 50, 77.

200 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 115.

201 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 90.

202 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 19.

203 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 4.

204 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 80, 82.

205 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 99.

206 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 42; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 219.

207 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 171, 178–9.

208 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 13.

209 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 9–10.

210 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 11–13.

211 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 422; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 13.

212 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 6.

213 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 116.

214 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 118, 144–5.

215 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 408; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 84.

216 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 17–18.

217 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 154.

218 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 109; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 89.

219 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 42.

220 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 4.

221 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 5–7.

222 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 181.

223 Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, 96; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 36.

224 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 85; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 23.

225 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 87; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 55.

226 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 43.

227 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 96; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 50.

228 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 164.

229 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 88.

230 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 12.

231 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 46; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 91.

232 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 44; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 119.

233 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 31.

234 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 144.

235 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 189.

236 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 54–5.

237 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 24, 97.

238 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 31; Merleau-Ponty, Signs, 19.

239 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 54.

240 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 50.

241 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 8.

242 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 17.

243 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 50–1.

244 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 87; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 39.

245 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 14, 17.

246 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 43.

247 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 37, 41; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 81.

248 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 141.

249 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 68; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 370.

250 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 13; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 139.

251 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 73; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 139–40.

252 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 13, 14, 17.

253 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 338; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 194.

254 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 133.

255 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 454.

256 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 153; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 143.

257 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 8, 55; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 58.

258 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 56; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 51.

259 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 140.

260 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 56; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 42, 46.

261 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 77; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 4.

262 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 29.

263 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 37. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 88: "All the signs together allude to a signification which is always in abeyance when they are considered singly, and which I go beyond them toward without their ever containing it."

264 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 96.

265 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 215–16.

266 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 224, 236.

267 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 6; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 10.

268 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 10.

269 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 428.

270 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 181.

271 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 71.

272 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 184.

273 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 93.

274 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 94.

275 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 63; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 13. Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 50: "If we wished to suppose other laws of a superhuman thought, either divine or angelic, then in order to find any meaning in these new principles, we would have to bring them under ours."

276 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 16.

277 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 23.

278 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 18.

279 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 19; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 44.

280 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 13.

281 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 76.

282 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 39–40.

283 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 7–8.

284 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 10.

285 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 41, 43.

286 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 42.

287 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 47.

288 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 22, 76.

289 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 57.

290 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 22.

291 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 22–3.

292 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 24, 53.

293 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 24, 54.

294 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 221–2.

295 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 225.

296 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 5.

297 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 41–2.

298 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 21; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 26.

299 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 199, 363.

300 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71.

301 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 24–5.

302 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 91; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 114; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 227–8.

303 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 153, 180, 212, 229.

304 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 228; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 474; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 40: "The same creative capacity which is at work in imagination and in ideation is present, in germ, in the first human perception."

305 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 29.

306 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 40.

307 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 180; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 227.

308 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 96–7.

309 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 143; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 118–19.

310 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 25, 65, 67.

311 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 234.

312 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 227: "A town, for whomever shares the history of it, is full of meaning—or a figure—but for whomever does not participate in it, it is meaningless."

313 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 118–19, 153.

314 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 119.

315 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 153, 167, 172; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 307.

316 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 363–4; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 35.

317 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 363.

318 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 69.

319 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 40; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 41–2.

320 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 86–7.

321 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 75.

322 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 92; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 141; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 54.

323 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 53.

324 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 54.

325 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 58; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 6–7.

326 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 148, 154.

327 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 101; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 212.

328 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 212.

329 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 93.

330 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 25. This reported to be a response to Sartre's "Hell is other people." (Speigelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 821).

331 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 19–20.

332 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 84. This image is reminiscent of Teilhard's noosphere.

333 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 25, 90.

334 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 90, 174.

335 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 474; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 9; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 20.

336 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 475; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 20.

337 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414. Deleuze and Guattari make a similar point in *What is Philosophy?*—that ideas have a "made by" tag.

338 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 90.

339 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 88–9.

340 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 109.

341 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 51.

342 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 57–8.

343 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 101.

344 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 6–7; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 74.

345 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 28–9.

346 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 428.

347 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 101–2.

348 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 134.

349 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 125.

350 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 19; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 133–4.

351 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 457.

352 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 224.

353 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 297.

354 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 174.

355 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 19–20, 32.

356 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 413.

357 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 67; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, xvi.

358 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 28.

359 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 482; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 52.

360 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 89; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 52.

361 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 95.

362 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 18; Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 41.

363 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 482.

364 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 32.

365 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 483.

366 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 59.

367 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70.

368 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 31.

369 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 7, 474.

370 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 159; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 413.

371 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 379.

372 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 457.

373 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 35.

374 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 80.

375 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 81, 101; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 35.

376 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 100–1.

377 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 28–9.

378 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 81.

379 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 101; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 24–5. Merleau-Ponty, in this regard, brings attention to how speech is susceptible to pathology. See Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 17.

380 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 131.

381 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxxiv, 466.

382 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 26.

383 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 132.

384 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 466–7.

385 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 97; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 160; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 173.

386 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 26, 65.

387 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 413.

388 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 225.

389 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 54.

390 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 124.

391 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 160.

392 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 24.

393 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 109.

394 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 96.

395 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 96.

396 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 56.

397 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 102.

398 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 195.

399 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 195; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 174.

400 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 228.

401 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 429.

402 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 429–30.

403 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 269; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 5–7.

404 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 124.

405 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 223.

406 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 390, 402.

407 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 401.

408 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 54.

409 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 69.

410 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 396; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 131.

411 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 125; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 455, 459.

412 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 86–7.

413 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 432; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 15.

414 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 446; 452.

415 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 249, 442, 451.

416 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 348, 434, 457.

417 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 349, 362.

418 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 21.

419 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 118; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 25.

420 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 119.

421 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 119.

422 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 21: "Two things are certain about freedom: that we are never determined and yet that we never change, since, looking back on what we were, we can always find hints of what we have become."

423 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 408.

424 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 175.

425 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 176.

426 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 174.

427 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 24.

428 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 137, 463–4.

429 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 467.

430 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 460, 463.

431 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 94–5.

432 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 132, 138.

433 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 26; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 40.

434 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 155; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 49.

435 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 154.

436 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 40.

437 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

438 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 155.

439 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 241; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 89.

440 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 10; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 240.

441 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 412.

442 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 159–60.

443 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 160; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 38.

444 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 63.

445 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 94.

446 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 14.

447 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 411.

448 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 413.

449 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 73: "So the Hegelian dialectic is what we call by another name the phenomenon of expression, which gathers itself up and launches itself again through the mystery of rationality."

450 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 114–15.

451 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 364, 411.

452 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 53; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960,* 4.

453 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 150.

454 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 410; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 151.

455 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 152.

456 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 83–4.

457 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 89.

458 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 88; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 6–7.

459 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 6–7: "The historicity of an idea is the positing, through the living human, of a task which is not uniquely his, but one that echoes back to earlier foundations."

460 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 58.

461 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 410.

462 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 177–8.

463 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 36.

464 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxii.

465 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 226.

466 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 366, 456; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 160.

467 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 74. In this context, Merleau-Ponty refers to "'objective' thought (in Kierkegaard's sense)."

468 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 57. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxii: "Scientific perspectives according to which I am a moment of the world are always naïve and hypocritical because they always imply, without mentioning it, that other perspective—the perspective of consciousness—by which a world first arranges itself around me and begins to exist for me. To return to the things themselves is to return to this world prior to knowledge."

469 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 159.

470 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 411, 456.

471 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 85; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 159–60.

472 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 152, 197.

473 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 16, 24; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 15.

474 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 35.

475 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 261; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 69.

476 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 419.

477 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 272, 291.

478 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 21.

479 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 310–11.

480 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 382; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 10.

481 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 483.

482 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 28.

483 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 482–3.

484 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 483.

Chapter 5

1 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IX.Prologue.1,1.

2 His last working note for *The Visible and the Invisible* mentions theology (Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 274).

3 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 43, 45; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 142–1.

4 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 145–6.

5 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 44.

6 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 45.

7 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 46.

8 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 143.

9 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 146.

10 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 140, 143.

11 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 145.

12 Augustine, *The Trinity*, VII.4.12.

13 Burrell, "Philosophy," 35.

14 Burrell, "Philosophy," 36, 38. As Augustine writes: "My pen is on the watch against the sophistries of those who scorn the starting-point of faith, and allow themselves to be deceived through an unseasonable and misguided love of reason" (Augustine, *The Trinity*, I.1.1,1).

15 Burrell, "Philosophy," 36, 38, 39.

16 Burrell, "Philosophy," 36, 39. Burrell observes that Christian Theology "has found it opportune from the beginning to mine Hellenic modes of thought to elaborate its key doctrines of divine incarnation and triunity."

17 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IX.Prologue.1,1; Burrell, "Philosophy," 40.

18 Augustine, *The City of God*, 16.2; Burrell, "Philosophy," 34.

19 Burrell, "Philosophy," 36.

20 Burrell, "Philosophy," 37.

21 Burrell, "Philosophy," 37.

22 Simpson, *Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern*, 35–6.

23 Burrell, "Philosophy," 36–7. What is needful, Burrell writes, is "a conception of philosophy which is not inflated, which answers to its originating impulse of wonder while retaining a properly self-critical edge"(Burrell, "Philosophy," 40).

24 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii–lxxviii.

25 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxxv; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 49.

26 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 164; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71–2; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 17.

27 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 106, 108; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 232.

28 Simpson, *Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern*, 42–5.

29 Burrell, "Philosophy," 37.

30 Simpson, *Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern*, 96–7.

31 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.45.2; Burrell, "Philosophy," 38–9.

32 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

33 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1.

34 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 177; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1.

35 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 177.

36 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 141–2.

37 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27: "Nietzsche's idea that God is dead is already contained in the Christian idea of the death of God."

38 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 176.

39 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1.

40 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

41 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 26.

42 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1.

43 This phrase is likely from Pascal meaning a reversal or transformation, a swing from pro to contra.

44 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

45 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II.1.4; Kierkegaard, *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*, 235.

46 Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, 140; Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, 98.

47 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II.2.1; Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, 11, 34–5, 86; Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 52.

48 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II.1.5ad1, II-II.1.6ad1; Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, 52–4; Kierkegaard, *Practice in Christianity*, 76.

49 Kierkegaard, *The Moment and Late Writings*, 324; Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*, 18; Kierkegaard, *The Sickness unto Death*, 18.

50 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II.2.10.

51 Kierkegaard writes that one can only appropriate what belongs to another (Kierkegaard, *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*, 259).

52 Origen, *The Philocalia of Origen*, 13.

53 Origen, *The Philocalia of Origen*, 13; Augustine, *The Confessions*, VII.9,15.

54 Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 43, 135.

55 Burrell, *Faith and Freedom*, 120.

56 McCabe, *God Still Matters*, 3.

57 See Oden, *Classic Christianity*.

Chapter 6

1 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fifth Theological Oration*, Oration 31.8.

2 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 7.4.

3 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 242.

4 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 8–9.

5 Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 20.

6 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 176.

7 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 242; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 211.

8 Desmond, *Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness*, 99; Desmond, *God and the Between*, 252; Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 240.

9 Desmond, *Perplexity and Ultimacy*, 202.

10 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 347–8.

11 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 448.

12 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414, 438, 447; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 267.

13 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 177.

14 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 211.

15 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 68.

16 Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.4,4.

17 Augustine, *The Trinity*, VII.3.5,10.

18 Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, 45–6; Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death*, 99, 126.

19 Burrell, *Faith and Freedom*, 116, 135; Burrell, *Knowing the Unknowable God*, 2.

20 Burrell, *Knowing the Unknowable God*, 35.

21 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 1: On that which is according to the Image 5*.

22 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.16.3, II.30.9.

23 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.49 (Berthold 137).

24 *The Trial of Maximus*, 2 (Berthold 19); Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.19 (Berthold 37); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.26 (Louth 124).

25 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.4 (Berthold 129).

26 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, Introduction (Berthold 185); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.39 (Louth 139).

27 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, Introduction (Berthold 185); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts* II.14 (Prassas 155).

28 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 57); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.39 (Louth 139).

29 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.18. "I have failed to find anything in this world with which I might compare the divine nature" (Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fifth Theological Oration*, Oration 31.31).

30 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.26 (Louth 125); Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, Introduction (Berthold 185).

31 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 8.5.

32 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 1: On that which is according to the Image 5*; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, I.History of Moses, II.The Departure from Egypt, II.The Darkness; Augustine, *The City of God*, 17.5; Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.1 (Berthold 129), I.49 (Berthold 137), II.2 (Berthold 148); Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, Introduction (Berthold 186). "Let him, then, who boasts that he has grasped the knowledge of real existence, disclose to us awhile the nature of the ant, and then, and not till then, let him discourse on the nature of the power that surpasses all understanding" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 10.1).

33 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.5, 28.11, 28.17.

34 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.31d (Louth 133); see also Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 1: On that which*

is according to the Image 6. Maximus writes: "For the divine cannot be grasped by any reason or thought, nor do we grasp his being when we say that he is. For being is derived from him but he is not being. For he is beyond being itself, and beyond anything that is said or conceived of him, whether simply or in a certain way. But beings possess being in a certain way, and not simply, so that where they are is determined by their position and the natural limit of the *logoi*" (Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.39 (Louth 139)).

35 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.25.4, IV.19.2, IV.20.4.

36 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.17.

37 Gregory of Nyssa, *Not Three Gods*; Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 2.3.

38 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts* 173 (Prassas 128), 190 (Prassas 136–7).

39 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 19.3; Augustine, *The City of God*, 10.13; Augustine, *The Trinity*, II.3.9,16.

40 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 35.1.

41 Augustine, *The Trinity*, V.Prologue.1,2.

42 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.9.

43 Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, 116; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.20.6. As Maximus writes, even "the very fact of knowing nothing about him is to know beyond the mind's power" (Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.100 (Berthold 46)).

44 Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, xi, 11.

45 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 32.1.

46 Augustine, *The Trinity*, VIII.3.4,8.

47 Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, 15.

48 Burrell, *Knowing the Unknowable God*, 12–13, 15; Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, 15, 18.

49 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 47.

50 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 72–3; Desmond, *Perplexity and Ultimacy*, 111; Desmond, *Ethics and the Between*, 44.

51 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 47.

52 Gregory of Nyssa, *Not Three Gods*; Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 1.15; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, I.Prologue, II.Eternal Progress.

53 Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.3,3, VI.3,4.

54 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.18.

55 Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 9; Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, xi, 1, 13, 31.

56 Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, 19.

57 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, Introduction (Berthold 185); Maximus, *Ambigua* 10.31d (Louth 133), 71 (Louth 165); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts* 173 (Prassas 128).

58 Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.4,4; Augustine, *The City of God*, X.12.

59 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.20,39 (369).

60 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.36 (Louth 137); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 23 (Sherwood 47).

61 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.51 (Louth 153).

62 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 158–9).

63 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 71 (Louth 166).

64 John 5.26; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.13.9; Augustine, *The City of God*, XI.10; Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.2.5,7.

65 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.20.5, V.2.3, V.3.3; Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.36 (Berthold 155).

66 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, Introduction (Berthold 185).

67 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.38.3, IV.20.7; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 33.

68 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.6.

69 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.26; Augustine, *The Confessions*, III.6,11.

70 Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.6,10.

71 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.37.1.

72 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 1.2, 3.10; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 15.

73 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 5.2.

74 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fifth Theological Oration*, Oration 31.31, 31.32.

75 Augustine, *The City of God*, XII.17; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, I.5,10 (172); Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.4,4, XIII.2,2, XIII.4,5.

76   Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 375–6.

77   Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 373

78   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 84, 234.

79   Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 47, 51, 91.

80   Desmond, *God and the Between*, 109, 114.

81   Desmond, *God and the Between*, 5, 10, 117.

82   Maximus, *Ambiguum* 1 (Lollar 51).

83   Augustine, *The Trinity*, XIII.11,12. Irenaeus calls the triune relations "altogether indescribable" generations (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.28.6).

84   Augustine, *The Trinity*, VIII.1.2,3.

85   Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.5.20,30. He continues later, "in the supreme triad one is as much as three are together, and two are not more than one, and in themselves they are infinite. So they are each in each and all in each, and each in all and all in all, and all are one" (VI.2.10,12).

86   Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 438, 434.

87   Augustine, *The Trinity*, I.2.5,8; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 38.

88   Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 68.

89   Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 265.

90   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 217, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 169, 176, 250.

91   Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 67–8; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 4.

92   Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 74.

93   Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 65–6; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 3.

94   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 125; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 267.

95   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 133.

96   Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 8–9; Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 53.

97   Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.46.2; Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 21.

98   Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 11; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life*

of Moses, II.The Departure from Egypt; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.28.3.

99 McCabe, *God Still Matters*, 11.

100 Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 63.

101 Desmond, *Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness*, 242; Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 262.

102 Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, 33.

103 Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 261–2.

104 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.28.4, I.4.2, I.5.4.

105 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.10.4.

106 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 4.2.

107 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.38.3.

108 Desmond, *Perplexity and Ultimacy*, 133, 144, 196, 216–17.

109 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.4 (Berthold 129).

110 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 3.3.

111 Burrell, *Knowing the Unknowable God*, 15.

112 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.46.1.

113 Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 8.

114 Desmond, *Hegel's God*, 128–31.

115 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.37.1.

116 Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 263.

117 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 1 (Berthold 186).

118 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 1 (Berthold 187); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.1 (Blowers and Wilken 50–1).

119 Origen, *De Principiis*, 2.9.6.

120 Desmond, *God and the Between*, 291, 161, 307, 247.

121 Desmond, *Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness*, 191; Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 256, 261.

122 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 53; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

123 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1.

124 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 274; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 90; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 135.

125 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 204.

126 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 274.

127 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, I.8,14 (173). "Is there anything that exists at all, if not because of you?" (Augustine, *The Confessions*, XI.5,7).

128 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, I.8,14 (173); Augustine, *The Confessions*, IV.11,16.

129 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.13; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.14,31 (364).

130 Augustine, *The City of God*, XII.2, XXII.24; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, IV.12,23 (253), V.23,46 (300).

131 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, IV.12,23 (254); Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.2,2, I.6,10; Acts 17.28.

132 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, IV.12,23 (254); Augustine, *The City of God*, X.12; Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.4,4.

133 Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.4,4, I.3,3, II.1,1.

134 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 45.6.

135 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 12.3–4, 45.2.

136 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 43.3.

137 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 40.2.

138 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 29.5; Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 1.4.

139 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 42.3.

140 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 40.5, 42.4, 44.2.

141 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 41.3, 42.1.

142 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.30.9, IV.20.2, IV.20.6.

143 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 3.

144 Teilhard, *The Divine Milieu*, 83.

145 Teilhard, *The Divine Milieu*, 91.

146 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 55); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.49 (Berthold 137).

147 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, Introduction (Berthold 185).

148 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 54, 57); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Sherwood 58); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts* 173 (Prassas 128).

149 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 57).

150 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 161).

151 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 5 (Berthold 194).

152 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 88).

153 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 160–2); Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 60 (Blowers and Wilken 125).

154 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 58); Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 89).

155 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 28; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71.

156 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxxiv.

157 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 3–4, 125.

158 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 4.

159 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 15.

160 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 345.

161 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 1.1, 5.10, 7.4; Augustine, *The Confessions*, XI.5,7.

162 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 28; Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, II.15 (Berthold 48).

163 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 1.6.

164 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 4.6, 6.2, 7.5.

165 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 6.1, 9.4.

166 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 1.2, 1.11, 8.7; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 1; Augustine, *The City of God*, XI.4; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, V.21,42 (297).

167 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 1.5.

168 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 5.3, 5.9, 6.11.

169 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, V.22,43 (298).

170 Augustine, *The City of God*, XI.22, XI.23, XII.4, XII.5, XVI.8; Augustine, *The Confessions*, IV.14,24; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 89.

171 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 6.1.

172 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 7.6.

173 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 1.11; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 1.

174 Augustine, *The City of God*, XI.19.

175 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.12, XXII.24; Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.1.2,4.

176 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, III.16,25 (231), III.24,37 (240).

177 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 1.7.

178 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 44.2.

179 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 28.3, 35.4, 36.1, 38.1, 42.1; Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 2.2.

180 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.25.2.

181 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 1 (Berthold 186), 2 (Berthold 188–9), 7 (Berthold 197); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.40 (Louth 141); Maximus, *Opuscule* 6 (Blowers and Wilken 173).

182 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 6.

183 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 2.2; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*.

184 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 1 (Berthold 186).

185 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, V.20,41 (297); Augustine, *The City of God*, V.14.

186 Augustine, *The Confessions*, IV.10,15.

187 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, I.8,14 (174).

188 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, III.16,25 (231).

189 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, IV.33,52 (272).

190 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.13,23 (314).

191 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii–lxxviii.

192 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 69; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 8.

193 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 9.

194 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 9.

195 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 10.

196 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 10.

197 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 126–7.

198 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 134.

199 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 74, 96–7.

200 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 133.

201 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 198.

202 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 201.

203 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 6.11; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.3; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection;* Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 1.22; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, II.The Mountain

of Divine Knowledge; Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 7 (Berthold 197); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 156–7).

204 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 2 (Berthold 188–9).

205 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2*: On the human being, 12.

206 Augustine, *The City of God*, VII.26.

207 Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 4 (Berthold 111).

208 Augustine, *The City of God*, XI.4; Augustine, *The City of God*, X.12; Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.8,15.

209 Desmond, "Wording the Between," 224; Desmond, *God and the Between*, 8, 32–3, 108.

210 Augustine, *The Confessions*, XI.4,6; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 12.

211 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, II.15 (Berthold 48); Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 1.

212 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.91.3; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.28.3.

213 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.20.2.

214 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.22.1.

215 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2: On the human being*, 12.

216 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.28.1; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.59.1.

217 Teilhard, *The Divine Milieu*, 34.

218 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 24.

219 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 73, 105.

220 Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 73.

221 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 5.3, 5.7.

222 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 5.8.

223 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2: On the human being* 4, *Discourse 1: On that which is according to the Image* 2.

224 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.9.1, II.16.3, IV.20.7.

225 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, summary, 12.

226 Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 72.

227 Augustine, *The City of God*, XXII.24, XXII.30.

228 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.26.1.

229 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 1.11, 5.2, 5.9, 8.7.

230 Augustine, *The Confessions*, IV.12,18, V.1,1; Maximus, *Questions and Doubts* 44 (Prassas 68).

231 Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.6,9. See also IX.10,25 in which the things of the world say to the astonished one "We did not make ourselves; he made us who abides for ever."

232 Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.34,53.

233 Maximus, *Ambigua* 10.18 (Louth 110), 10.23 (Louth 123), 10.31e (Louth 133), 10.35 (Louth 136–7).

234 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.23 (Louth 123).

235 Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 218, 222; Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.6,8, XI.4,6.

236 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.25.3.

237 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 89); Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.96 (Berthold 45–6).

238 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, III.24 (Berthold 64), III.99 (Berthold 75), IV.7 (Berthold 76).

239 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 68.

240 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 74.

241 Burrell, *Knowing the Unknowable God*, 29.

242 Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas*, 29.

243 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.8 (Berthold 130); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.31b (Louth 132); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.2.1.

244 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 41.

245 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 90; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 135; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 274.

246 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 204; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 274.

247 Teilhard, *The Divine Milieu*, 119.

248 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 202; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 173.

249 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 33.

250 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, III.18.7.

251 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.1.3.

252 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 32.

253 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 22.

254 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 32.

255 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 159).

256 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 66).

257 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts* 118 (Prassas 104).

258 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts* 64 (Prassas 77); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 70–1).

259 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Blowers and Wilken 80–1).

260 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 60 (Blowers and Wilken 124).

261 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 160).

262 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 60 (Blowers and Wilken 125).

263 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 55).

264 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 159).

265 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.33.4.

266 Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 2 (Berthold 103).

267 Teilhard, *The Divine Milieu*, 119.

268 Teilhard, *The Divine Milieu*, 123.

269 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 47.

270 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 53.

271 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

272 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies,* II.31.1.

273 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.19.2.

274 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 3.

275 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.1.2, II.30.9, IV.20.2, IV.20.6.

276 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 25.

277 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 1.22; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 12.9.

278 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 1.22, 8.5; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Faith*; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 12.10; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 6; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, II.The Burning Bush.

279 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 12.

280   Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 8.5.

281   Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 6.

282   Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 23; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fifth Theological Oration*, Oration 31.29.

283   Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 55); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.49 (Berthold 137).

284   Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, Introduction (Berthold 185).

285   Augustine, *The City of God*, XII.2.

286   Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.14,31 (364).

287   Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.2,2, I.6,10, I.7,12; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, IV.12,23 (254).

288   Augustine, *The City of God*, X.15.

289   Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.3,3, I.4,4.

290   Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, lxxvii.

291   Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 164; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 71–2.

292   Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 17.

293   Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 242.

294   Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 46; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

295   Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 145.

296   Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.3 (Louth 102); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.10 (Berthold 130).

297   See also Augustine, *The City of God*, X.18, XII.1.

298   Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.42 (Louth 144).

299   Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 2 (Blowers and Wilken 100).

300   Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 2 (Blowers and Wilken 99); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 17; Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.42 (Louth 144). Likewise Irenaeus and Basil approach the world with posture of gratitude, seeing nature as "the object of continual care," as sustained and provided for (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.38.4; Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 9.5; Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 8).

301   See Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 19.1.

302   Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.94 (Berthold 45), III.69 (Berthold 70).

303   Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 64 (Prassas 77–8).

304   Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.19 (Louth 112–13).

305 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.19 (Louth 113–14).

306 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.19 (Louth 115).

307 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.32 (Louth 134).

308 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 71 (Louth 164).

309 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.3 (Louth 100–1), 10.19 (Louth 115); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 64 (Prassas 78).

310 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 45.6.

311 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 88); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 54).

312 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 55).

313 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 5 (Berthold 194).

314 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.3 (Louth 101).

315 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 91).

316 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 66).

Chapter 7

1 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 217; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 169, 176, 250.

2 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 177.

3 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 207.

4 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 213, 217.

5 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 177, 208.

6 Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 70, 120; McCabe, *God Matters*, 10.

7 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.13.9.

8 Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 68.

9 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.38.3.

10 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.2.3.

11 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.20.7.

12 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.38.3.

13 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.20.5.

14 Irenaeus writes, "in [the times of] the end, the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, having become united with the ancient substance of Adam's formation, rendered man living and perfect, receptive of the perfect Father" (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.1.3).

15 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.20.7.

16 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 33.

17 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.3.3.

18 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 46.

19 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 21; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 163.

20 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 13; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 146.

21 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 68; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 6.

22 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 4–5, 93, 124–5; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 455–6.

23 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 122; Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, 73.

24 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 145.

25 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 6; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 283.

26 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.13.

27 Origen, *De Principiis*, 2.8.1–2; Augustine, *The City of God*, VII.29; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.4,6 (304).

28 Augustine, *The City of God*, VII.19, VIII.11; Augustine, *The Trinity*, VI.2.6,8; Augustine, *The Confessions*, IV.10,15.

29 Augustine, *The City of God*, XII.5; Augustine, *The Confessions*, IV.11,16, VII.12,18 .

30 Basil of Caesarea, O*n the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2: On the human being*, 14.

31 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 28.

32 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 8.3; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 29.3; Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 7.2.

33 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 27.9.

34 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 28.

35 Basil of Caesarea, O*n the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 1: On that which is according to the Image*, 13.

36 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.26.1, IV.9.3.

37 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, II.28.1.

38 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.6, 28.16.

39 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 2.3.

40 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 5.5.

41 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 9.3, 9.4.

42 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 5.10; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.6.

43 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.13.

44 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 29.3, 29.8.

45 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 30.30.

46 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 2.1.

47 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 8.4.

48 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*.

49 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*: "They dawn first in the fœtus, in the shape of the power of nutrition and of development: after that, they introduce into the organism that has come into the light the gift of perception: then, when this is reached, they manifest a certain measure of the reasoning faculty, like the fruit of some matured plant, not growing all of it at once, but in a continuous progress along with the shooting up of that plant."

50 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 8.5, 8.7, 14.2. Gregory proposes, when it comes to humans, "using, the word 'body' for the nutritive part, and denoting the sensitive by the word 'soul,' and the intellectual by 'spirit.'" (Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 8.5).

51 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208.

52 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 455.

53 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 16.

54 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 214; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 27.

55 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210; Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 67–8.

56 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 261–2, 316.

57 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 81, 82.

58 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The First Theological Oration*, Oration 27.7; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 6.

59 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 30.4.

60 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.2.3; Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 13.

61 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, I.9.3; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 11, 32.

62 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2: On the human being*, 2, 12, 13.

63 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2: On the human being*, 2.

64 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2: On the human being*, 3–4.

65 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, IV.38.4.

66 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 27.9.

67 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 13.1.

68 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 4.5–6, 5.1.

69 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.3.3; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 11.

70 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 30.7.

71 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 6; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, I.Prologue.

72 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.21.

73 Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.4.11,21–2.

74 Augustine, *The Trinity*, X.3.9,12.

75 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.6.1.

76 Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 924.

77 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.6.1; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 2.

78 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.22.

79 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 174.

80 Augustine, *The Trinity*, XIII.6.19,24.

81 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 5.3.

82 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 141–2.

83 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

84 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 177.

85 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 137–8.

86 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27.

87 Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas*, 33; Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, xi–xii.

88 Augustine, *The Trinity*, II.2.5,7.

89 Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 6 (Berthold 118); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.24 (Berthold 152); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Blowers and Wilken 80–1); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 71 (Louth 167).

90 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 30.

91 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 3 (Lollar 55).

92 McCabe, *God Still Matters*, 39; Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 63.

93 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 1.1.

94 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 71 (Louth 164).

95 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 162).

96 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 11.

97 Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, 23, 26, 34; Burrell, *Knowing the Unknowable God*, 88–9; Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 60–1.

98 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Third Theological Oration*, Oration 29.18.

99 Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.3.11,20; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 34.

100 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Third Theological Oration*, Oration 29.19. There was "left no part of our nature which He did not take upon Himself" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 2.13).

101 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.13.

102 Augustine, *The Trinity*, I.3.7,14, II.1.1,2, VII.2.3,5.

103 Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.3.11,20.

104 Maximus, *Ambigua* 3 (Lollar 55), 4 (Lollar 60).

105 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 3 (Lollar 56); Maximus, *Opuscule* 7 (Louth 185).

106 Maximus, *Opuscule* 7 (Louth 182); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 2 (Lollar 53).

107 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Blowers and Wilken 84).

108 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 35 (Prassas 62); *The Trial of Maximus*, 9 (Berthold 24).

109 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 2 (Lollar 52).

110 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 4 (Lollar 60).

111 Maximus, *Opuscule* 3 (Louth 197); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Blowers and Wilken 83). Christ "unites both natures in His own identity." (Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 35).

112 Maximus, *Opuscule* 3 (Louth 193).

113 Maximus, *Opuscule* 7 (Louth 183).

114 Maximus, *Opuscule* 6 (Blowers and Wilken 174).

115 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 15.

116 Augustine, *The Trinity*, I.4.13,28; Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 54.3.

117 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 15.7, 43.2.

118 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 54.3.

119 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 61 (Blowers and Wilken 141). On Kierkegaard's Christology as reflecting this dual portrait of Gift and Guide, see Simpson, *The Truth is the Way*, 128–61.

120 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 14.8, 16.5; Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 34.3, 47.1–2; Augustine, *The Trinity*, II.2.5,9, IV.5.20,32.

121 *The Trial of Maximus*, 2 (Berthold 19).

122 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 61 (Blowers and Wilken 141); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.23 (Berthold 152).

123 Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 2 (Berthold 103); Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 15.7, 43.2.

124 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.1.1,2, XIII.4.10,13.

125 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 15.7.

126 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 61 (Blowers and Wilken 141).

127 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 43.2.

128 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 16.5, 54.3.

129 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.21.

130 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The First Letter to Cledonius*, Letter 101.4.

131 Augustine, *The City of God*, XI.2.

132 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 266.

133 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 137–8.

134 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 41.

135 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 74.

136 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 34, 38.

137 "For since from man it was that death prevailed over men, for this cause conversely, by the Word of God being made man has come about the destruction of death and the resurrection of life." (Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 10.5, 13.7–9, 27.1).

138 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 6.1, 6.2.

139 Augustine, *The Trinity*, I.4.13,28.

140 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 20.5; Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.1.3,6.

141 Augustine, *The Trinity*, XIII.4.13,17, XIII.4.14,18, XIII.5.16,21, XIII.5.18,23; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 62.

142 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 42 (Blowers and Wilken 121).

143 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 1.4, 5.1, 7.1, 13.7–9; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.20,31 (319), VI.24,35 (321).

144 Maximus, *Ambigua* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 70–1), 41 (Louth 156), 42 (Blowers and Wilken 81); Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 21 (Blowers and Wilken 112–13), 42 (Blowers and Wilken 120–1); Maximus, *Opuscule* 3 (Louth 194); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 62 (Prassas 76); Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 5 (Berthold 192).

145 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 10.1, 15.7; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The First Letter to Cledonius*, Letter 101.5; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 8

146 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 93 (Prassas 93).

147 Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 2 (Berthold 104).

148 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 87).

149 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 10, 15; Augustine, *The City of God*, X.24, X.27, X.32, XIII.15, XIII.18, XV.1; Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.1.2,4, IV.4.18,24, XV.3.8,14.

150 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 103 (Prassas 97).

151 Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, II.The Heavenly Tabernacle.

152 Augustine, *The City of God*, X.24, XXI.15.

153 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.21.

154 Maximus, *Opuscule* 7 (Louth 184).

155 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 89–91).

156 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 36–7; Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 5.4; Augustine, *The City of God*, IX.15.

157 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.77 (Berthold 164); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 4 (Lollar 59); Augustine, *The City of God*, XXI.15.

158 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 6.2; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.14; Augustine, *The City of God*, XXI.15.

159 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 8 (Sherwood 30), 42 (Sherwood 57).

160 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 61 (Blowers and Wilken 136–7).

161 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 61 (Blowers and Wilken 134).

162 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 61 (Blowers and Wilken 135–8).

163 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 61 (Blowers and Wilken 140).

164 Augustine, *The City of God*, X.32.

165 Augustine, *The Trinity*, II.6.17,29.

166 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Blowers and Wilken 88–9); Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 10.5, 21.1.

167 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 64 (Blowers and Wilken 166); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Sherwood 59).

168 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 30.1.

169 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 39; Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.66 (Berthold 139–40).

170 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 38.

171 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1.

172 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 27, 46; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1.

173 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 274.

174 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 200; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210, 217.

175 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 180; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 128; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210, 214.

176 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 7; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 167; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

177 Augustine, *The City of God*, X.29, X.32; Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.2.8,12; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.33.4.

178 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 91).

179 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 4 (Lollar 60).

180 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 9.2.

181 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 31.

182 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, III.18.7, IV.20.4; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Third Theological Oration*, Oration 29.19; Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 6.2; Augustine, *The City of God*, IX.15.

183 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 4 (Lollar 60); Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 60 (Blowers and Wilken 124).

184 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, III.25 (Berthold 64); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Sherwood 57); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* III,1 (Prassas 156–7).

185 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, IV.90 (Berthold 85); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.13 (Berthold 131).

186 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 15.

187 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.3.12,15

188 Augustine, *The Trinity*, VII.2.3,5.

189 Augustine, *The City of God*, XI.2.

190 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.4.18,24, VII.2.3,5.

191 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 23; Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 60).

192 McCabe, *God Still Matters*, 7: "Because we are given a share in the life of Christ, because we are filled with the Spirit, because we have grace, we are divine, and, like Christ, we are beloved of God."

193 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 9.

194 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.19.

195 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Second Theological Oration*, Oration 28.17.

196 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 60); Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 90); Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 64 (Blowers and Wilken 169): "The more he himself became a man by nature in his incarnation, the more he deified us by grace."

197 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.33.4; Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 54.3, Augustine, *The City of God*, IX.15, XXI.16. Athanasius, *Life of Anthony*, 74: "He took a human body for the salvation and well-being of man, that having shared in human birth He might make man partake in the divine and spiritual nature."

198 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Third Theological Oration*, Oration 29.19.

199 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 70–1); Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 60 (Blowers and Wilken 128).

200 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 22 (Blowers and Wilken 115, 118), 60 (Blowers and Wilken 124, 127).

201 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 4 (Lollar 60).

202 Maximus, *Ambigua 3,* 36 (Lollar 56, Sherwood 53).

203 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 90); Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, Oration 30.6.

204 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.21 (Berthold 152).

205 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts*, 61 (Prassas 76); Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 22 (Blowers and Wilken 118). Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 11: This is "to be made bright and luminous himself in the communion of the real Light."

206 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.39.2, V.1.3; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 1.

207 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 6.

208 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, II.52 (Berthold 54); Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 6 (Berthold 118); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 48 (Sherwood 64).

209 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.38.4; Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 60).

210 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.38.3.

211 Origen, *De Principiis*, 3.6.6.

212 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 74.

213 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 175.

214 Origen, *De Principiis*, 2.2.1, 2.3.3, 2.4.3

215 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.2.2–3.

216 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.7.2.

217 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.3.2–3; Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 21.1.

218 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 2.13.

219 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIII.24; Augustine, *The Trinity*, V.1.3,6; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 41.

220 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 16, 25; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, II.The Priestly Vestments.

221 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 27.2, 27.5; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection.*

222 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 17.2; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 8.

223 Augustine, *The City of God*, I.12; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 88–9. Augustine, *The City of God*, XXII.12: "of all these, the most difficult question is, into whose body that flesh shall return which has been eaten and assimilated by another man constrained by hunger to use it so; for it has been converted into the flesh of the man who used it as his nutriment, and it filled up those losses of flesh which famine had produced."

224 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIII.23. Such a body is not "burdensome" and capable of "almost spontaneous movement" (Augustine, *The City of God*, I.12, X.29, XIII.18, XIII.24, XIV.3).

225 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 9.2; Athanasius, *Life of Anthony*, 16; Augustine, *The City of God*, XIII.18.

226 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 44.6; Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.10.

227 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 18.9.

228 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Sherwood 57, Blowers and Wilken 88–9).

229 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.87 (Berthold 145).

230 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 4 (Lollar 59); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 19 (Prassas 53).

231 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.3 (Blowers and Wilken 63).

232 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 13; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 146.

233 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 150.

234 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.13 (Berthold 131); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 65 (Sherwood 67); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* III,1 (Prassas 156-157).

235 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Sherwood 57); Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, IV.90 (Berthold 85).

236 Maximus, *Ambigua* 10.3 (Louth 102), 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 59).

237 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge,* III.24, III.27 (Berthold 64-65).

238 Maximus, *Ambigua* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 58-59), 10.51 (Louth 154).

239 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Sherwood 57); Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.6.1: "receiving the similitude through the Spirit."

240 Maximus, *Ambigua* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 60), 42 (Blowers and Wilken 60).

241 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 58-59).

242 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Sherwood 57, Blowers and Wilken 88-89, 94). Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 15: "the water receiving the body as in a tomb figures death, while the Spirit pours in the quickening power."

243 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.6.1; Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 5 (Berthold 118).

244 1 Cor. 6.19; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.6.2; Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 8; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.28,39 (323).

245 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 9.

246 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 15; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fifth Theological Oration*, Oration 31.30; Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 5 (Berthold 118).

247 Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 4, 5 (Berthold 109, 118); Augustine, *The Trinity*, II.2.5,8-10, IV.5.20,29, V.4.16,17, XV.5.18,32.

248 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 16; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Holy Spirit against the followers of Macedonius*; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Holy Trinity and of the Godhead of the Holy Spirit*.

249 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 15, 24; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fifth Theological Oration*, Oration 31.28; Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 13; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*.

250 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 61 (Blowers and Wilken 142).

251 Augustine, *The Confessions*, I.5,6, IV.11,16; Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 45 (Prassas 69).

252 Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.5.18,32; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 117; Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.6,8.

253 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.1.3,6; Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 19 (Prassas 53); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.70 (Berthold 162).

254 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 86-87); Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 64 (Blowers and Wilken 152).

255 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIII.20; Augustine, *The City of God*, XIV.1, 4; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, X.14,24 (412).

256 Augustine, *The City of God*, XXII.21.

257 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 4 (Lollar 59); Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 21 (Blowers and Wilken 113).

258 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 66).

259 Maximus, *Ambigua* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 58-59), 10.16 (Louth 108); Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.42 (Berthold 39).

260 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.100 (Berthold 180).

261 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 173 (Prassas 128).

262 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 137–8.

263 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 154–5.

264 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 200; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 74.

265 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.65 (Berthold 42).

266 Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 20.

267 Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 8, 16, 18, 22; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, II.The Royal Way; Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 27 (Prassas 57).

268 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.16 (Louth 108).

269 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, IV.45 (Berthold 80).

270 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 89).

271 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.58 (Berthold 138).

272 Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 9.

273 Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, I.Prologue.

274 Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 18.

275 Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, intro; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great*

Catechetical Oration, 21; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, II.Eternal Progress.

276 Origen, *De Principiis*, 2.11.1.

277 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 2.3–4; Athanasius, *Life of Anthony*, 14.

278 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.4–5 (Berthold 36); Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 6 (Berthold 119); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.12 (Louth 107).

279 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 18.4: "All the particular forms that proceed from the want of reason in brute nature become vice by the evil use of the mind."

280 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 18.5.

281 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 8 (Prassas 46).

282 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.29 (Berthold 154).

283 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.34 (Berthold 155).

284 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.17 (Louth 109); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 41 (Prassas 67).

285 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.27, I.34, II.57, III.50 (Berthold 38, 55, 68); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts*, I,1 (Prassas 141).

286 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, III.67, III.71, III.98 (Berthold 70, 71, 75).

287 Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.9 (Berthold 149); Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 4 (Berthold 112); Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, IV.2 (Berthold 75).

288 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.3 (Louth 101).

289 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 58–9).

290 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 66); Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 4 (Berthold 116).

291 "The soul is moved reasonably when its concupiscible element is qualified by self-mastery, its irascible element cleaves to love and turns away from hate, and the rational element lives with God through prayer and spiritual contemplation" (Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, IV.15 (Berthold 77)).

292 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 64 (Blowers and Wilken 168).

293 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 88).

294 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.92, III.1, IV.44,

IV.91 (Berthold 45, 61, 80, 85); Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, 4 (Berthold 114); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* I,68 (Prassas 150).

295 Augustine, *The City of God*, XV.22; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 117, 121.

296 Augustine, *The City of God*, I.10, XI.25, XIX.13–14; Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.4.18, 24, IX.2.7,13, XI.3.4,10; Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.40,65, II.6,13.

297 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIV.7, XV.22; Augustine, *The Trinity*, XII.3.12, 17, XIV.4.14,18; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VIII.14,31 (364); Augustine, *The Confessions*, II.5,10, V.4,7; Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, III.50 (Berthold 68).

Chapter 8

1 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 83; Something of this is echoed when Augustine writes of those "who have gotten into the habit of limiting their conscious awareness to what they perceive with the senses of the body" (Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, X.24, 40 (424)).

2 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 24, 181; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 25–6.

3 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 55–6, 89–90; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208, 214.

4 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 149.

5 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 28, 83; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 367.

6 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 79, 162.

7 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 181.

8 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 243.

9 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 53; Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 209.

10 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 168: "The life of the human body cannot be described without it becoming a psycho-physical body."

11 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 163.

12 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Holy Trinity and of the Godhead of the Holy Spirit*.

13 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIII.24, XIV.4, XXII.4; Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.1.1,3, V.1.4,5.

14 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIII.24; Augustine, *The Trinity*, II.2.5,9, IX.1.2,2, IX.2.10,16; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.11,19 (312), VII.19,25 (335); Augustine, *The Confessions*, III.6,11.

15 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, I.9.3, V.3.2; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 11; Augustine, *The City of God*, XIII.3, XIII.24.

16 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 15.3.

17 Maximus, *Ambigua* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 66, 72–3), 41 (Sherwood 57). Bodies were thus not found for souls in punishment of evil. Gregory makes the same point, stating that "the point of commencement of existence is one and the same for body and soul" (Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*).

18 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 72).

19 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Blowers and Wilken 87, Sherwood 57). Sherwood comments: "Maximus' doctrine is clearly not in the Platonic stream represented by Nemesius and Leontius of Byzantium, for whom the soul is a complete substance without any necessary relation to the body" (Sherwood 60).

20 Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite*, 113.

21 Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, 47.

22 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 217.

23 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 153.

24 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 9; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 146, 177; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 55.

25 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 27.

26 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 177; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 140, 218.

27 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 163–4, 176; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 215, 218.

28 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 150–1.

29 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 202.

30 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 212; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 136–8, 147, 152.

31 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 12.

32 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 8.7; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*.

33 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 8.5.

34 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 8.4, 8.5.

35 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*: "Scripture informs us that the Deity proceeded by a sort of graduated and ordered advance to the creation of man. After the foundations of the universe were laid, as the history records, man did not appear on the earth at once; but the creation of the brutes preceded his, and the plants preceded them. Thereby Scripture shows that the vital forces blended with the world of matter according to a gradation; first, it infused itself into insensate nature; and in continuation of this advanced into the sentient world; and then ascended to intelligent and rational beings."

36 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 8.5.

37 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 2.1, 8.4, 8.7. "Perfect bodily life is seen in the rational" (8.4).

38 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 6. Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.8,13 (308–309): God in creation was "establishing as it were in the seed or root of all times the man still to be formed in his own due time."

39 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VII.15, 21 (333), VII.18,24 (335), VII.20,26 (336); Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 1: On that which is according to the Image* 7–8, 18–19.

40 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*.

41 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210.

42 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 210; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 78.

43 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 151, 212.

44 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 414.

45 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 152.

46 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 33.

47 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 94.

48 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 143–4.

49 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 218; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 234.

50 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 21, 181.

51 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 21; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 268.

52 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 321, 483; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 178; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 238.

53 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 91, 181, 184; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 7.

54 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 199.

55 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 66; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 4.

56 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 136, 148; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 202–3, 456; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 177.

57 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 180; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 128; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210, 214.

58 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 368; Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 64; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 147.

59 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 200; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 210, 217.

60 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 124–5; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 458.

61 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 173–4; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 4.

62 Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite*, 113.

63 Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, 47.

64 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.29, 40 (323).

65 Augustine, *Soliloquies*, I; Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.17, 26.

66 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.29, 40 (323), VIII.21, 40 (369).

67 Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.2.7, 13, V.Prologue.1, 2.

68 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 9. 6.

69 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 11.2.

70 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VII.21, 30 (338).

71 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VII.21, 30 (338), VII.28, 43 (345).

72 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.7.1; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VII.12, 19 (332).

73 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Blowers and Wilken 87); Augustine, *The City of God*, X.15; Augustine, *The Trinity*, II.3.8, 14; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, X.3,5 (401), X.14,24 (412).

74 Augustine, *The City of God*, X.12, XIX.13; Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.8,15; Augustine, *The Trinity*, XIV.4.14,19.

75 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 30.4, 31.1, 31.5; Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.Prologue.1,1.

76 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 31.2: Man is "not impelled toward what he sees merely, but judges by thought what he sees with his eyes."

77 Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, II.Birth and Childhood.

78 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity*, *Discourse 1: On that which is according to the Image*, 7.

79 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 31.4, 32.2, 43.2; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 12.8.

80 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 31.5, 33.

81 Augustine, *The Confessions*, X.17,26.

82 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 6.1.

83 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 1: On that which is according to the Image*, 3.

84 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 6.11, 7.5.

85 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 2.1.

86 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 2.2.

87 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 6.

88 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, III.24,36 (239); Augustine, *The Confessions*, VII.12,18.

89 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.3, 10.43 (Louth 101, 147).

90 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 16.9.

91 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 274.

92 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 181; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 177.

93 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 180.

 94 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 267; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 128–9.

 95 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 202; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 173.

 96 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 95; Merleau-Ponty, Institution and Passivity, 18.

 97 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 11; Basil of Caesarea, *On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2: On the human being*, 14; Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy,* 7 (Berthold 196); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 68).

 98 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 66).

 99 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Sherwood 55, Louth 156–7); Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 91).

100 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.26 (Louth 124); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 64 (Prassas 77).

101 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 41 (Louth 159–60).

102 Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 64 (Prassas 77).

103 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 208.

104 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 21.

105 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

106 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 6; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 228; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 169, 211.

107 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 225; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 11.

108 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 311, 424.

109 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 10.4.

110 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 8.4.

111 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, 8.2, 8.8.

112 Augustine, *The City of God*, XX.4, XXI.3.

113 Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 9.

114 Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 23.

115 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 54; *Merleau-Ponty, Signs*, 175.

116 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 172.

117 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 99; Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 19.

118 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 10.

119 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 38.

120 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 56; Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 68; Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 25.

121 Desmond, *God and the Between*, 191, 291.

122 Augustine, *The City of God*, XII.27, XIX.5, XIX.12.

123 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIV.4, XIX.17.

124 Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death*, 14.

125 Augustine, *The City of God*, XII.27, XIV.4, XIX.3.

126 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 483.

127 Maximus, *The Church's Mystagogy*, 7 (Berthold 197).

128 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 34.3; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, preface.

129 Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite*, 114.

130 Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite*, 170–1; McCabe, *God Still Matters*, 49–52; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, III.19, 29 (234).

131 Augustine, *The City of God*, XI.2, XI.26; Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, VI.12,22 (313); Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.5.20,30, XIV.3.8,11, IX.3.12,18.

132 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 175.

133 Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, 20.

134 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 142; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 171.

135 Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, 39.

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138 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.13–14.

139 Augustine, *The Trinity*, VIII.4.6,9.

140 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.17.

141 Basil of Caesarea, *The Hexæmeron*, 2.2.

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143 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 11, 25–7.

144 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 19–20, 32.

145 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 131.

146 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 225.

147 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 124.

148 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 160.

149 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 8–10, 12–13.

150 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 457.

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152 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 36, 40–1, 77.

153 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 11, 13, 24.

154 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 24, 54; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 482.

155 Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, 26, 65.

156 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 134.

157 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 68.

158 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 142.

159 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 73; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 67.

160 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 46.

161 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 6.9–10, 43.2; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Moses*, II.Birth and Childhood; Augustine, *The City of God*, X.14.

162 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 22, 60 (Blowers and Wilken 115, 118, 124, 127–8).

163 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 8.

164 Augustine, *The Confessions*, VI.5,8; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 4.

165 Augustine, *The City of God*, VII.32, XVIII.41.

166 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.1.1,2.

167 Augustine, *The City of God*, XVI.6; Augustine, *The Trinity*, I.1.1,2, II.3.9,16, II.5.15,25.

168 Augustine, *The City of God*, XV.25; Augustine, *The Trinity*, I.1.1,2.

169 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 482; Merleau-Ponty,

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170 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 89; Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 52; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 95.

171 Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 47.

172 Merleau-Ponty, *Institution and Passivity*, 11, 77; Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the* Collège de France *1952–1960*, 40–1.

173 *The Trial of Maximus*, 5 (Berthold 21); Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Holy Spirit against the followers of Macedonius*.

174 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, III.1.1. Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, 1.13: The apostles are "those men … on whom successively devolved the preaching of the mystery, whether they were from the first eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word, or, as successors to these, filled the whole world with the Evangelical doctrines, and again at various periods after this defined in a common assembly the ambiguities raised about the doctrine; whose traditions are constantly preserved in writing in the churches."

175 Origen, *De Principiis*, preface.4; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.33.8.

176 Athanasius, *Against the Heathen*, 1.3; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 39.

177 Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 12.3–4; Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.23 (Louth 123); Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 29.

178 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.26.2; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 3; Gregory of Nyssa, *Not Three Gods*; Gregory of Nyssa, *On Virginity*, 23; Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, III.58 (Berthold 69).

179 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, I.10.2, III.24.1, IV.26.2; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 86, 98.

180 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, III.1.1; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 41, 86.

181 Origen, *De Principiis*, 4.1.2; Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, 46.5.

182 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.26.5, V.preface; Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fifth Theological Oration*, Oration 31.25, 31.27.

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185 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 70–1.

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188 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 173; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 273; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 141.

189 Augustine, *The Trinity*, II.2.5,8, IV.5.20,29, V.4.16,17; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 117.

190 Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.5.18,32; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 117

191 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.6.1; Origen, *De Principiis*, 1.3.8, 1.7.5.

192 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.1.1.

193 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 7; Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Holy Spirit against the followers of Macedonius*: "As it is impossible to mount to the Father, unless our thoughts are exalted thither through the Son, so it is impossible also to say that Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit."

194 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 5.

195 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.38.1.

196 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.20.5, IV.38.3.

197 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.20.5.

198 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.Prologue.1.

199 Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fifth Theological Oration*, Oration 31.30.

200 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 16, 26.

201 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 4, 26.

202 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 64 (Blowers and Wilken 163).

203 Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, I.18,36 (185): "brooding over the water in the way birds brood over their eggs, where that warmth of the mother's body in some way also supports the forming of the chicks through a kind of influence of her own kind of love."

204 Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Holy Spirit against the followers of Macedonius*.

205 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 177.

206 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 69.

207 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 31; Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 242; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 137–8.

208 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, 224; Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, 31.

209 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 178.

210 Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 61, 72.

211 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.3.

212 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.51 (Louth 154); Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.24–25 (Berthold 38), IV.90 (Berthold 85).

213 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.13 (Berthold 37); Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 87).

214 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 30.

215 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.5, XIX.14; Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.2.9,12.

216 Maximus, *Commentary on the Our Father*, Prologue (Berthold 101); Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 88).

217 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, IV.36 (Berthold 79).

218 Augustine, *The City of God*, XXII.6.

219 Maximus, *Questiones Ad Thalassium*, 64 (Blowers and Wilken 169); Augustine, *The City of God*, II.21.

220 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.11.

221 Augustine, *The City of God*, I.15, XII.21, XIV.1, XIX.5, XIX.10, XIX.13–14

222 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.17.

223 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 278.

224 Augustine, *The City of God*, XVII.14.

225 Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX.20; Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 63.

226 Augustine, *The City of God*, XXII.30.

227 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 161.

228 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 370; Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 211.

229 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 214–15.

230 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 215, 239, 263.

231 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 154–5; Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 372.

232 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, I.10.2. "The doctrine of the apostles, and the ancient constitution of the Church throughout all the world, and the distinctive manifestation of the body of Christ according to the successions of the bishops, by which they have handed down that Church which exists in every place" (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV.33.8).

233 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.6.2.

234 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.4 (Blowers and Wilken 70); Maximus, *Questions and Doubts,* 173 (Prassas 128); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, II.84 (Berthold 165–6).

235 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.2.9,12.

236 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 76.

237 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.6.2; Irenaeus, *The Proof of The Apostolic Preaching*, 34; Augustine, *The Confessions*, VI.4,5.

238 Augustine, *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love*, 56.

239 Augustine, *The Trinity*, IV.3.10,13, VIII.5.8,12.

240 Maximus, *Letter* 2 (Louth 88); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 7.2 (Blowers and Wilken 58–59).

241 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, I.42 (Berthold 39).

242 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.3 (Louth 101).

243 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 203.

244 Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, 72.

245 Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 175.

246 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 12: "Faith and baptism are two kindred and inseparable ways of salvation: faith is perfected through baptism, baptism is established through faith, and both are completed by the same names."

247 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, I.21.1; Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 10.

248 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 15.

249 Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit*, 15.

250 Maximus, *Ambiguum* 42 (Sherwood 57, Blowers and Wilken 88–90, 94).

251 Maximus, *The Four Hundred Chapters on Love*, III.23 (Berthold 64), IV.90 (Berthold 85); Maximus, *Ambiguum* 10.3 (Louth 102); Maximus, *Chapters on Knowledge*, I.13 (Berthold 131).

252 Merleau-Ponty, *Nature*, 209, 215; Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 217.

253 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 149, 209, 215–16.

254 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.2.2–3.

255 Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Oration*, 37: "He disseminates Himself in every believer through that flesh, whose substance comes from bread and wine, blending Himself with the bodies of believers, to secure that, by this union with the immortal, man, too, may be a sharer in incorruption."

256 Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, V.2.3

257 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, III.73.1resp, III.73.3ad2.

258 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, III.73.4resp.

259 Augustine, *The City of God*, X.6.

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